Hall v. Dempsey

• Decision Date: 13 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 99-D-716-N.,Civ.A. 99-D-716-N.
• Citation: 111 F.Supp.2d 1208
• Parties: William HALL, Plaintiff, v. Gene DEMPSEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

111 F.Supp.2d 1208 William HALL, Plaintiff,
v.
Gene DEMPSEY, et al., Defendants. No. Civ.A. 99-D-716-N. United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division. June 13, 2000.

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Jimmy D. Jacobs, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.

Susan Shirock DePaola, Samford & DePaola, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Barry R. Holt, Barry L. Holt, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot."), filed March 22, 2000, along with a Brief in support thereof ("Br."). On April 7, 2000, Plaintiff filed an Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Resp."). On April 14, 2000, Defendants filed a Reply On Motion For Summary Judgment ("Reply").

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Also before the court is Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant's Evidentiary Submissions And Motion To Strike ("Mot. To Strike"), filed April 25, 2000. On April 28, 2000, Defendant Gene Dempsey ("Dempsey") filed a Response To Plaintiff's Motion To Strike ("Resp. To Mot. To Strike"). Plaintiff filed a Reply thereto on May 18, 2000 ("Reply To Mot. To Strike").

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part. Further, the court finds that Plaintiff's Motion To Strike is due to be denied as moot.¹

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended) (" § 1981"). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities

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when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

BACKGROUND²

Defendant Dempsey, a white male, owns and operates Defendant G & D Materials, which is a company that specializes in hauling sand and gravel.³ Plaintiff, a 53-year-old black male, began working as a driver for Defendants in February of 1999. Plaintiff has worked as a driver for various employers since graduating high school. Defendants apparently hired Plaintiff based solely on his experience as a driver because they did not require him to complete an employment application. Defendants did require Plaintiff to provide copies of his driver's license, commercial driver's license ("CDL"), Alabama Department of Public Safety Driver License Abstract, and social security card. Plaintiff complied with Defendant's requirements and the aforementioned documents comprise the entire contents of his personnel file with Defendants.

Plaintiff's duties as a driver for Defendants consisted primarily of hauling sand and gravel. When not actively engaged in driving a truck, Plaintiff was required to perform other tasks, such as washing trucks and cleaning out truck cabs. Plaintiff was also required to perform daily maintenance and inspections of Defendants' trucks. The record indicates that Plaintiff attempted to perform all tasks assigned to him.

However, Plaintiff experienced some difficulty with his job on April 22, 1999, when he accidentally left his truck bed in the raised position as he was leaving a job site. As Plaintiff drove away, his truck bed caught a power line and pulled down the line and the temporary pole that was securing the line.⁴ While this accident created a potentially dangerous situation, ultimately, no damage resulted to the job site or to the truck. Further, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was reprimanded for the pole incident. To the contrary, throughout the time that Plaintiff worked for Defendants, Dempsey told him that he was doing a good job.

Nevertheless, on April 27, 1999, Dempsey informed Plaintiff that he could no longer employ him because of added expenses and lack of work. For several days thereafter, Plaintiff contacted Dempsey to inquire about his old job. Although Dempsey maintained that there was not enough work for Plaintiff, Dempsey soon hired a white male for the job from which Plaintiff was discharged.

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On July 13, 1999, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint ("Compl.") in this court, asserting various claims of racial discrimination against Defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed an Amended Complaint on November 29, 1999.⁵ While Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is somewhat disjointed, construing it broadly⁶ leads the court to find that he has raised the following claims against Defendants: (1) discriminatory discharge under a disparate treatment theory in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("discriminatory discharge") (Am. Compl.¶¶ 9-13); (2) retaliation on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("retaliation") (Id. ¶ 14); and (3) tort of outrage ("outrage") (Id. ¶ 18.)

Although Defendants move for summary judgment on all of these claims, Plaintiff only opposes summary judgment with respect his discriminatory discharge claim. Indeed, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence or argument on his retaliation claim⁷ or his outrage claim.⁸ Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned these claims,⁹ and, thus, Defendants' unopposed Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted with respect to said claims. However, for the reasons that follow, the court finds that Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be denied with respect to Plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim.

DISCUSSION

As stated, the only claim that Plaintiff sufficiently advances against Defendants is discriminatory discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants wrongfully terminated him on the basis of his race. Section 1981 "prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts."¹⁰ Ferrill

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v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir.1999). The allocation of burdens and elements of a prima facie case are the same for employment claims stemming from § 1981 and Title VII. See Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept., 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1995); Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1994); Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520 (11th Cir.1994).

The critical element in establishing wrongful...