Gustafson v. Comm'r of Human Servs., A15–1943.
| Citation | 884 N.W.2d 674 |
| Decision Date | 25 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. A15–1943.,A15–1943. |
| Parties | Jason Daniel GUSTAFSON, Relator, v. COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Patrick W. Michenfelder, Throndset Michenfelder, LLC, St. Michael, MN; and Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for relator.
Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Tim Sime, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by JOHNSON, Presiding Judge; STAUBER, Judge; and KIRK, Judge.
JOHNSON
, Judge.
Jason Daniel Gustafson's wife applied for a license to operate a child-care program in their home. The department of human services conducted a background study and disqualified Gustafson from having direct contact with or access to persons served by the child-care program until 2020 because he was convicted of criminal vehicular operation in 2003. After Gustafson requested reconsideration, the commissioner of human services upheld the disqualification but granted a variance that allows a license to issue so long as Gustafson abides by certain conditions. On appeal, Gustafson challenges his disqualification on the grounds that the statute authorizing his disqualification is unconstitutional and that the commissioner erred by denying his request for reconsideration of his disqualification. We conclude that the statute is not unconstitutional and that the commissioner did not err by denying reconsideration. Therefore, we affirm.
On August 11, 2003, Gustafson pleaded guilty in the Hennepin County District Court to criminal vehicular operation, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2b(3) (2002)
(). The criminal complaint alleged that Gustafson caused a multi-vehicle accident on interstate highway 94 while he was intoxicated and that drivers of two other vehicles were injured. Gustafson's sentence included, among other things, a three-year term of probation.
In early 2015, Gustafson's wife applied for a license to operate a child-care program in the couple's home in Elk River. Gustafson's wife was required by the Department of Human Services Background Studies Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 245C.01
–.34 (2014 & Supp.2015), to submit to a background study, and Gustafson also was required to do so because he was living in the home where child-care services would be provided. See Minn.Stat. § 245C.03, subd. 1(a)(1)–(2). In June 2015, a Sherburne County social worker determined that Gustafson is disqualified from having direct contact with or access to persons served by a child-care program because of his 2003 conviction. See Minn.Stat. §§ 245C.14 –15.
In July 2015, Gustafson requested reconsideration of his disqualification. See Minn.Stat. § 245C.21
. He argued that the victims of his criminal offense were not seriously injured, that the offense took place 12 years earlier, that he no longer drinks alcoholic beverages and has completed a treatment program, and that he would not have any responsibilities in the child-care program. Gustafson challenged the disqualification by requesting a set-aside or, in the alternative, a variance.
In September 2015, a deputy inspector general in the licensing division of the department of human services, on behalf of the commissioner, denied Gustafson's request to set aside the disqualification. See Minn.Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 1
. The letter ruling reiterates that Gustafson's prior conviction is a proper basis for disqualification. The letter ruling also states that Gustafson's ten-year disqualification period commenced on April 23, 2010, and expires on April 23, 2020. Even though the commissioner did not set aside Gustafson's disqualification, the commissioner granted a variance, with conditions that “minimize the risk of harm to people receiving services.” See Minn.Stat. § 245C.30, subd. 1(a). Specifically, the variance precludes Gustafson from, among other things, being present when persons served by the child-care program are present, providing transportation to persons served by the program, or being used as a substitute caregiver.
Gustafson appeals by way of a writ of certiorari.
violate Gustafson's constitutional rights to equal protection or due process?
Gustafson argues that section 245C.15 of the Minnesota Statutes
, which is the legal basis of his disqualification, is unconstitutional. His argument is premised on his assertion that the statute is flawed in its manner of determining the timing of his disqualification. He contends that, to protect his constitutional rights, his disqualification, which began on the date he was discharged from his sentence, should have begun on the date he pleaded guilty.
We begin by reviewing the language of the Department of Human Services Background Studies Act. Under the act, the commissioner shall conduct a background study on a person seeking a license to operate a child-care program and on certain other persons who will work for a licensed program or will live at a location where licensed services will be provided. Minn.Stat. § 245C.03, subd. 1(a)
. The commissioner shall disqualify a person subject to a background study if the study reveals “a conviction of, admission to, or Alford plea [1
] to one or more crimes listed in section 245C.15
.” Minn.Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(a)(1).
If a person is disqualified because of criminal conduct, the duration of the disqualification depends on the severity of the offense. The most serious forms of criminal conduct require permanent disqualification. Minn.Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 1
. Less-serious forms of criminal conduct require disqualification for either 15 years, 10 years, or 7 years. Id., subds. 2–4.
In this case, Gustafson's conviction of criminal vehicular operation requires a ten-year disqualification. See id., subd. 3(a). The disputed issue on appeal is when the ten-year disqualification period begins to run and when it expires. The commissioner's position is that Gustafson's disqualification period began on the date of “the discharge of the sentence imposed ... for the offense.” See id. Based on information that Gustafson was discharged from his sentence on April 23, 2010 (which date Gustafson challenges as being incorrect), the commissioner determined that Gustafson is disqualified until April 23, 2020. Gustafson's position is that his disqualification period should have begun on August 11, 2003, the date of his guilty plea, and that his disqualification expired on August 11, 2013.
Gustafson's argument is based on the third sentence of the following paragraph within section 245C.15, subdivision 3
:
When a disqualification is based on a judicial determination other than a conviction, the disqualification period begins from the date of the court order. When a disqualification is based on an admission, the disqualification period begins from the date of an admission in court. When a disqualification is based on an Alford Plea, the disqualification period begins from the date the Alford Plea is entered in court. When a disqualification is based on a preponderance of evidence of a disqualifying act, the disqualification date begins from the date of the dismissal, the date of discharge of the sentence imposed for a conviction for a disqualifying crime of similar elements, or the date of the incident, whichever occurs last.
Id., subd. 3(e) (emphasis added). Gustafson acknowledges that he did not enter an Alford plea but contends that section 245C.15, subdivision 3
, is unconstitutional to the extent that a person who is convicted of a crime after entering an Alford plea is allowed to complete the ten-year disqualification period sooner than a person who is convicted of a crime after entering a conventional guilty plea.
The commissioner argues that Gustafson's constitutional challenge is based on an incorrect interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Department of Human Services Background Studies Act. In her responsive brief, the commissioner states, first, that the department consistently has interpreted subdivision 3(a) of section 245C.15
to apply if a person has a criminal conviction of an offense listed in that subdivision, regardless of the manner of the adjudication of guilt, and, second, that the department consistently has interpreted subdivision 3(e) of section 245C.15 to apply only if a person is determined to have engaged in conduct that violates the criminal statutes listed in that subdivision but does not have a criminal conviction for that conduct. Specifically, the commissioner's brief asserts, “DHS has historically interpreted the statute as requiring the Commissioner to treat all convictions for disqualifying crimes equally, regardless of whether the conviction was based on a guilty plea, Alford plea or jury verdict.”2 The commissioner urges the court to adopt the department's pre-existing interpretation of the statute.
We begin the task of interpreting a statute by asking “whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous.” American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.2001)
. A statute is unambiguous if it is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. Lietz v. Northern States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn.2006). If a statute is unambiguous, we “interpret the words and phrases in the statute according to their plain and ordinary meanings.” Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 798 (Minn.2015). A statute is ambiguous, however, “if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 870. If a statute is ambiguous, we apply “the canons of statutory construction to determine its meaning.” County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn.2013).
Section 245C.15, subdivision 3
, is ambiguous to the extent that it...
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