Hamilton v. Huggins
| Decision Date | 09 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 29915-8-I,29915-8-I |
| Citation | 855 P.2d 1216,70 Wn.App. 842 |
| Parties | Jay W. HAMILTON and Paul W. Steere, Trustees of the Ramberg Residuary Trust, Sterling Ramberg, and Roland Ramberg, Respondents, v. Rosalind Ramberg HUGGINS, Appellant, Jacquelene S. Siegel, and Lester M. Kleinberg, Jr., Defendants. Division 1 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
William J. Morris, Kenneth Hart, Casey Pruzan & Kovarik, Seattle for appellant.
Robert C. St. Louis, Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, Seattle, for respondents.
This appeal centers around an award of attorney fees in a partition action. We reverse that portion of the decision taxing the appellant, Rosalind Ramberg Huggins, with attorney fees and costs incurred which were not for the common benefit.
Ingwald Ramberg was married twice and had three children. Rosalind Ramberg Huggins and Roland Ramberg were offspring of Ingwald Ramberg's marriage to Jacquelene S. Ramberg, now Siegel. After divorcing Jacquelene, Ingwald Ramberg married Elinor Ramberg and they had a son, Sterling Ramberg. Prior to his death, Ingwald established a number of trusts.
One of those trusts was a residuary trust created under his will, the purpose of which was to provide income to the surviving spouse, Elinor. Among other assets, that trust owned one-half of an industrial property known as the Mesco Building. The remaining one-half of the property was owned by Ingwald's three children in undivided interests, or an undivided one-sixth of the total property each.
After Ingwald died, Jay Hamilton served as the managing agent for the Mesco Building. In February 1989, Rosalind Ramberg Huggins attempted to terminate Hamilton's authority as to her undivided one-sixth interest in the property. Huggins was not satisfied with the trustees, their management style, or with Hamilton in particular, especially in regard to the operation of the Mesco Building. 1 Hamilton continued to represent the other interests. Huggins' attempt at termination was the culmination of considerable correspondence between she and the trustees.
After attempts at settling the dispute failed, the trustees and Roland and Sterling Ramberg (hereinafter trustees) commenced a partition action seeking to have the Mesco Building sold and the proceeds divided. Additionally, they sought permission to bid on the property. Huggins raised affirmative defenses and lodged a counterclaim against the trustees, contending that the partition action was an attempt to "squeeze her out" of the family owned building, that there were conflicts of interest between the trustees and the beneficiaries, and that the right to partition was subordinate to the fiduciary duties of the trustees to her as a beneficiary of the trust.
The trustees brought a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of their right to proceed with a partition sale. Specifically, the motion asked for the following relief: (1) a finding that the parties are joint owners of the real property; (2) that the real property is not susceptible to physical partition without great pecuniary loss to the parties; (3) that pursuant to RCW 7.52.080 2 the plaintiffs are entitled to have the property sold and the net proceeds divided among the owners; and (4) that the parties are entitled to be purchasers at the sale.
In response, counsel for Huggins asked for a continuance, citing the need for additional discovery. The trial court declined to continue the hearing and entered an order granting partial summary judgment and ordering a sheriff's sale of the property. The court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law as presented by the trustees. Specifically, the trial court found as a matter of law that the trustees were entitled to seek partition and could be bidders at the sale. The trial court further concluded the cost of the action and sheriff's sale including the plaintiffs' attorney fees should be charged against Huggins' interest pursuant to RCW 7.52.480, the statute allowing apportionment of costs. 3
Huggins moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the findings and conclusions were improper and mere surplusage. The trial court wrote to the parties denying the motion for reconsideration, but indicated there could be a problem with the form of the order as entered. Subsequently, in March 1991, Huggins took a voluntary nonsuit on her counterclaims, in part, because she was pursuing her claims against the trustees in a separate action.
In late August 1991, a public sale was held for the Mesco Building. The trustees were the successful purchasers for a bid of $750,000. They bid in their interests ($625,000) and additionally paid in $125,000 in cash for Huggins' interest. The trustees moved for confirmation of the sale and in addition requested an award of attorney fees and costs of $39,939.92 against Huggins. Huggins objected and argued that the partition statute did not allow the costs be assessed against her and that the trustees did not make an adequate showing that the fees were either reasonable or necessary.
By order dated October 14, 1991, the trial court confirmed the sheriff's sale, directed the sheriff to issue a deed conveying the property to the new co-owners, ordered disbursement of $85,060.08 to Huggins, set a date for a hearing on attorney fees, and directed that the balance of the cash proceeds of sale ($39,939.92) be held jointly by the attorneys of the parties pending further order of the court. An additional hearing was scheduled before a different trial judge on this matter.
