Hanson v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue

• Decision Date: 30 June 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC788
• Citation: 328 P.3d 122
• Parties: Andrew HANSON, Petitioner v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

328 P.3d 122

Andrew HANSON, Petitioner

v.COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC788

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 30, 2014

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA1351

Attorneys for Petitioner: Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP, Daniel S. Foster, Chip G. Schoneberger, Christopher Carrington, Denver, Colorado, Gillum Law Group, L.L.C., Shawn E. Gillum, Denver, Colorado, The Orr Law Firm, L.L.C., Rhidian D.W. Orr, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Daniel D. Domenico, Solicitor General, Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General, Cathern Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Division of Motor Vehicles, a section of the Colorado Department of Revenue (the “Department”), revoked Andrew Hanson's driver's license, following a hearing officer's determination that Hanson had improperly refused a blood alcohol test in violation of sections 42–2–126, C.R.S. (2013), ¹ and 42–4–1301.1, C.R.S. (2013). The district court and the court of appeals both affirmed the Department's decision. Hanson petitioned us for review.²

¶ 2 Following the decision we announced today in Francen v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111, we hold that under section 42–2–126, C.R.S. (2011), as it was in effect at the time of the hearing in this case, “probable cause” in the context of the driver's license revocation statute refers to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary for a law enforcement officer to issue a notice of driver's license revocation, not whether the officer's initial contact with the driver was lawful. We further hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license revocation proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 On August 17, 2010, a third party reported to the sheriff's office that a silver Toyota Tundra was weaving through traffic, driving in excess of 100 miles per hour, and had continued to drive after striking a road sign. The third party followed the vehicle until it was parked at a residence in Parker, Colorado. When a police officer, Deputy Ashby, arrived at the residence, he saw a silver Toyota Tundra through a garage window that appeared to be damaged. Ashby called for an ambulance because the condition of the driver was unknown and the car had severe damage. Ashby proceeded to the front door of the house and made announcements. After he received no response, he entered the house through the open front door, without a warrant, and walked into the dining room.

¶ 4 Hanson's girlfriend came down from upstairs and spoke with Ashby. She retrieved Hanson from an upstairs bedroom and brought him downstairs. Hanson had red hair, matching the description from the original witness, and he had broken glass in his hair and ears and was bleeding. Ashby reported that Hanson showed several signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes, unsteady balance, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol. An ambulance and two State Patrol troopers then arrived at the scene, and the ambulance took Hanson to a hospital. Trooper Sajczek, one of the State Troopers, followed. At the hospital, Hanson continued to show signs of intoxication, and Sajczek arrested Hanson to investigate a possible DUI, notifying Hanson of Colorado's expressed consent law. See§ 42–4–1301.1(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2013). Hanson refused to take a blood alcohol test, and Sajczek gave Hanson a civil notice of driver's license revocation for violating the expressed consent law.

¶ 5 Hanson timely requested a hearing with the Department, and he included a request to subpoena Ashby, the officer who entered Hanson's home. The hearing officer granted the request, but Ashby failed to appear at the hearing. Hanson requested dismissal of the administrative action based on Ashby's failure to appear. The hearing officer denied Hanson's request and submitted Ashby's report into evidence.³

¶ 6 The hearing officer concluded that exigent circumstances—the driver might be injured, could not respond when Ashby called into the home, and needed immediate medical attention—justified entry into the home.⁴ Therefore, the hearing officer declined to suppress the evidence under the exclusionary rule and issued a decision and order revoking Hanson's driver's license. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the revocation, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license revocation proceedings and that the initial entry into the home was irrelevant.

II.

¶ 7 Following the decision we announced today in Francen, we hold that “probable cause” in the context of the driver's license revocation statute, as it existed at the time of the hearing in this case, refers to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary for a law enforcement officer to issue a notice of driver's license revocation, not whether the officer's initial contact with the driver was lawful. We further hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license revocation proceedings.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 Judicial review of a driver's license revocation proceeding is governed by statute. See§ 42–2–126(9)(b), C.R.S. (2013). “If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.” Id.

1. Probable Cause for Driver's License Revocation

¶ 9 Colorado's expressed consent law, § 42–4–1301.1, requires an individual to take a blood or breath alcohol test if he or she is requested to do so by a police officer who “[has] probable cause to believe that the person [has] been driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 42–4–1301,” which is the Colorado statute criminalizing driving under the influence, while impaired, or with excessivealcoholic content. § 42–4–1301.1(5), C.R.S. (2013). If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the driver's license should be revoked for refusal,⁵ the officer is required to provide a notice of revocation to the driver and then submit an affidavit to the Department stating the information relevant to the revocation. § 42–2–126(5)(a)–(b)(I), C.R.S. (2013). The Department is required to revoke the driver's license of a person who refused to take or complete a blood, breath, saliva, or urine test as required by law. § 42–2–126(2)(h), (3)(c), C.R.S. (2013).

¶ 10 In Francen, we held that any evidence regarding the initial contact was irrelevant for the purpose of revoking a driver's license under the then-existing section 42–2–126. ¶ 16. We explained that the statutory language only requires that the police officer have probable cause to believe that the driver's license should be revoked, either due to excess blood alcohol content or refusal under the expressed consent law. Id. at ¶ 12–13. Probable cause in this context is held to exist where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious police officer to believe that an offense has been committed. Id. at ¶ 13; see also Colo. Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16, 18 (Colo.1987). The hearing officer need not examine whether the police officer's initial contact was legal.

¶ 11 In this case, the State Trooper at the hospital—the law enforcement officer who issued the notice of revocation—had probable cause to believe that Hanson had driven a motor vehicle while intoxicated.⁶ Accordingly, Hanson was required under the expressed consent statute to comply with the request by the State Trooper to take a blood or breath test. When Hanson refused, he violated section 42–4–1301.1, and his driver's license was subject to revocation under section 42–2–126(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011). The hearing officer was not required to consider the legality of the first police officer's contact with Hanson because any evidence regarding the legality of the initial contact with Hanson is irrelevant for the purpose of revoking his license for refusing to take the blood or breath test. See Francen, ¶ 16.

2. The Exclusionary Rule is Inapplicable to Driver's License Revocation Proceedings

¶ 12 In Francen we decided to follow the majority of other states and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license revocation proceedings. Id. at ¶ 28. We applied our previous decision in Ahart v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998), which requires that we assess “the deterrent benefits [under] a fact-specific analysis that usually involves two considerations: (1) whether the illegal agency conduct is ‘inter-sovereign’ or ‘intra-sovereign’; and (2) whether the proceedings may be characterized as quasi-criminal.” See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446–47, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). Hanson argues that the police officer's report should have been excluded because it contained evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He argues that without this report, there would not have been sufficient evidence to sustain his driver's license revocation.

¶ 13 First, we conclude that the conduct here was inter-sovereign, rather than intra-sovereign. Conduct is inter-sovereign when the agency that committed the violation is not the same entity seeking to introduce the evidence. Ahart, 964 P.2d at 520. In this case, Ashby was the first officer to respond to the scene, and he was the law enforcement officer whose conduct is at issue. The Division of Motor Vehicles—which sought to use the evidence—is a state entity tasked with regulating Colorado's motor vehicles and...