Hanold v. Raytheon Co.

• Citation: 662 F.Supp.2d 793
• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-03-734.
• Parties: Reinhardt Carl Frederick HANOLD, IV, Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Raytheon Aircraft Company, Raytheon Travel Air, Raytheon Aircraft Services, Raytheon Aircraft Charter and Management, and Flight Options, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

662 F.Supp.2d 793

Reinhardt Carl Frederick HANOLD, IV, Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Raytheon Aircraft Company, Raytheon Travel Air, Raytheon Aircraft Services, Raytheon Aircraft Charter and Management, and Flight Options, LLC, Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-03-734.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

September 30, 2009.

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Reinhardt Carl Frederick Hanold, IV, Boca Raton, FL, pro se.

Charles Bedford Hampton, Timothy Scott McConn, Andrews & Kurth LLP, Houston, TX, Jaclyn A. Hermes, Fulbright Jaworski LLP, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MELINDA HARMON, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are Defendants' Raytheon Company (Raytheon), Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC), Raytheon Travel Air (RTA), Raytheon Aircraft Services (RAS), Raytheon Aircraft Charter and Management (RACM), and Flight Options, LLC's (Flight Options) (collectively, Defendants) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 26); Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment (Doc. 63); Defendants' motions to strike (Docs. 68 & 84); Plaintiff Reinhardt Carl Frederick Hanold, IV's (Hanold) motions to strike (Docs. 75 & 76); and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77). Upon review and consideration of these motions, the responses, replies, and surreplies thereto, the entire record, and the relevant legal authority, the Court finds that summary judgment should be granted in Defendants' favor.

I. Background and Relevant Facts

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Hanold originally filed the above styled and numbered cause in Texas state court, and Defendants subsequently removed it to this Court on February 27, 2003. (Doc. 1). On August 9, 2005, the parties filed a joint motion to stay because of the sufficient similarity between the claims and defenses raised in this cause and those raised by the parties in Eric L. Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Company, Raytheon Travel Air, and Flight Options, L.L.C. (Cause No. 02CV0990) in the 10th Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas (the Miller Case). (Doc. 44). In support of their motion, the parties represented that the determination of the legal issues in the Miller Case by the state appellate court would likely impact many of the same claims and defenses raised in the instant cause. (Id.). As such, on August 10, 2005, the Court issued an order granting the joint motion to stay, administratively closing the case, and instructing the parties to file a motion to reinstate after the appellate process in the Miller Case had concluded. (Doc. 46). On May 12, 2008, the Court reinstated this case to its active docket, and on August 4, 2008, Plaintiff Hanold filed his amended complaint. (Docs. 55 & 61). Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts claims for promissory estoppel, common law fraud, common law fraud-failure to disclose, negligent misrepresentation, wrongful discharge, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, and negligence. (Doc. 61).

B. Relevant Facts

Defendant RTA, created in June 1997, is a sister company of Defendant RAC and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raytheon Aircraft Holdings, Inc., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Raytheon. (Wallisch Aff., Doc. 63 Ex. D at ¶ 3). Defendants RAS and RACM are also sister companies to Defendant RTA, as well as wholly-owned subsidiaries of Raytheon Aircraft Holdings, Inc. (Id.). From June 1997 until March 20, 2002, Defendant RTA operated fractionally-owned aircraft and employed more than 500 pilots. (Id.).

On March 20, 2002, Defendant RTA combined certain of its assets and liabilities with certain assets and liabilities of its competitor, Flight Options, Inc. in order to form a separate legal entity, Defendant Flight Options. (Id. at ¶ 4). As a result of this transaction, Defendant RTA did not cease to exist. (Id. at ¶ 5). It did, however, cease its operation of fractionally-owned aircraft. (Id.). As such, the services provided by the pilots who were employed by Defendant RTA were no longer necessary, and the employment of those pilots was officially terminated on April 1, 2002. (Id.). The pilots employed by Defendant RTA were under the operational control of Defendant Flight Options from March 20, 2002, until April 1, 2002. (Id.).

Defendant RTA hired Plaintiff Hanold in March 1999 to serve as a pilot in its fractionally-owned aircraft operation. (Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff Hanold did not have an employment contract and, as such, served as an at-will employee of Defendant RTA. (Id.). Defendant Flight Options extended an offer of at-will employment to Plaintiff on February 7, 2002, to begin on the effective date of the merger. (Doc. 63 Ex. K). Plaintiff executed the offer letter on February 11, 2002. (Id.). Pursuant to the terms of his offer letter, Plaintiff attended an indoctrination session at Defendant Flight Options' Cleveland, Ohio facility during March 2002. (Id.). Based on Defendant Flight Options' Chief Pilot Joseph Salata's (Salata) observations of and interactions with Plaintiff at the indoctrination session, Defendant Flight Options decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment. (Salata Dep., Doc. 63 Ex. L at pp. 150-51). Plaintiff's employment was terminated on April 1, 2002. (Doc. 63 Ex. P).

In his latest pleading, Plaintiff Hanold claims that he was wrongfully discharged by his employer solely because he repeatedly refused to falsify maintenance discrepancy logs at the hypothetical and actual insistence of his superiors.¹ Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants specifically instructed him that he was not to make an entry into the maintenance discrepancy log before takeoff as required by law even if the entry was for an item that would not result in delay to flight operations. (Pl.'s Am. Pet., Doc. 61 at ¶ 44). Plaintiff further alleges that when Defendants understood that he would not conform to their "criminal practices," he was "threatened with termination, targeted for termination by the various Raytheon Subsidiaries and terminated by each of them in turn in a coordinated and a conspiratorial fashion." (Id. at ¶ 46). Plaintiff maintains that he was put on a list targeted for termination which was then passed on to the operational managers at Defendant Flight Options who subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment, effective April 1, 2002. (Id.; Doc. 63 Ex. P).

The remainder of Plaintiff's allegations are, in large part, related to his allegation of wrongful discharge for failure to falsify maintenance discrepancy logs. To the extent those allegations include additional facts, the Court cites to and discusses those in its analysis of each of the remaining claims.

II. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment

A party moving for summary judgment must inform the court of the basis for the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir.2003). The substantive law governing the suit identifies the essential elements of the claims at issue and, therefore, indicates which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas essential to the nonmovant's claim in which there is an "absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the adequacy of any response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).

Once the movant meets its burden, however, the nonmovant must direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)). Instead, the non-moving party must produce evidence upon which a jury could reasonably base a verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2005). To do so, the nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial." Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of North Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.1998). Unsubstantiated and subjective beliefs and conclusory allegations and opinions of fact are not competent summary judgment evidence. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998); Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir.1996); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992). Nor are pleadings summary judgment evidence. Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). The non-movant cannot discharge his burden by offering vague allegations and legal conclusions. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir.1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Nor...