Hanford v. King County
| Decision Date | 04 October 1920 |
| Docket Number | 15942. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | HANFORD v. KING COUNTY. |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tallman, Judge.
Action by Frank Hanford against King County. Judgment of dismissal and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded with directions.
C. H Hanford and Geo. W. Korte, both of Seattle, for appellant.
Fred C Brown and Wm. Parmerlee, both of Seattle, for respondent.
The purpose of this action was to recover damages alleged to be due to negligence which was chargeable to the defendant county. The answer contained admissions and denials and a number of affirmative defenses. To the fifth affirmative defense the plaintiff's demurrer was overruled. The reply did not traverse the allegations of this defense. The defendant made a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained, and the action dismissed. From this disposition of the case the plaintiff appeals.
The undisputed facts as summarized from the pleadings may be stated as follows: On the 1st day of March 1919, the appellant was injured by being struck by an automobile owned by the respondent and driven for and on its behalf. The manner of the accident is set out for the purpose of showing that the driver of the car was negligent. Paragraph 12 of the complaint alleges that on the 11th day of March, 1919, the appellant presented to the board of county commissioners a claim in writing for compensation in the sum of $5,000 for the injury and damage which he had sustained. Paragraph 13 of the complaint alleges that thereafter, on the 28th day of June, the appellant, for the purpose of making a more formal presentation of his claim, filed with the clerk of the court of county commissioners an amended claim properly verified setting forth the particulars of the injury and the appellant's residence at the time thereof for a period of six months preceding. On the 1st day of July the claim was rejected. The fifth affirmative defense alleged that the claim mentioned and set forth in paragraph 13 of the complaint was filed more than 60 days after such claim for damages accrued, and that 60 days had not elapsed after the filing and presentation of the claim before the institution of the action. The first question to be determined is whether a valid claim was presented to the board of county commissioners. Whether this question could have been raised upon the demurrer to the complaint rather than upon the demurrer to the affirmative defense is not now material and will not here be determined. In 1919 the Legislature passed an act relating to claims for damages against counties. Laws of 1919, c. 149. This act, among other things, provides:
This act became effective on June 11, 1919. For the purpose of this opinion it will be assumed, but not decided, that the first claim did not comply with the prior law upon the subject because it was not verified. Giving effect to this assumption, it then appears that when the 1919 act when into effect the matter stood as though no claim had been filed. It presented a case where a cause of action had accrued prior to the statute becoming operative, and the question arises: To what extent is the statute applicable to such claims? Limitation laws pertain only to the remedy, and may be changed at the pleasure of the Legislature, but such laws will not be given a retroactive effect unless it appears that such was clearly the legislative intention. Moore v Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23, 34 P. 199. There is nothing in the 1919 act which would indicate a legislative intention that it should be given a retroactive effect. Horner v. Pierce County, 191 P. 396. Were the statute so construed, it would bar the claim upon which the present action...
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...held that once a claim has been denied there is no reason to require a tort claimant to wait to file suit. Hanford v. King County, 112 Wash. 659, 662-63, 192 P. 1013 (1920) (once the county denied the claim, the plaintiff did not need to wait the remainder of the sixty day period to file su......
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Ballard Square Condominium v. Dynasty
...the action is first subjected to the operation of the statute, unless the legislature has otherwise provided." Hanford v. King County, 112 Wash. 659, 662, 192 P. 1013 (1920) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., O'Donoghue v. State, 66 Wash.2d 787, 791-92, 405 P.2d 258 (1965); Earle v. Froedtert ......
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In re Parentage of M.S., 54794-1-I.
...791-92, 405 P.2d 258 (1965); Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 344-45, 85 P.2d 264 (1938); Hanford v. King County, 112 Wash. 659, 661, 192 P. 1013 (1920); King County Boundary Review Bd. v. City of Auburn, 45 Wash.App. 363, 366-67, 725 P.2d 451 (1986); Torkelson v. Roer......
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Unruh v. Cacchiotti
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