Hanshaw v. River Valley Health Systems
| Decision Date | 07 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02CA31.,02CA31. |
| Citation | 789 N.E.2d 680 |
| Parties | TERRIA HANSHAW, A MINOR, BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND LEGAL GUARDIAN, CONNIE HANSHAW, AND JIMMY HANSHAW AND CONNIE HANSHAW, INDIVIDUALLY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RIVER VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEMS, F/K/A LAWRENCE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court.
William L. Mundy, P.O. Box 2986, Huntington, West Virginia 25728, and Donald R. Capper, P.O. Box 619, Proctorville, Ohio 45669, for appellant.
Gerald R. Draper and Stephen K. Sesser, 155 East Broad Street, 12th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas Court summary judgment in favor of River Valley Health System (fka Lawrence County General Hospital), defendant below and appellee herein. The trial court determined that appellee did not owe a duty to notify Terria Hanshaw, plaintiff below and appellant herein, of abnormal newborn screening results.
{¶2} Appellant raises the following assignments of error for our review:
{¶3} The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. On December 14, 1986, Karen Lewis gave birth to Terria Lewis at Lawrence County General Hospital. Dr. Thomas Tsou was the attending physician
{¶4} In 1986, Ohio Admin. Code 3701-45-01 required children to undergo newborn screening. Thus, Dr. Tsou ordered newborn screening test to be performed on Terria. On December 16, 1986, Terria's blood was drawn for newborn testing. The test results subsequently were sent to both Dr. Tsou and appellee. The test results were abnormal, indicating that Terria had homocystinuria. Upon receiving the results, the hospital placed them in Terria's medical chart. The hospital did not contact Terria's mother.
{¶5} Dr. Tsou also received Terria's test results. Dr. Tsou stated that upon receiving newborn screening results, he routinely notified the parents of the results and advised the parents of any need for a follow-up. For reasons not entirely clear, no follow-up tests were performed on Terria and consequently, Terria's condition went untreated.
{¶6} Appellant subsequently filed suit against both Dr. Tsou and appellee. Appellant alleged, inter alia, that appellee possessed a duty to notify her of the abnormal test results.
{¶7} To support her claim against appellee, appellant retained James Massey as an expert in hospital administration. Massey opined that appellee deviated from the accepted standard of care applicable to hospitals. Massey stated that appellee possessed a duty to: (1) review the newborn screening results that it received; (2) recall the newborn for additional testing; and (3) provide advice and treatment for the newborn's homocystinuria.
{¶8} On May 15, 2002, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and asserted that it had no duty to notify appellant of the abnormal test results. Appellee contended that the Ohio Administrative Code required that the physician who ordered the screening possessed the duty to contact the parent.
{¶9} On May 8, 2002, the trial court granted appellee's summary judgment motion. The court determined that appellee did not possess a duty to contact appellant to notify her of the abnormal test results. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
{¶10} In her two assignments of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in appellee's favor. Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously determined that appellee did not owe a duty to contact the newborn's parents upon learning of the abnormal test results. Appellant asserts that appellee possessed a common law duty to notify her of the abnormal test results and that the Ohio Administrative Code imposed such a duty on appellee.
{¶11} Appellee asserts that it did not possess either a common law duty or a statutory duty to notify appellant of the abnormal test results. Appellee contends that under the Ohio Administrative Code, it was the attending physician's duty to notify appellant. Thus, appellee argues that the Ohio Administrative Code placed no duty upon it to notify appellant of the abnormal test results. Appellee further asserts that the Ohio Administrative Code abrogates any common law negligence action appellant may have against it.
{¶12} Initially, we note that when an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. See, e.g., Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243; Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment was appropriate and need not defer to the trial court's decision. See Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153; Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-12, 599 N.E.2d 786. In determining whether a trial court properly granted a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court must review the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment as set forth in Civ.R. 56, as well as the applicable law.
{¶13} Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
* * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.
{¶14} Thus, a trial court may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless the evidence before the court demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. See, e.g., Vahila v.. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429-30, 674 N.E.2d 1164.
{¶15} In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on "unsupported allegations in the pleadings." Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46, 47. Rather, Civ.R. 56 requires the nonmoving party to respond with competent evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Specifically, Civ.R. 56(E) provides:
* * * When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
{¶16} Consequently, once the moving party satisfies its Civ.R. 56 burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate, by affidavit or by producing evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C), that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. A trial court may grant a properly supported motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, 273; Jackson v. Alert Fire & Safety Equip., Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 48, 52, 567 N.E.2d 1027, 1031.
{¶17} In order to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care; and (3) as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's breach, the plaintiff suffered injury. See Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d 575, 578, 733 N.E.2d 1161; Texler v. D.O. Summers Cleaners, 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 680, 693 N.E.2d 217; Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142, 539 N.E.2d 614; Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707.
{¶18} If a defendant points to evidence illustrating that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any one of the foregoing elements and if the plaintiff fails to respond as Civ.R. 56 provides, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Feichtner v. Cleveland, 95 Ohio App.3d 388, 394, 642 N.E.2d 657, 661; Keister v. Park Centre Lanes, 3 Ohio App.3d 19, 443 N.E.2d 532; Lindquist v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores of Ohio, Inc. (Nov. 14, 1997), Ashtabula App. No. 97-A-0015, unreported.
{¶19} The crux of the issue in the case at bar is whether appellee owed appellant a duty to notify her of the newborn screening results. Appellant maintains that appellee...
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