Pick v. Szymczak, Docket No. 98142

Decision Date05 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 7,Docket No. 98142,7
Citation548 N.W.2d 603,451 Mich. 607
PartiesJohn Oliver PICK and Sally Pick, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jan Albert SZYMCZAK and Gratiot County Road Commission, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Oade, Stroud & Kleiman, P.C. by Ted W. Stroud, East Lansing, for plaintiffs.

Fordney, Dust & Prine by Andrew W. Prine, P.C., Saginaw, for defendant Gratiot County Road Commission.

Law Offices of Wayne J. Miller, P.C. by Anne K. Flaherty and Wayne J. Miller, Bingham Farms, amicus curiae for Michigan Head Injury Alliance.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Brenda E. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, amicus curiae for Michigan Department of Transportation.

Highland & Zanetti, P.C. by John N. Highland, Southfield, amicus curiae for Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool.

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Justice.

This case requires us to revisit the still-unsettled issue of the highway exception to governmental immunity, M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102). Presented for our review in this appeal is the plaintiffs' claim that defendant Gratiot County Road Commission breached its duty to provide traffic control devices and warning signs, "that Scheurman [v. Dep't of Transportation] and Prokop [v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Rd. Comm'r, 434 Mich. 619, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990) ] are dispositive that the road commission had a duty to ... repair and maintain the improved traveled portion of the roadway, but did not have to go outside the roadway proper." The trial

court granted summary disposition for the defendant road commission. We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law, and remand for a summary disposition hearing pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).

I

On September 5, 1988, John Pick was driving his car eastbound on Roosevelt Road in Gratiot County. At the crossroads intersection of Roosevelt and Crapo Roads, 1 Pick's automobile collided with a vehicle being driven by defendant Jan Szymczak. 2

A

Plaintiffs' complaint made the following allegations relevant to this appeal:

21. That pursuant to MCLA 691.1401, et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) [et seq. 3 ..., the defendant, Road Commission, is charged with the statutory duties to design, maintain and repair all roadways within its jurisdiction, including Roosevelt Road, Crapo Road, and their intersection, so they are reasonably safe and fit for public travel.

22. That included within the above-described duties was a duty owed by the defendant, Road Commission, to post signs and other traffic control devices and warnings at or before the aforesaid intersection to assure that same was reasonably safe and fit for public travel.

23. That one of the proximate causes of the collision previously described above, and the resulting injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiffs, was the failure of the defendant, Road Commission, to fulfill their aforementioned duties so that the said roadways and intersection were reasonably safe and fit for public travel, and the said defendant's breaches were in the following particulars:

A. Failing to properly design the aforesaid intersection and roadways to be safe for vehicular traffic.

B. Failing to properly maintain the aforesaid intersection and roadways to be safe for vehicular traffic.

C. Failing to install and provide reasonably necessary traffic control devices at or near the intersection of Roosevelt Road and Crapo Road in Gratiot County, Michigan.

D. Failing to install and provide stop or yield signs at or near the aforesaid intersection.

E. Failing to install and provide warning signs or notices on Roosevelt Road and Crapo Road informing motorists of the approaching crossroad and intersection.

F. Failing to install and provide signs or devices to assure that the aforesaid intersection and roadways were safe for vehicular traffic.

Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). In its brief in support of that motion, defendant argued:

[T]here is no claim in this matter that any condition existing within the "traveled portion of the roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel" caused either vehicle to go out of control, or leave the roadway....

Rather, it is the contention of both Plaintiffs ... that the accident occurred as a result of an alleged "vision obstruction" in the form of an orchard, which was admittedly located on private property, and After oral argument at the motion hearing, the circuit judge stated that "the issue before the Court is what were the duties of the road commission...." Noting that questions of duty are questions of law, the circuit court held "that Scheurman [and] Prokop are dispositive that the road commission had a duty to ... repair and maintain the improved traveled portion of the roadway, but did not have to go outside the roadway proper." Accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition. 4

outside the "improved portion of the roadway designed for vehicular travel."

