Haggard v. Shaw
| Decision Date | 18 November 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 37989,37989,2 |
| Citation | 112 S.E.2d 286,100 Ga.App. 813 |
| Parties | Josephine HAGGARD v. Siggle SHAW et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A letter to the plaintiff's employer referring to an 'indebtedness' of the plaintiff to another, and stating that 'every possible means to collect this account' had been unavailing, and that the account is long in arrears, cannot, even by innuendo, charge the plaintiff with a crime punishable by law since the failure to pay a debt is not a crime. Neither is it a charge against her 'in reference to her trade, office or profession.' Accordingly, count 1 of this petition fails to set out a cause of action for libel, no special damages resulting from the publication of such allegedly false statement having been sought.
2. A letter written by a creditor to an employer notifying him that his employee is indebted to the creditor and seeking the employer's aid in the collection of the debt, when written in the ordinary course of business, is not actionable as an invasion of the right of privacy. The petition here fails to allege facts sufficient to support the conclusion that the letter was written deliberately and in bad faith, not for the ostensible purpose of collecting an account but for the purpose of doing personal injury to the plaintiff. Should the latter fact appear, a different case would be presented.
3. The remaining counts, which add no factual material not included in counts 1 and 2, likewise fail to set forth a cause of action.
Josephine Haggard filed an action for damages in the City Court of Columbus against Siggle Shaw, N. L. Davis and Bonded Credit Bureau, Inc., which, as amended, contained four counts. Count 1 alleged that the defendants, acting through their agent Davis, mailed a letter to the Director of Civilian Personnel, Fort Benning, Georgia, where plaintiff was employed, which was styled and contained the following: Plaintiff sought general and punitive damages. The trial court sustained a general demurrer and dismissed the petition, which judgment is here assigned as error.
Vincent P. McAuley, Jack M. Thornton, Columbus, for plaintiff in error.
Arthur F. Copland, Paul Blanchard, Columbus, for defendant in error.
1. (a) Count 1 of the petition, based on libel, alleges that the statements in the letter as to indebtedness, arrears, requests for payment and the statement that every possible means to collect the account had been used are all false and defamatory statements; that these statements were delivered and published to the Director of Civilian Personnel and numerous other employees of the United States Government having authority over the plaintiff; that the intendment of the statements was that the plaintiff, although capable of paying her debts, lacked the honesty and integrity to do so and that she refused to pay the debt because of her dishonesty, and the statements were so understood by those who read them; that the defamatory matter was calculated to and did injure the plaintiff's reputation; that they were wilfully and maliciously made; that she was injured in her trade and profession in that a good credit rating is essential for employees of the United States Government to retain their employment; that the plaintiff had informed the defendants that she had never owed any debt to Dr. C. D. Johnson or the defendants and had no knowledge thereof and the act was without probable cause on the part of the defendants; that the plaintiff had to spend three hours straightening out the matter with her superiors; that the letter has been placed in her personnel file and will be a constant detriment to promotion or advancement with the United States Government.
In Estes v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, 50 Ga.App. 619, 719 S.E. 222, it was held that words which are plain and unambiguous and do not impute a crime can not by innuendo have their meaning enlarged and extended so as to become actionable per se, citing Morris v. Evans, 22 Ga.App. 11, 95 S.E. 385. The words in the Estes case were that a named person 'persists in retaining the money that is due' despite appeals for payment. The letter to the employer there closely resembles the letter to the employer here, which states that the writer has failed to 'collect this account' and no response has been received to 'written requests.' The wording clearly does not impute a crime, and cannot by innuendo be enlarged so as to do so. A charge that a person owes a debt which is past due and which he refuses to pay is not libelous per se. Mell v. Edge, 68 Ga.App. 314(2), 22 S.E.2d 738. These cases state well settled law, and the request to overrule them is denied. Count 1 of the petition accordingly does not charge a libel per se in failing to pay the account.
(b) Where the falsely spoken or written words do not contain 'a charge made in reference to one's trade, office or profession' they are not actionable without proof of special damages on the theory that they tend to injure one in his trade or profession. Van Epps v. Jones, 50 Ga. 238; Mell v. Edge, 68 Ga.App. 314, 22 S.E.2d 738, supra. Only general damages are sought here. The pleader shows nothing to have resulted from the letter which has specially damaged her in a monetary sense. She alleges that employees of the United States Government who refuse to pay their debts are discharged and that a good credit rating is essential in order to retain employment, but fails to allege that her credit rating was in fact affected or that she was discharged. In like manner she alleges the letter in her file will be a detriment to advancement but fails to show what damages, if any, would result therefrom. 'In an action for libel, where the alleged defamatory words are as a matter of law not actionable per se, and where the petition does not set out any proper or legitimate item of special damage, and where it fails to allege by way of innuendo that the words complained of 'convey a covert meaning, wholly different from the ordinary and natural interpretation usually put upon them; and that the author of the libel intended them to be understood in their covert sense, and that they were in fact so understood by those who read them, the petition does not set out a cause of action and should be dismissed on general demurrer.' Anderson v. Kennedy, 47 Ga.App. 380, 170 S.E. 555. The trial judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to count 1 of the petition.
(c) It is contended that this petition sets out a cause of action for libel under White v. Parks, 93 Ga. 633, 20 S.E. 78. In that case the defendants...
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