Hanson v. BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD COM'RS

Decision Date03 January 2002
Docket NumberDocket No. 117176,Docket No. 117973.
Citation638 N.W.2d 396,465 Mich. 492
PartiesLucia J. HANSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nels Thomas Hanson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD COMMISIONERS OF the COUNTY OF MCOSTA, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Dallas Joseph Sullivan, Defendant. Lucia J. Hanson, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nels Thomas Hanson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Board of County Road Commissioners of the County of Mecosta, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Dallas Joseph Sullivan, Defendant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Ray Kent, Grand Rapids, and Sidley & Austin, (by Thomas F. Ryan), Chicago, IL, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge, P.C, (by Jon D. Vander Ploeg), Grand Rapids, for the defendant-appellee Mecosta County Board of County Road Commissioners.

Garan, Lucow, Miller & Seward, P.C, (by John W. Sharp), Traverse City, for defendant Sullivan.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff's decedent died as a result of a motor vehicle accident on a road under the jurisdiction of defendant Mecosta County Board of Road Commissioners. Plaintiff sued both the other driver and the road commission, contending that the accident was caused in part by the defective condition of the roadway, and that this claim was within the highway exception to the governmental immunity statute. MCL 691.1402(1). Among other things, the plaintiff alleged that the slope of the road at the crest of a hill prevented drivers from seeing each other in time to avoid a collision. The circuit court granted summary disposition for the road commission, and, on rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The plaintiff's allegations regarding the slope of the road present a claim of defective design, which is not within the road commission's duty to maintain and repair the highway under § 1402(1). We therefore affirm the decisions of the lower courts.

I

Plaintiff's decedent, Nels Hanson, was seriously injured in a head-on automobile collision on August 3, 1994, and died the following day. Decedent and the other driver, defendant Dallas Joseph Sullivan, were driving in opposite directions on 160th Avenue, an unpaved road in Mecosta County. It appears that the accident occurred as both vehicles were approaching the crest of a hill. Plaintiff maintained that Sullivan had crossed over the center line, though expert testimony developed during discovery suggested that both drivers may have done so.1 The essence of plaintiff's claim against the road commission was that the section of highway in question was unsafe because of the limited sight distance caused by the curvature of the hill. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the road commission breached its duties by:

a. Failing to keep the improved, travelled portion of 160th Avenue in a reasonable state of repair and reasonably safe and convenient for public travel;
b. Failing to grade and profile 160th Avenue on the hill north of 22 Mile Road to conform to the applicable standards for sight distance;
c. Maintaining the grade and profile of 160th Avenue on the hill north of 22 Mile Road so that southbound motorists did not have a safe sight distance as they climbed the hill;
d. Failing to provide adequate warning to southbound motorists of the limited sight distance on the hill north of 22 Mile Road;
e. Failing to reduce the speed limit on 160th Avenue in recognition of the danger posed by the limited sight distance;
f. Failing to maintain 160th Avenue at a proper and adequate width given the limited sight distance caused by the grade and profile of the hill to provide motorists reasonable margins of error in their driving patterns and allow oncoming vehicles to safely pass each other at the crest of the hill;
g. Failing to provide proper or adequate shoulder area for emergency use by motorists climbing the hill; and
h. Carelessly and negligently breaching its statutory duties.

Among other defenses, the road commission contended that plaintiff's claim was barred because it was not within the highway exception to the governmental immunity statute, M.C.L. § 691.1402(1), which provides:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 2a, each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure, and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21 of chapter IV of 1909 PA 283, M.C.L. § 224.21. The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.

The circuit court granted summary disposition for the defendant, concluding that the highway exception did not apply and that the road commission was protected by governmental immunity. The court also rejected the plaintiff's nuisance theory.2

The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court's initial decision affirmed in part and reversed in part.3 The Court concluded that summary disposition was properly granted on the nuisance theory. However, it reversed on the highway exception. The Court relied on Pick v. Szymczak, 451 Mich. 607, 548 N.W.2d 603 (1996), for the proposition that the duty of highway maintenance includes a duty to erect adequate warning signs or traffic control devices at a "point of hazard" or a "point of special danger". The Court of Appeals said that the evidence submitted created a genuine issue of material fact about whether the hill crest was a point of danger to such an extent that the defendant had a duty to provide adequate warning signs.

On June 30, 2000, the defendant road commission filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court,4 and on the same day the plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals. While that motion was pending, on July 28, 2000, we decided Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000), which clarified the law regarding the highway exception and overruled Pick. In light of Nawrocki, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing and reversed itself on the highway exception issue, affirming the circuit court's grant of summary disposition.5

The plaintiff has filed an application for leave to appeal from that decision.6

II

This case involves a review of a decision on a motion for summary disposition, and presents an issue of statutory construction, both of which we review de novo. Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 464 Mich. 456, 461, 628 N.W.2d 515 (2001); Brown v. Michigan Health Care Corp., 463 Mich. 368, 374, 617 N.W.2d 301 (2000).

III

In Naivrocki and its companion case, Evens v. Shiawassee County Rd. Comm'rs, we relied on Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), for the basic principle that the immunity conferred on governmental agencies is a broad one, with only narrowly drawn exceptions. 420 Mich, at 618, 363 N.W.2d 641. In rejecting Brian Evens' claim that the repair and maintenance obligation imposed by the highway exception includes a duty to install, maintain, repair, or improve traffic control devices, we examined the plain language of § 1402(1). While we agreed with Pick that the first sentence of the statutory clause creates a general duty to repair and maintain highways so they are reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, we noted that the duty with regard to state and county road commissioners is significantly limited, extending "only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." We explained:

Nowhere in this language, or anywhere else in the statutory clause, do phrases such as "known points of hazard," "points of special danger," "integral parts of the highway," or "traffic sign maintenance" appear. We are not persuaded that the highway exception contemplates "conditions" arising from "pointfs] of hazard," "areas of special danger," or "integral parts of the highway," outside the actual roadbed, paved or unpaved, designed for vehicular travel. None of these phrases or concepts appears anywhere within the provision of the highway exception. To continue to rely upon these phrases in determining the scope of the highway exception is contrary to the language selected by the Legislature in creating this exception. [463 Mich, at 176-177,615 N.W.2d 702 (emphasis supplied).]

In light of those principles, we concluded that Pick must be overruled and the liability of state and county road commissions limited. We said:

The state and county road commissions' duty, under the highway exception, is only implicated upon their failure to repair or maintain the actual physical structure of the roadbed surface, paved or unpaved, designed for vehicular travel, which in turn proximately causes injury or damage. Scheurman [ v. Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich. 619, 631, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990) ]. A plaintiff making a claim of inadequate signage, like a plaintiff making a claim of inadequate street lighting or vegetation obstruction, fails to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity because signs are not within the paved or unpaved portion of the roadbed designed for vehicular travel. Traffic device claims, such as inadequacy of traffic signs, simply do not involve a dangerous or defective condition in the improved portion of the highway
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