The circuit court did not specify which subsection of the court rule it relied on in granting defendant's motion for summary disposition in either its bench ruling or its written order. The Court of Appeals noted that the circuit court based its grant of summary disposition on its holding that defendant "had no duty to maintain areas outside the improved portion of the roadway" and, accordingly, reviewed it as a grant under MCR 2.116(C)(8). 203 Mich.App. 138, 139, 511 N.W.2d 694 (1993). We agree, and will review the Court of Appeals decision under the same standard.

B

The Court of Appeals panel cited Scheurman, supra, for the proposition that "the duty [that arises under the highway exception] is narrowly drawn, and extends only to the improved, traveled portion of the roadway of a highway that was designed for vehicular travel; it does not include ... any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." 203 Mich.App. at 140, 511 N.W.2d 694 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals majority then held as follows:

In this case, it is very clear that the orchards on private property adjacent to the road cannot be classified as being part of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Consequently, the existence of the orchards and their influence as a visual obstruction of the intersection creates no duty on the part of the defendant under the highway exception to governmental immunity.

What is not so clear is whether the improved portion of the highway includes improvements that serve as integral parts of the highway, such as signs and shoulders. See Scheurman, supra at 637, n. 29, 456 N.W.2d 66; Salvati v. State Hwys. Dep't, 415 Mich. 708, 330 N.W.2d 64 (1982); Hutchinson v. Allegan Co. Bd. of Road Comm'rs (On Remand), 192 Mich.App. 472, 477, 481 N.W.2d 807 (1992). If there is an "integral parts of the highway" exception under the broad concept of "traffic sign maintenance" that includes erecting signs or warning devices at points of hazard, it appears to conflict with the very narrow definition of duty that excluded street lighting inScheurman. Because we can find no way to distinguish between street lighting and traffic signs, and because both have their physical structure outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed, we must conclude that the defendant is not subject to liability for the alleged lack of adequate traffic signs at the intersection of Roosevelt and Crapo Roads.

Affirmed. [203 Mich.App. at 141, 511 N.W.2d 694.]

The dissenting judge on the panel "disagree[d] with the majority's conclusion that this case is controlled by the limited definition of an improved roadway set forth in Scheurman .... While the Supreme Court in Scheurman, supra at 633, 456 N.W.2d 66, may have clearly stated that there is no duty to provide street lighting because it is not part of the improved portion of a roadway, it did reserve its decision with respect to the duty to post and maintain traffic signs, citing the previous case of Salvati v. State Hwys. Dep't, 415 Mich. 708, 330 N.W.2d 64 (1982)." 203 Mich.App. at 142, 511 N.W.2d 694 (citing Scheurman, supra at 637, n. 29, 456 N.W.2d 66). In the view of the dissenting judge, the circuit court's grant of summary disposition should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.

We granted leave and instructed the parties to "include among the issues to be

briefed whether a 'point of hazard' is created by vegetation growing on private property." 448 Mich. 930, 534 N.W.2d 520 (1995).

II

As a threshold matter, we think it necessary to clarify exactly what claims are at issue in this appeal. Defendant's brief and oral argument in this Court evidence a mistaken belief that plaintiffs alleged a breach of duty only in regard to the vegetation that allegedly constitutes a visual obstruction at the intersection where the accident occurred. 5 In fact, as already noted, plaintiffs' complaint also stated the following claims: defective design of the intersection, failure to provide reasonably necessary traffic control devices or warning signs at the intersection, and, generally, failure to properly maintain the intersection so as to be safe for vehicular traffic. Put another way, plaintiffs' claim is that a governmental duty arises under the highway exception with regard to any factors that actually affect reasonably safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of a roadway.

Defendant's position, based on the purported authority of Scheurman and Prokop, is that no duty of any kind arises under the highway exception in cases where the alleged hazard-creating factor is physically outside of the improved portion of the roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel.

III

Properly characterizing it as a question of law for the court to decide, the circuit judge, citing Scheurman and Prokop, ruled that defenda...

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