Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155

• Decision Date: 03 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2–14–0098.,2–14–0098.
• Citation: 18 N.E.3d 149
• Parties: Jeff GURBA, The Louis A. Bianchi Revocable Trust, and the Jean M. Bianchi Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 155, Defendant (The Board of Education of Community High School District No. 155, Defendant and Third–Party Plaintiff–Appellant; The City of Crystal Lake, Third–Party Defendant–Appellee; and Leslie Schermerhorn, in Her Official Capacity as McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools, Third–Party Defendant–Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

18 N.E.3d 149

Jeff GURBA, The Louis A. Bianchi Revocable Trust, and the Jean M. Bianchi Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs–Appellees

v.COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 155, Defendant (The Board of Education of Community High School District No. 155, Defendant and Third–Party Plaintiff–Appellant; The City of Crystal Lake, Third–Party Defendant–Appellee; and Leslie Schermerhorn, in Her Official Capacity as McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools, Third–Party Defendant–Appellant).

No. 2–14–0098.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Sept. 3, 2014.

Michael G. Nerheim, State's Attorney, of Waukegan (Daniel L. Jasica and Carla N. Wyckoff, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant Leslie Schermerhorn.

Dean W. Krone, Robert E. Swain, Steven M. Richart, and Kerry P. Burnet, all of Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP, of Arlington Heights, for other appellants.

Victor P. Filippini, Jr., of Filippini Law Firm, LLP, of Glenview, for appellee City of Crystal Lake.

Michael R. Burney, of Schain, Burney, Banks & Kenny, Ltd., of Chicago, and Thomas R. Burney, of Zanck, Coen, Wright & Saladin, P.C., of Crystal Lake, for other appellees.

Brian D. Day and Roger Huebner, both of Illinois Municipal League, of Springfield, amicus curiae.

Laurie A. Reynolds, of University of Illinois College of Law, of Champaign, amicus curiae.

OPINION

Justice BIRKETT

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiffs here are Jeff Gurba, the Louis A. Bianchi Revocable Trust, and the Jean M. Bianchi Revocable Trust, property owners whose land is adjacent to the Crystal Lake South High School football stadium. The defendants are Community High School District No. 155 (the District), which is responsible for, among other things, the physical plant of Crystal Lake South, and the Board of Education of Community High School District No. 155 (the Board). Plaintiffs objected to the District's decision to build bleachers that violated the zoning and stormwater ordinances of the City of Crystal Lake (the City) by being too big, too high, and too close to the property line. The complaint spawned a third-party action filed by the Board against the City and Leslie Schermerhorn, in her capacity as the McHenry County regional superintendent of schools (the Superintendent). In short, the Board decided to reconstruct and relocate the home bleachers, but it did not notify the City or comply with the City's zoning ordinances, under which the Board would have been required to obtain a variance or special-use permit. The trial court held that the Board was subject to the City's zoning and stormwater ordinances, and the Board appeals, contending that the court's ruling represented an unconstitutional infringement on the Board's and the Superintendent's power. We disagree and affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The District operates several high schools located within both Lake and McHenry Counties. It serves the municipalities of Bull Valley, Burton's Ridge, Cary, Crystal Lake, Fox River Grove, Lake in the Hills, Lakewood, Oakwood Hills, Prairie Grove, and Ridgefield. In particular, the District operates Crystal Lake South, which is located within the City.

¶ 4 The controversy in this case arose from a failed structural inspection of the bleachers and the Board's decision to replace them. As part of the project, the Board decided to switch the home and visiting bleachers, moving the home bleachers to the side of the field that is adjacent to plaintiffs' property. The Board represents that repositioning the bleachers would improve the traffic flow inside the stadium. The Board avers that the bleachers are used for “school purposes[,] such as physical education classes and visitor seating for school events.”

