Gutierrez-Medina v. State

• Decision Date: 20 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 39672.,39672.
• Citation: 157 Idaho 34,333 P.3d 849
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ernesto GUTIERREZ–MEDINA, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

157 Idaho 34

333 P.3d 849

Ernesto GUTIERREZ–MEDINA, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 39672.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 20, 2014.

Review Denied Sept. 15, 2014.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge.

Ernesto Gutierrez–Medina appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In 1995, Gutierrez–Medina, a citizen of Mexico and legal permanent resident of the United States, was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance. In 1997, he entered an Alford¹ plea to possession of a controlled substance and was placed on probation for five years, with an underlying unified five-year sentence, with two and a half years determinate. Gutierrez–Medina did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Several months later, Gutierrez–Medina was deported to Mexico by federal immigration officials due to his conviction. Gutierrez–Medina reentered the United States and in 2010, was arrested by immigration officials for being in the United States unlawfully.

In 2011, Gutierrez–Medina filed a petition for post-conviction relief regarding his 1997 guilty plea. He asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for improperly advising him that a guilty plea would not affect his immigration status. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, contending Gutierrez–Medina's petition was untimely. Gutierrez–Medina responded, requesting the district court toll the statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction actions to protect his due process rights. Specifically, he contended that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485–87, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 298–99 (2010), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel requires that an attorney accurately inform a client when a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation, should be retroactively applied to his case.

The district court determined Padilla announced a new rule, but it was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure and so did not apply retroactively. Gutierrez–Medina did not raise due process concerns warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal of Gutierrez–Medina's post-conviction petition. Gutierrez–Medina filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. He now appeals.

II.ANALYSIS

Gutierrez–Medina contends the district court erred by granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues the statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction petitions should be equitably tolled on due process grounds because Padilla should be retroactively applied to his case. Therefore, he contends, he presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's allegedly incorrect advice as to the immigration implications of his guilty plea.

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Code § 19–4907 ; State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Idaho Code § 19–4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if "it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.C. § 19–4906(c). On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010). Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009).

The statute of limitation for noncapital post-conviction actions provides that a petition for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of appeal, or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. I.C. § 19–4902(a). The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct.App.2009). The statute of limitation may be equitably tolled, however. Equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is borne of the petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385–86, 256 P.3d 791, 793–94 (Ct.App.2011) ; Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct.App.2009). A petitioner's due process right is not violated by a statute of limitation bar unless he can show such an inability to file a timely petition denied him a meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. See Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (Ct.App.2010) ; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176.

Equitable tolling has only been recognized in Idaho where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication prevented the petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction.

Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070 ; Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794 ; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176. Our Supreme Court has stated, however, that at least where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues, the limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). But see Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967, 969 (2001) (recognizing the possibility of a discovery exception, but refusing to apply equitable tolling where the defendant technically had six weeks after he learned of the claim in which to file a post-conviction petition). This exception is narrow; as we said in Amboh, "[I]n cases where equitable tolling was allowed, the petitioner was alleged to have been unable to timely file a petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective control, or the facts underlying the claim were hidden from the petitioner by unlawful state action." Amboh, 149 Idaho at 653, 239 P.3d at 451.

Gutierrez–Medina contended below, and now on appeal, that equitable tolling should apply in this case because the constitutional right recognized in Padilla raises "important due process concerns" that are retroactively applicable to his case. He argues that because the United States Supreme Court did not decide Padilla until well after his conviction was final, this post-conviction action was his first opportunity to present this particular claim. We need not decide whether the retroactive application of a new rule of criminal procedure would warrant equitable tolling in this instance because we agree with the district court that Padilla does not apply retroactively.

In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel requires an attorney to inform a client when a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373–74, 130 S.Ct. at 1485–87, 176 L.Ed.2d at 298–99. Because counsel had not so advised Padilla, the Court ruled he had established deficient performance under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and remanded the matter to the state court to determine whether Padilla could establish he had been prejudiced by counsel's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369, 130 S.Ct. at 1483, 176 L.Ed.2d at 295–96.

Generally, "new" constitutional rules are not applicable to cases already final when the rule is announced. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 355–56 (1989). See also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180–81, 167 L.Ed.2d 1, 10–11 (2007) ("[A]n old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review."). The United States Supreme Court has, however, set forth two exceptions where a new rule will apply retroactively: if the rule substantively alters punishable conduct or if it is a "watershed" rule implicating the fundamental fairness of the trial. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. at 1075–76, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356–57. It is the watershed exception which Gutierrez–Medina argues is applicable in this case.²

The Supreme Court has explained that in order to qualify as a watershed rule, a decision must satisfy two requirements: it must "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding," Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418, 127 S.Ct. at 1182, 167 L.Ed.2d at 12, and it must announce a rule "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished," Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523, 159 L.Ed.2d 442, 448–49 (2004).³ Elevating the standard even more, a "showing that a new procedural rule is based on a ‘bedrock’ right" is insufficient because "a new rule must itself...