Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 10 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1D13–2542.,1D13–2542.
• Parties: Johnnie J. JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

140 So.3d 1067

Johnnie J. JACKSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D13–2542.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

June 10, 2014.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Tallahassee; Terry P. Roberts of Law Office of Terry P. Roberts, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Samuel B. Steinberg and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WETHERELL, J.

Johnnie J. Jackson appeals the judgment and sentence imposed after he was found guilty of burglary of a dwelling and battery. Jackson argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of two previous incidents involving the victim in this case. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse Jackson's judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

Doris Woodard, Jackson's ex-girlfriend, claimed that, on March 29, 2011, Jackson broke into her apartment and attacked her with a knife. Jackson was arrested and charged with burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery (Count I) and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (Count II). He was also charged with aggravated stalking (Count III) for acts occurring between October 1, 2009, and March 29, 2011. All three counts were tried together.

Prior to trial, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce collateral-crime, or “ Williams¹ rule,” evidence to prove Jackson's intent to commit the charged crimes. Jackson filed a motion in opposition to the notice and renewed his objection to the evidence at the outset of the trial. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the State to introduce the evidence, after giving the following limiting instruction:

Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence you're about to receive concerns evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts allegedly committed by the defendant and that can be considered by you for the limited purpose of proving intent on the part of the defendant and you shall consider it only as it relates to that issue. The defendant is not on trial for a crime, wrong or act that is not included in the Information.

And to explain that a little bit more is the three charges in the Information relate to a particular date and time. You're going to hear some testimony about an incident or two from another date or time. Mr. Jackson is not charged with a crime having occurred on that date. That information is coming to you only for the limited purpose of proving the intent on the part of the defendant as it relates to the case he's on trial for. If you understand that, hopefully.[ ²]

Additionally, the final instructions to the jury stated:

The evidence which has been admitted to show other crimes, wrongs or acts allegedly committed by the defendant we talked about before, that would be the earlier incidents, should be considered by you only as evidence as it relates to proof of intent on the part of the defendant. Those are not separate crimes to have him be found either guilty or not guilty of.

* * *

Keep in mind that a separate crime is charged in each count of the Information and while they've been tried together, each crime and the evidence applicable to it must be considered separately by you ....

The Williams rule evidence presented by the State consisted of testimony about two prior incidents in which Jackson allegedly attacked Woodard. The first incident occurred on June 1, 2010, when according to Woodard and another witness, Jackson drug Woodard from a car, choked her, and threatened to kill her. The second incident occurred on November 16, 2010, when according to Woodard, she invited Jackson into her apartment where he pushed her, punched her, and hit her over the head with a stereo speaker. In addition to the testimony of Woodard and the witness to the June event, the Williams rule evidence included testimony from the police detective who investigated the prior incidents as well as photographs of Woodard's injuries from those incidents taken by the detective.

The jury found Jackson guilty as charged on Count I, guilty of the lesser-included offense of battery on Count II, and not guilty on Count III. The trial court sentenced Jackson to 20 years on Count I and 365 days for battery, to be served concurrently. Jackson was granted a belated appeal. Jackson v. State, 112 So.3d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Analysis

We review the trial court's admission of the Williams rule evidence for an abuse of discretion. See LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001).

“[C]ollateral-crime evidence ... is admissible to prove a material fact in issue, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” Wright v. State, 19 So.3d 277, 291–92 (Fla.2009) (emphasis in original) (citing section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes). A material fact is not at issue simply because it relates to an element of the charged crimes and the defendant has pled not guilty. See Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158, 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“Whether a relevant material fact is in issue is not necessarily established by the defendant's plea of not guilty (which denies each essential element of the charged offense), but must be determined from the particular facts and circumstances involved in each case, i.e., has the defendant put such fact in issue.”). If there is not a genuine dispute over a material fact that the Williams rule evidence is offered to prove, “then the probative value of such evidence necessarily has significantly less importance than its prejudicial effect, and the evidence should be excluded under section 90.403.” Id. at 162; see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.9, at 245 (2011 edition) (noting that “[t]he defense's failure to vigorously dispute the fact the Williams rule evidence is offered to prove may well be determinative in the trial court's balancing decision”).

Here, although intent is an element of the crimes for which Jackson was found guilty,³ intent was not a material issue in dispute in this case. Jackson pled not guilty and, at trial, his defense was that he was not involved in the March 2011 incident. He did not, for example, claim self-defense, accident, or mistake with respect to the alleged battery, nor did he claim that he was invited into Woodard's apartment or that, at the time of entry, he did not intend to commit an offense therein; rather, he simply claimed that he was not at Woodard's apartment on the night of the incident and his counsel argued that Woodard's allegations about the incident were not credible. Cf. Miller v. State, 667 So.2d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“[ Williams rule] evidence may be admissible to disprove a defendant's theory of defense or to disprove a defendant's attempt to explain [his or her] intent.”). Accordingly, because intent was not a material issue in dispute, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the Williams rule evidence to prove Jackson's intent to commit the charged crimes. See Pratt v. State, 1 So.3d 1169, 1170–71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reversing admission of collateral-crime evidence that defendant beat his wife three times in the 18 months preceding the charged crime to show motive or intent because the defendant denied committing the charged crime and “[n]either party did anything to make motive or intent significant to any contested fact”); Roberts v. State, 662 So.2d 1308, 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (reversing admission of collateral-crime evidence offered to show intent and absence of mistake because those issues “[were] not actually in dispute”); Jordan v. State, 171 So.2d 418, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (reversing admission of testimony concerning defendants' prior criminal offenses as evidence of their intent to commit the present offense because the prior offenses “had no relevant bearing upon the issue being tried”).

Even if intent was a material issue in dispute simply by virtue of Jackson's not guilty plea, the probative value of the Williams rule evidence to prove that fact in this case is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, particularly as to the burglary charge because the prior incidents are simply not probative of the intent required for burglary. Cf. United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 923 (5th Cir.1974) (explaining that “evidence of prior crimes involving intent of the moment are hardly ever probative of later acts involving similarly split-second intent” and that “such prior crimes have less to do with the specific intent that may arise later ... than they do with the defendant's overall disposition or character”). Indeed, it is noteworthy that the prosecutor did not argue at trial that Jackson's intent to commit the burglary was shown by his prior violent interactions with Woodard; rather, she argued consistent with section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes,⁴ that the requisite intent—“the intent to commit an act therein”—was shown by the time and manner in which Jackson allegedly entered the apartment: at night by prying open the back door with a crowbar.

Moreover, as to the battery charge, the probative value of the prior incidents seems to be premised on the logic that because Jackson attacked Woodard in the past, he had the requisite intent to commit the March 2011 battery alleged in the information. This, however, is precisely the type of reasoning against which the Williams rule is intended to protect. See§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (“Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove ... propensity.”); San Martin, 505 F.2d at 923 (explaining that “if there is one clear category that is not an exception to the general rule against allowing evidence of prior acts, it is that which includes character, disposition, and reputation”) (internal quotations omitted); Harden v. State, 87 So.3d 1243, 1246–47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that evidence of prior incident of domestic violence against victim offered to show motive and intent was...