¶ 5 The Board submitted its plans for the project to the Superintendent, who reviewed the plans and issued a building permit, pursuant to section 3–14.20 of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/3–14.20 (West 2012)

). The Board did not proceed under the City's zoning code or notify the City. The Board avers that the Superintendent was required to provide notice only if the City requested it and that the City never made that request.

¶ 6 While the bleacher project was underway, the City objected, maintaining that the project required a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances from the City. Under the City's zoning plan, the high school's campus is located in an R–2 (single-family home) district. The City maintained that its zoning restrictions applied to the project and that the home bleachers were limited to a height of 15 feet, a size of 600 square feet, and a minimum setback of 50 feet from the property line. The Board did not agree and did not change the project to comply with the City's zoning restrictions. The City then issued a stop-work order against the Board.

¶ 7 As the City and the Board's controversy was gearing up, plaintiffs sued the District and the Board, seeking to privately enforce the City's zoning and stormwater ordinances. The Board filed a third-party complaint against the City and the Superintendent, seeking a declaration that the project was not subject to the City's zoning or stormwater ordinances.

¶ 8 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the project was subject to the City's zoning and stormwater ordinances, and the Board timely appeals.¹

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, the Board argues that it is not subject to the City's zoning or stormwater-management ordinances.² The Board roots its contention in the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The Board argues that the constitution declares public education to be a matter of statewide concern and that the legislature, acting under a constitutional grant of plenary power over public education, has enacted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the field and has relegated to municipalities only a limited role. Based on this chain of reasoning, the Board contends that the City's zoning power stops at the boundary of property used for school purposes (and it makes the ancillary argument that the “school purposes” test or analysis is well established in the case law and is applicable to the controversy in this case). We follow the Board's general organization in presenting our opinion (constitutional support, statutory support, other considerations), but we do not fully agree with the contours of the Board's argument, so we set forth our analysis of each issue and then consider any particulars of the Board's contentions that have not been addressed in our analysis.

¶ 11 A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We begin with the overarching standard of review. This matter comes before us after the trial court ruled on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c)

(West 2012); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 130593, ¶ 15, 2014 WL 1775628. When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that no material factual issues exist and that only questions of law are presented. City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank & Trust Co., 364 Ill.App.3d 506, 510, 301 Ill.Dec. 135, 845 N.E.2d 1000 (2006). (Of course, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court is required to accept the parties' beliefs as to the existence of factual issues, and both courts remain free to determine the existence of a genuine factual issue sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. ) We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. G.M. Sign, 2014 IL App (2d) 130593, ¶ 15, 2014 WL 1775628. Likewise, we review de novo the construction of any statutes or ordinances, as it involves legal questions. Oakbrook Terrace, 364 Ill.App.3d at 510, 301 Ill.Dec. 135, 845 N.E.2d 1000.

¶ 13 B. Constitutional Underpinnings

¶ 14 The Board begins with some of the pertinent language from the Illinois Constitution regarding public education as well as municipalities' home-rule powers. As this is a good starting point, we will begin our analysis similarly. We keep in mind that, when discussing and interpreting a constitutional provision, we wish to discern the common understanding of those who ratified and gave life to the constitution. Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc.,

173 Ill.App.3d 953, 958, 123 Ill.Dec. 506, 527 N.E.2d 1281 (1988). This common understanding is best determined by looking at the common meaning of the words used in the provision. Id. Moreover, the rules of statutory interpretation are roughly applicable to interpreting a constitutional provision, and we are to strive to interpret a constitutional provision so as to promote its essential purpose. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to the constitution's public education provisions animating this dispute.

¶ 15 The Illinois Constitution contains an article devoted solely to education. Ill. Const. 1970, art. X. In section 1, article X

states, “A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1. To that end, the state government is tasked to “provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” Id. The Board points to these provisions, as well as those mandating the state to provide free public education through the secondary-school level and any other free education required by statute. Id. In addition to making these hortatory statements and assigning fiscal responsibility, the constitution created and empowered a State Board of Education to oversee the implementation of public education. Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 2. Notably, ...