Harden v. State

• Decision Date: 23 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4D10–2615.,4D10–2615.
• Citation: 87 So.3d 1243
• Parties: Larry HARDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

87 So.3d 1243

Larry HARDEN, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D10–2615.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

May 23, 2012.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and John M. Conway, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

Appellant, Larry Harden, appeals his convictions for sexual battery, false imprisonment, and domestic battery. Because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a prior incident of domestic violence that served only to show propensity, we reverse for a new trial. We also write to address an evidentiary issue likely to arise again on retrial.

Appellant was accused of beating and raping his then-girlfriend, K.W., in a motel room following an argument in which appellant accused K.W. of sleeping with someone else. Before trial, the prosecutor notified the trial court that he intended to ask K.W. about her relationship with appellant, including a prior domestic violence incident that occurred about six months before the alleged rape. Defense counsel objected to evidence of the prior incident on grounds of relevance, prejudice, and lack of notice. Defense counsel further argued that the standard was not merely whether there was relevancy, but whether the prejudice outweighed the probative value. The trial court found that the evidence was admissible as probative of appellant's motive and intent, relying on Nicholson v. State, 10 So.3d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Evidence of the prior act was admitted at trial. The jury convicted appellant of sexual battery, false imprisonment, and domestic battery.

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior act of physical violence towards K.W. The state suggests that this issue was not preserved because appellant raised only a “leading” objection at trial when the prosecutor asked about the prior incident and because appellant did not specifically argue that the victim's testimony was “evidence of other bad acts which served only to show propensity to commit crime.” On the merits, the state argues that the evidence of the prior incident was relevant to establish appellant's intent and motive.

As a preliminary matter, we find that this issue was preserved. Notwithstanding the fact that defense counsel did not use the magic word “propensity,” it is apparent that defense counsel's articulated concern was sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the alleged error. See Conner v. State, 987 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (explaining that “no magic words” are required when making an objection and that an issue is preserved for appeal if the attorney's articulated concern is sufficiently specific to inform the court of the alleged error). Moreover, defense counsel's pretrial arguments were sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review where the trial court made a definitive ruling on the record. See McWatters v. State, 36 So.3d 613, 627 (Fla.2010) (“Moreover, McWatters preserved his objection for review by obtaining a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the evidence.”); § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“If the court has made a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).

Turning to the merits, we first note that a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. McCall v. State, 941 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The trial court's discretion, however, is limited by the rules of evidence. Id.

Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact. § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2009). Generally, any evidence relevant to prove a fact at issue is admissible unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. See State v. Williams, 992 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see also§ 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2008). However, even if evidence is relevant, it is inadmissible “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2009).

Similar fact evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts “is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Thus, evidence of other crimes is admissible where such evidence “tends to disprove a defendant's theory of defense or attempt to explain his intent.” Gould v. State, 942 So.2d 465, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Evidence of other crimes is not, however, limited to other crimes with similar facts. See Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 836–37 (Fla.1997). “[E]vidence of bad acts or crimes is admissible without regard to whether it is similar fact evidence if it is relevant to establish a material issue.” Pittman v. State, 646 So.2d 167, 170 (Fla.1994). As our supreme court explained:

So-called similar fact crimes are merely a special application of the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically excluded by a rule of evidence. The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the introduction of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence of other crimes is relevant.

Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988).

In Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court properly admitted evidence that the defendant previously stalked, threatened, and assaulted the woman whom he was charged with murdering. In affirming the admission of the evidence, the court cited Sexton and held that “the nature of Dennis's relationship with the victim was relevant to establish Dennis's motive.” Id. at 762.

Accordingly, even if prior bad acts do not bear a striking similarity to the charged offenses, the prior acts are admissible if they are relevant to show motive and intent. See Nicholson, 10 So.3d at 145–46 (holding that, in the defendant's trial for the murder of his ex-wife, evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts committed against victim were admissible to show the defendant's motive and intent even though they were not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to warrant introduction for purposes of identity); State v. Wright, 74 So.3d 503, 505–06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that, in the prosecution of the defendant for armed kidnapping of the victim, evidence of the defendant's prior acts of domestic violence against the victim was relevant to the issues of motive and intent, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect).

However, where intent or motive is not a material fact at issue, the collateral crime evidence cannot be admitted for the purpose of showing intent or motive. See Pratt v. State, 1 So.3d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In Pratt, this court held that in a prosecution for aggravated battery of the defendant's wife and daughter, it was error to admit evidence of three prior beatings of the wife by defendant during the preceding eighteen months. We explained:

In the circumstances of this case, these earlier incidents of violence do nothing more than demonstrate his propensity for violence with his family members. Neither party did anything to make motive or intent significant to any contested fact. No one suggested any factual issue as to a specific reason for battering the two women. Nor did he claim that his actions were by mistake. Motive, intent and mistake were simply not made pertinent issues in the trial.

Id. at 1170 (emphasis added); accord Herbert v. State, 526 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (in prosecution for aggravated child abuse, error to admit evidence of an earlier beating of the same child; there was no dispute at trial as to the identity, motive, or knowledge of the defendant in beating her son with a belt, and the only issue in dispute was whether or not the beating constituted a crime).

Here, unlike in a murder case such as Nicholson, motive and intent were not particularly pertinent issues in the trial. As our supreme court has explained: “State of mind is not a material fact in a sexual battery charge, nor is intent an issue.” Coler v. State, 418 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla.1982). Likewise, the Second District has held that, in a prosecution against the defendant for sexual battery of his then spouse, it was error to admit a prior incident in which the defendant slapped his spouse, “because the perpetrator's state of mind is not an issue in a sexual battery case.” Hebel v. State, 765 So.2d 143, 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

In the case at bar, the earlier incident of domestic violence did nothing more than demonstrate appellant's propensity for violence against his girlfriend. The primary contested fact in this case was whether appellant's girlfriend consented to the sex; appellant's motive or intent was not significant to any contested fact. See id. at 145. Even if the prior domestic violence incident had some marginal relevance in showing why K.M. delayed reporting the alleged sexual battery, this relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The prior bad act was unfairly prejudicial because it was classic propensity evidence that showed appellant's bad character. Furthermore, on this record, we cannot say that the error was harmless. See Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 547 (Fla.1999) (erroneous admission of collateral crimes is...