Huggins opposed the request for an award of attorney fees and costs, arguing the partition statute does not permit the court to tax costs against only one party. Instead, Huggins argued that costs be apportioned among the parties according to each interest, and further that only the fees and costs incurred for the common benefit should be apportioned. She also argued that in a contested partition action, each party should be left to pay his, her, or its own litigation expenses.
In response, the trustees asserted for the first time that they were also entitled to recover attorney fees under the frivolous claims statute, RCW 4.84.185. 4 The trustees claimed the court could apportion those fees and costs deemed to have been incurred for the common benefit of the parties and then award the balance of the fees against Huggins as her defenses and counterclaims were frivolous. The trustees cited the original trial court's findings and conclusions to this effect and, additionally, pointed out the fact that Huggins had taken a voluntary nonsuit of her counterclaims.
The second trial court held that reasonable fees of $7,000 and costs of $2,190.70 had been incurred by the trustees and would be apportioned among the parties pursuant to RCW 7.52.480 ($1,531.78 as Huggins' share). The court also concluded the trustees should be awarded $20,722 in attorney fees and costs incurred in defense of Huggins' counterclaims which the court found frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. Including her apportioned share of costs and attorney fees, Huggins was taxed $22,253.78 in attorney fees and costs in the partition action. Huggins appealed in January of 1992. 5
The trustees have moved to dismiss Huggins' appeal on the ground that Huggins accepted the benefits of the judgment of the trial court. They rely on RAP 2.5(b) which provides in pertinent part:
(b) Acceptance of Benefits
(1) Generally. A party may accept the benefits of a trial court decision without losing the right to obtain review of that decision only (i) if the decision is one which is subject to modification by the court making the decision or (ii) if the party gives security as provided in subsection (b)(2) or (iii) if, regardless of the result of the review, the party will be entitled to at least the benefits of the trial court decision.
Huggins is not disputing the order of sale. She is only appealing the determination of the amount of attorney fees and costs. Therefore, regardless of the result of this appeal, Huggins is entitled to at least the monetary benefits representing her share of the property awarded in the decision of the trial court, and more if the determination of the amount of attorney fees is reduced or reversed. Huggins' appeal should not be dismissed. See Buckley v. Snapper Power Equipment Co., 61 Wash.App. 932, 940, 813 P.2d 125, review denied, 118 Wash.2d 1002 822 P.2d 287 (1991).
Huggins claims the trial court improperly entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on the motion for a partial summary judgment. The trustees and the second trial court relied heavily upon these findings and conclusions. Findings of fact are superfluous in summary judgment proceedings and carry no weight on appeal. Chelan Cy. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. County of Chelan, 109 Wash.2d 282, 294 n. 6, 745 P.2d 1 (1987). In Duckworth v. Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 21-22, 586 P.2d 860 (1978), the court stated The function of a summary judgment proceeding is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. It is not, as appears to have happened here, to resolve issues of fact or to arrive at conclusions based thereon. State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wn.2d 419, 424-25, 367 P.2d 985 (1962). Consequently, the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered here are superfluous and may not be considered to the prejudice of the City. Washington Optometric Ass'n v. County of Pierce, 73 Wn.2d 445, 438 P.2d 861 (1968)[.]
The trustees assert that findings entered in a partial summary judgment action are not superfluous under CR 56(d) which concerns cases not fully adjudicated on the motion. CR 56(d) provides:
Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under the rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and...
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...Hamel v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 93 Wn. App. 140, 966 P.2d 1282 (1998), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1036 (1999): 21.12(1)(b) Hamilton v. Huggins, 70 Wn. App. 842, 855 P.2d 1216 (1993): 13.2(4) Hamilton v. Pac. Drug Co., 78 Wash. 689, 139 P. 642 (1914): 20.11 Hammel v. Rife, 37 Wn. App. 577, 682 P.2d......
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Table of Cases
...P.2d 151 (1982): 4.6(7) Hamilton v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 111 Wn.2d 569, 761 P.2d 618 (1988): 51.6(3), 51.7(6) Hamilton v. Huggins, 70 Wn.App. 842, 855 P.2d 1216 (1993): 56.6(7)(d) Hamilton v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 161 Wash. 669, 297 P. 784 (1931): 19.6(2) Hamlin v. Robinson, 129 Wn.Ap......
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...Halsted v. Sallee, 31 Wn. App. 193, 639 P.2d 877 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.05[1] Hamilton v. Huggins, 70 Wn. App. 842, 855 P.2d 1216 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69.06, [3] Hamilton v. Johnson, 137 Wash. 92, 241 P. 672 (1925) . . . . . . . . . . .......
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