Hamilton v. State
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED110209,ED 110209 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ALEJO A. HAMILTON, Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis Honorable Steven R. Ohmer
Alejo Hamilton ("Movant") pled guilty to second-degree murder, first-degree attempted robbery, armed criminal action, unlawful possession of a firearm, attempted possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of armed criminal action. The motion court denied his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.[1] Movant appeals the motion court's judgment and raises two Points. In Point I, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred because his punishment was grossly disproportionate to the punishment received by his codefendant. In Point II, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred because the State used inconsistent theories of prosecution by prosecuting him and dismissing all charges against a similarly situated codefendant.
We vacate the motion court's judgment and remand the cause with directions to dismiss Movant's motion because he failed to timely file his pro se motion.
On May 27, 2015, Movant and Eugene Johnson went to buy marijuana. The two entered the back seat of Victim's vehicle. Victim was in the driver's seat and Victim's girlfriend was in the front passenger seat. During the drug transaction Movant drew a gun and attempted to rob Victim. Movant shot Victim in the forehead. Movant and Johnson fled the scene. Victim later died of his gunshot wound. The State initially filed an indictment charging Johnson in relation to the crime, but later dismissed the charges.
On November 9, 2015, the State filed an indictment charging Movant with six counts of criminal conduct: in Count I murder in the first-degree; in Counts II and VIII, armed criminal action; in Count VII, attempted robbery in the first degree; in Count IX, unlawful possession of a firearm; and in Count X, attempted possession of a controlled substance.
On January 26, 2018, Movant pled guilty to Count I second-degree murder, in violation of section 565.021;[2] Count II: armed criminal action, in violation of section 571.015; Count VII: first-degree attempted robbery, in violation of sections 564.011 and 569.020; Count VIII: armed criminal action, in violation of section 571.015; Count IX: unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of section 571.070, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2010; and Count X: attempted possession of a controlled substance, in violation of sections 564.011 and 195.202, RSMo Cum. Supp 2011. The plea court accepted the plea and on the same day sentenced Movant to a total term of imprisonment of twenty-five years at the Department of Corrections, all sentences to run concurrently: twenty-five years Count I; twenty-five years Count II; fifteen years Count VII; twenty-five years Count VIII; four years Count IX; and four years Count X. On January 31, 2018, Movant was delivered to the Department of Corrections to serve his sentence. Movant never filed a direct appeal.
On April 5, 2021, Movant filed his pro se motion in the circuit court seeking relief under Rule 29.12(b). The State challenged Movant's pro se motion arguing it did not state a cause of action under Rule 24.035. On April 19, 2021, the motion court appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Movant. On May 11, 2021, motion counsel entered her appearance and requested an additional thirty days to file Movant's amended motion. On September 20, 2021, Movant filed an amended Rule 24.035 motion and requested an evidentiary hearing. The motion court denied Movant's request for an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion for postconviction relief.
This appeal follows.
Our review of a Rule 24.035 motion is "limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous." Rule 24.035(k). "The motion court's findings are presumed correct." Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016) (citing Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013)). "A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013) (citing Taylor v. State, 382 S.W.3d 78, 80 (Mo. banc 2012)). "This Court defers to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses." Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 905 (quoting Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 760 (Mo. banc 2014)). "After a guilty plea, our review is limited to a determination of whether the movant's plea was knowing and voluntary." Taylor v. State, 456 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citing Loudermilk v. State, 973 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)).
In Point I, Movant claims the motion court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because his punishment was grossly disproportionate to the punishment received by his codefendant, violating his rights to due process of law, to equal protection of the law, and to fair and impartial sentencing. Movant argues it was "grossly disproportionate for Mr. Johnson to receive no sentence for his complicity and participation" compared to Movant receiving a twenty-five-year sentence. Movant admits his total twenty-five-year sentence is within the statutory ranges of punishment for the offenses for which he was convicted. Movant also admits a "sentence within the range of punishment prescribed by statute generally will not be found excessive, or grossly disproportionate, to the crime committed." State v. Denzmore, 436 S.W.3d 635 644 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (citing Burnett v. State 311 S.W.3d 810, 814 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). Movant further acknowledges a sentence will only be found grossly disproportionate in "exceedingly rare" and "extreme" cases. Burnett, 311 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). Movant also admits unless the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, "comparison to sentences given to other defendants for the same or similar crime is irrelevant." State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (1991)). Movant argues his punishment was grossly disproportionate because Johnson was an accomplice to the crime leading to Victim's death and received no punishment. Movant admits he "can find no Missouri law prohibiting similarly-situated codefendants from receiving sentences that are grossly disproportionate to each other." Movant argues however, "fundamental fairness" should require similarly situated defendants to not receive grossly disparate sentences. Movant argues because his sentence was "fundamentally unfair," because he received punishment grossly disproportionate to the punishment received by Johnson, his constitutional rights were violated and this Court must reverse the motion court's judgment, vacate Movant's sentences, and resentence him, or remand for an evidentiary hearing.
The State responds the motion court erred in considering the merits of Movant's Rule 24.035 motion because the motion court lacked authority to hear Movant's amended motion. The State argues the motion court lacked authority because Movant's initial pro se motion was untimely filed and was not substantially in the form of Criminal Procedure Form No. 40. The State argues, if no appeal of judgment or sentence is taken in the original conviction, Rule 24.035(b) provides a "motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date of the sentence is entered." The State argues a failure to file within the time provided "shall constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule 24.035 and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a motion filed pursuant to this Rule 24.035." Rule 24.035(b). The State argues the time limits provided are "constitutional, mandatory, and represent a strict guideline for filing of post-conviction motions." Walker v. State, 626 S.W.3d 331, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (). The State argues it is the court's duty to enforce the statutorily set time limits and the complete waiver. Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012). The State then cites Burgin where the Movant filed his pro se motion one day late, and this Court found the movant did not plead and prove a timely motion, thus waiving his right to proceed under Rule 24.035. 969 S.W.2d at 227. The State argues here, Movant admittedly filed his pro se motion, "without excuse, three years, two months, and [ten] days late." The State argues because Movant filed his pro se motion late, Movant completely waived his right to proceed under Rule 24.035.
The State also argues the motion court lacked authority because Movant's pro se motion was not "substantially in the form of Criminal Procedure Form No. 40." The State argues Rule 24.035(b) requires a person seeking relief under Rule 24.035 must file their motion "substantially in the form of Criminal Procedure Form No. 40." The State cites White v. State where a prisoner initially sent a letter to a trial court informing it of his intention to file a Form 40 to undo his guilty plea. 91 S.W.3d 154, 156 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). The prisoner later untimely filed a pro se motion, but argued his letter substantially complied with Form 40 making his motion timely. The Court of Appeals held the letter did not contain the information required in a Form 40 and...
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