Hall v. State

Decision Date12 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. SC17–1355,SC17–1355
Citation246 So.3d 210
Parties Enoch D. HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie Mirialakis and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a Successive Motion to Vacate Death Sentence pursuant to Hurst v. State , 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017), under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, we have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

This Court has previously detailed the underlying facts of this case. Hall v. State (Hall I ), 107 So.3d 262, 267–71 (Fla. 2012). Relevant to the instant proceeding, Hall, an inmate at Tomoka Correctional Institution (TCI), was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Correctional Officer (CO) Donna Fitzgerald. Hall v. State (Hall II ), 212 So.3d 1001, 1009 (Fla. 2017). After a penalty phase, the jury returned a unanimous death sentence. Id. at 1012.1 Hall appealed, and this Court ultimately affirmed his conviction and sentence. See generally Hall I , 107 So.3d 262.2 On October 7, 2013, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Hall v. Florida , 571 U.S. 878, 134 S.Ct. 203, 187 L.Ed.2d 137 (2013) ; thus Hall's case became final on that date.

This Court affirmed the denial of Hall's initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hall II , 212 So.3d at 1036. During the pendency of his initial postconviction motion, Hall filed a Successive Motion to Vacate Death Sentence pursuant to Hurst , which was denied by the postconviction court. This appeal from the first successive motion for postconviction relief follows.

ANALYSIS
Hall's Claims for Relief under Hurst v. State

We affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief on this claim for the reasons discussed below. Most importantly, our opinion in Hall II , and our corresponding Hurst harmless error analysis denying relief within that opinion, already addressed the issues that Hall now attempts to present.

CCP Aggravator Stricken

We conclude that this subclaim of Hall's successive postconviction motion fails on the merits. Notably, aside from Wood v. State , 209 So.3d 1217, 1234 (Fla. 2017), which is distinguished below, Hall presents no binding precedent that supports his assertion that the stricken CCP aggravator in his case is sufficient to receive Hurst relief. Moreover, as discussed below, our recent decisions in Middleton v. State , 220 So.3d 1152 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 829, 200 L.Ed.2d 326 (2018), and Cozzie v. State , 225 So.3d 717, 729 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1131, 200 L.E.2d 729 (2018), support the contrary conclusion.

In Wood , we struck both the CCP and avoid arrest aggravating factors, which were two of the three aggravators found by the trial court and to which it assigned "great weight." Id. at 1233. In ultimately determining that the error in Wood was not harmless, we emphasized:

In this case the jury was instructed on both aggravating factors that we have determined were not supported by competent, substantial evidence. This alone would require a finding that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We note that our conclusion in this regard is also consistent with our pre- Hurst precedent in Kaczmar v. State , 104 So.3d 990, 1008 (Fla. 2012), where we held that, upon striking the CCP and felony-murder aggravating factors so that only one valid aggravating factor remained , such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Post– Hurst , this conclusion is even more compelling.
... [T]he jury would have had to make these factual determinations that the sole valid aggravating factor —that the capital felony was committed while Wood was engaged, or was an accomplice in the commission of a burglary and or robbery—outweighed the mitigating circumstances established. "[W]e are not so sanguine as to conclude that [Wood's] jury ... would have found [this sole aggravating factor ] sufficient to impose death and that [this sole aggravating factor ] outweighed the mitigation."

