Halacy v. Steen, 7537

• Decision Date: 30 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 7537,Docket No. C,7537
• Citation: 670 A.2d 1371
• Parties: Suzanne HALACY v. Jon STEEN, et al. DecisionLawum 95 294.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1371

670 A.2d 1371

Suzanne HALACY v. Jon STEEN, et al.

Decision No. 7537.

Law Docket No. Cum 95 294.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Dec. 7, 1995.

Decided Jan. 30, 1996.

Paul R. Dumas, Jr. (orally), Joyce, Dumas, David & Hanstein, P.A., Farmington, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Donlan (orally), Verrill & Dana, Portland, for Defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and LIPEZ, JJ.

RUDMAN, Justice.

This case is on report pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72(c) ¹ from the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Saufley, J.). We are asked whether and under what circumstances a presentence investigation report prepared by the Division of Probation and Parole pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 32 may be disclosed to persons other than the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or the prosecuting attorney. We conclude that materials contained in a presentence investigation report are generally confidential. This confidentiality, however, is not absolute. When the party seeking disclosure has demonstrated a compelling particularized need for the contents of the report, the court may disclose those portions of the report directly relevant to the demonstrated need, subject to such controls against further dissemination as the court shall deem warranted. Because no compelling necessity for disclosure is apparent on the record in this case, we vacate the order of the court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Underlying Action

Suzanne Halacy filed a civil complaint against Jon Steen alleging counts of assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and fraudulent transfer of assets. Steen had previously been found guilty of a gross sexual assault on Halacy. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 147 (Me.1993). We vacated Steen's conviction. Id. at 146. Subsequently, Steen pleaded nolo contendre to the gross sexual assault charge and was sentenced to time served. Prior to Steen's sentencing, the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Brodrick, J.) had ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI) pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 32.

As part of a protracted discovery battle in Halacy's civil suit against Steen, Halacy sought all information contained in Steen's PSI in the belief that production of the psychological reports contained in the PSI would lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with respect to Steen's general mental processes and impressions of the incident. The court ordered disclosure of the PSI. On Steen's motion for reconsideration the court reviewed each of the documents contained in Steen's PSI and redacted certain documents pertaining to Steen's substance abuse history but refused to modify its order directing the release of the PSI to Halacy. The court based its release of Steen's PSI on its conclusion that disclosure was not precluded by law or rule. In a separate order, the court, noting the confusion concerning the confidentiality of PSIs and the irreparable harm that would be done to Steen's privacy interests if the court erred in ordering the release of his PSI, granted Steen's motion to report the issue of the PSI's confidentiality to us and stayed release of the PSI pending our decision. ²

The Confidentiality of the Presentence Report Investigation

M.R.Crim.P. 32(c) authorizes the trial court to order the Division of Probation and Parole to conduct a presentence investigation and to submit a written or oral report to the court prior to the court's imposition of a sentence on the defendant. As with its federal counterpart, the primary purpose of the PSI is to facilitate the court's determination of an appropriate sentence. See 3 Glassman, Maine Practice: Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated § 32.4 at 250 (1967) (stating that it is within the discretion of the trial justice to determine whether preparation of a PSI would aid in sentencing). See also Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Pub. No. 105, The Presentence Investigation Report 1 (1978, rev. 1984). The PSI, which contains a broad range of in-depth personal information, information on the offense, and an evaluation of the individual defendant's specific rehabilitative needs, has been characterized as "the critical document at both the sentencing and correctional stages of the criminal process." Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1613, 1616 (1980).

Pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A), the PSI must be disclosed to the defendant and to the defendant's counsel. The Maine rule, however, like its federal analog, is silent on the issue of post-sentencing dissemination of the PSI to third parties. Despite this silence, we are not without guidance. Our rules of criminal procedure were modeled on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 3 Glassman, Maine Practice: Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated, Introduction at x (1967) ("At the outset it was decided that the Federal Rules should be used as a guide...."). See also State v. Wells, 443 A.2d 60, 63 (Me.1982) (quoting former Chief Justice Williamson's observation that "it may be fairly said that we have adopted the Federal Rules tailored to our needs"). Thus we have often interpreted our rules of criminal procedure by resort to the federal courts' analyses of their analogous rules. See State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250, 1251 (Me.1987) (relying on federal authority's interpretation of analogous rule in support of construction of Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure); Wells, 443 A.2d at 63 ("[W]e interpret the Rules ... by turning to sources of federal authority as useful tools to accomplish the purpose of the Rules...."); State v. Wedge, 322 A.2d 328, 330 (Me.1974) (stating that consistent with the drafters' intention when the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated, the interpretation given to parallel federal rules by the Circuit Court of Appeals is controlling).

Traditionally, "in both civil and criminal cases the courts have been very reluctant to give third parties access to the presentence investigation report prepared for some other individual or individuals." United States Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 12, 108 S.Ct. 1606, 1613, 100 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). The federal courts routinely have stated that the PSI is a confidential document. See, e.g., United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that there is a general presumption that courts will not grant third parties access to a PSI); United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860, 867 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2151, 128 L.Ed.2d 877 (1994) (same); United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1578 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that a PSI enjoys a strong presumption of confidentiality); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 502 US. 823, 112 S.Ct. 86, 116 L.Ed.2d 58 (1991) ("It is clear that presentence reports have traditionally been confidential--indeed, it is only in the past 25 years that the defendant has had access to the presentence report...."). Our State's trial courts historically have afforded PSIs in their possession similar treatment. Even absent any explicit mention in the rule or directive from this Court, both Superior Court justices and clerks consistently have concluded that the PSI should be treated as a confidential document. See, e.g., Maine Superior Court's Clerk Manual 37 (1994) (stating that PSI should be put in a sealed envelope and that access to PSI absent a court order is limited to defendant's attorney of record); Minutes of Superior Court Clerks Meeting para. 3 (Sep. 28, 1990) (stating that if a clerk has reason to believe that an attorney is representing a victim or other party and is pursuing a civil matter against the defendant the PSI should not be released without further action from the court); Memorandum from Superior Court Administrators to Superior Court Clerks 1 (Feb. 4, 1988) (stating that until further notice PSI shall be treated as confidential documents); Memorandum from Superior Court Chief Justice Brody to Superior Court Justices and Clerks 2 (Apr. 14, 1988) (stating that PSI should be treated as a quasi-confidential document available only to counsel for the parties and defendants); Memorandum from Superior Court Chief Justice Clifford to Superior Court Clerks 1 (June 7, 1984) (stating that PSI shall be made available only to counsel for defense and prosecution). Important governmental and societal interests support this policy of limited disclosure:

1. The need to encourage individuals, including the defendant, who have relevant information to provide it to the Probation Office for ultimate transmittal to the sentencing judge with the assurance of confidentiality. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 [69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337] (1949); United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 [106 S.Ct. 1194, 89 L.Ed.2d 309] (1986); United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir.1973). See also Jacob B. Barnett and David H. Gronewold, Confidentiality of the Presentence Report, 26 Fed.Prob. 26 (1962) ("Basic to the functioning of the correctional apparatus is the conviction that comprehensive knowledge in breadth and depth of each client is essential.").

2. Consideration of the privacy interests of the victims and of their families. See United States v. Charmer Indus. Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1175 (2nd Cir.1983).

3. Protection of the defendant's privacy. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 235.

4. Protection of confidential source information and grand jury material. Hancock Brothers, Inc. v. Jones, 293 F.Supp. 1229, 1232 (N.D.Calif.1968).

5. Concern that the report includes irrelevant and unsupported information. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 235.

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