Id. at 1234 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hurst , 202 So.3d at 68 ). In determining that the error was harmful, we repeatedly emphasized that our conclusion was influenced by the fact that two of the three aggravators presented were stricken, leaving only one valid aggravating factor for the jury to properly consider. Thus the harmless error analysis in Wood was based on the Court's determination that the remaining sole valid aggravating factor was not sufficient to support the sentence of death.3

Wood is distinguishable from Hall's case for numerous reasons. Firstly, even after striking the CCP aggravator, Hall had four valid remaining aggravators, all of which were afforded either "great weight" or "very great weight,"4 as opposed to the one remaining aggravator found in Wood . Secondly, three of the remaining aggravators found in Hall's case (i.e., under sentence of imprisonment, previously convicted of another violent felony, and the victim was a law enforcement officer) were without dispute. Thus as we stated in our harmless error analysis in Hall II ,

Presuming that the jury did its job as instructed by the trial court, we are convinced that it would have still found the aggravators greatly outweighed the mitigators in this case. Indeed, it is inconceivable that a jury would not have found the aggravation in Hall's case unanimously, especially given the fact that three of the aggravators found were automatic ....

212 So.3d at 1035. It is also worth noting that this Court, in conducting its harmless error analysis in Hall II , did not include the invalidated CCP aggravator in its analysis. Id. Instead, we found that the Hurst error, as it related to Hall's case, was harmless, even without the stricken CCP aggravator. Id. Thus we conclude that Wood is distinguishable from Hall's case.

Two other cases recently decided by our Court, Middleton and Cozzie , also lend support to the postconviction court's denial of this subclaim of Hall's successive postconviction motion.

Middleton involved a unanimous jury recommendation of death, where this Court ultimately struck the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators. 220 So.3d at 1172. There, we explained:

"When this Court strikes an aggravating factor on appeal, ‘the harmless error test is applied to determine whether there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the sentence.’ " Williams v. State , 967 So.2d 735, 765 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Jennings v. State , 782 So.2d 853, 863 n.9 (Fla. 2001) ); see also Diaz v. State , 860 So.2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2003) ("We find this error harmless, however, after consideration of the two remaining aggravating circumstances and the five mitigating circumstances in this case."). Despite striking the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators, two valid aggravators remain in this unanimous death-recommendation case. The two aggravators which remain are that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and that is was committed during the commission of a burglary and for pecuniary gain, which were each given "great weight" by the trial court.

Id. In finding that the error in Middleton was harmless, we noted that there was no statutory mitigation and that "the trial court expressly stated that any of the considered aggravating circumstances found in this case, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh the mitigation in total presented." Id.5 Thus because there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneous aggravators contributed to Middleton's sentence, we ultimately concluded that any errors there were harmless. Id.

Hall's case is similar to Middleton because significant aggravation remained, even without the stricken CCP aggravator, that "far outweighed the mitigation." Hall I , 107 So.3d at 271. Furthermore, three of the remaining aggravators present in Hall are without and beyond dispute. The fourth aggravator that remains, HAC, is one of the weightiest in Florida, see Jackson v. State , 18 So.3d 1016, 1035 (Fla. 2009), and was afforded "very great weight" by the trial court. Thus we conclude, as we have previously in Hall's initial postconviction case, that any error in Hall's case, like the errors in Middleton , was harmless. See Hall II , 212 So.3d at 1035–36 (finding any Hurst error harmless).

Similarly, in Cozzie , we determined that "[e]ven if the avoid arrest aggravator were stricken ... the unanimous death recommendation would still remain, along with the aggravators of CCP, HAC, and in the course of a felony, which are among the weightiest aggravators in our capital sentencing scheme." 225 So.3d at 729. Furthermore, the remaining aggravators in Cozzie were afforded "great weight" by the trial court. Id.6 Thus we ultimately determined that "any possible error was harmless because there was not a reasonable possibility that [Cozzie] would have received a life sentence without the trial court finding of the [avoid arrest] aggravator." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Aguirre–Jarquin v. State , 9 So.3d 593, 608 (Fla. 2009) ).

Hall has significant and weighty aggravation beyond the invalidated CCP aggravator. Further, the trial court in both Cozzie and here concluded that the aggravating circumstances "far outweigh[ed]" the mitigating circumstances. Id. at 725 ; see Hall I , 107 So.3d at 271. Thus we conclude that Cozzie is factually similar to Hall's case.

Both Hall and the dissent attempt to conflate nonbinding,...

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