Hardison v. Shepard, 36010
| Decision Date | 30 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 36010,36010 |
| Citation | 269 S.E.2d 458,246 Ga. 196 |
| Parties | HARDISON v. SHEPARD. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Daryl A. Robinson, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Jones & VanGerpen, D. Richard Jones, III, Charles B. Rice, Atlanta, for appellee.
The Department of Public Safety revoked Shepard's driver's license on the ground that he was a habitual violator as defined by § 68B-308(b)(2). This section allows for revocation of a license if the driver has accumulated at least 15 moving violations in a five year period. After pursuing an unsuccessful administrative hearing, Shepard filed a de novo appeal in the superior court as provided by § 68B-315. He contended that he was not a habitual violator as defined by the code and challenged the constitutionality of Code Ann. § 68B-308, the habitual violator statute.
The evidence produced at the hearing showed there were exactly 15 moving violations in a five year period. One of those 15 was a conviction for violating § 68A-801 by driving too fast for conditions. Chapter 68A-8 is the section of the Uniform Rules of the Road enacted in 1975, Ga.L.1975, p. 1582, which relates to speed restrictions and sets maximum and minimum speeds. Section 68A-801 is entitled "Basic Rules" and provides in part: "No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing." The trial court ruled the conviction for driving too fast for conditions could not be considered as one of the 15 traffic offenses because § 68A-801 is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. Consequently, there were not sufficient offenses in a five year period to hold Shepard was a habitual violator as defined in § 68B-308, and the court ordered the driver's license to be reinstated.
Hardison, the Commissioner of Public Safety, appeals alleging the lower court was without jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of § 68A-801, and that even if the issue was properly before the court, the judge erred in finding the statute to be unconstitutional.
1. Cofer v. Cook, 141 Ga.App. 646, 234 S.E.2d 185 (1977), the court found a collateral attack under § 81A-160(a) proper in a license suspension case where the conviction on which the suspension was based was void on its face. The underlying conviction had been based upon a repealed, and therefore unenforceable, ordinance. While the appellate courts of this state have held statutes with language similar to that of the present § 68A-801 to be unconstitutionally vague, see Carter v. State, 12 Ga.App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913); Howard v. State, 151 Ga. 845, 108 S.E. 513 (1921), we find the trial court erred in holding this statute void on its face.
In the context of the present case, it is impossible to determine the nature of the conduct which gave rise to the charge of driving to fast for conditions. "It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Since the statute could not be declared void for vagueness on its face, the court below erroneously excluded this violation on constitutional grounds in considering whether or not the department had shown sufficient evidence to prove Shepard was an habitual violator.
2. The appellee's complaint in the proceeding below alleged the habitual violator statute, Ga.L.1975, pp. 1008, 1032 (Code Ann. § 68B-308) violates the due process requirements of notice and hearing of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution.
Section 68B-308(a) provides that when the records of the department reveal a person to be an habitual violator, Appellee challenges the right of the state to revoke his license prior to holding an administrative hearing. He requested and received an administrative hearing within 30 days of the department's notice of revocation.
In Weaver v. State, 242 Ga. 8, 247 S.E.2d 749 (1978), we held that the notice provisions in § 68B-308 met the constitutional standards of due process, relying on the case of Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). Dixon involved a due process challenge to a statute authorizing revocation prior to an administrative hearing. As in our statute, revocation was automatic once a certain number of convictions were obtained against a driver, and then an administrative hearing could be requested. The court found that due to the public interest in keeping dangerous drivers off the roads and the need for administrative efficiency, a pre-revocation hearing was unnecessary since the licensee's rights were protected by adequate post-revocation proceedings.
We find that the Georgia scheme of administrative appeal and de novo review in the superior court meets the due process hearing requirements of the state and federal constitutions. In addition the provisions of § 68B-308(a) are held to be a reasonable condition to the acceptance of a driver's license.
3. Although we hold the constitutional challenges to be without merit, we affirm the trial court's reinstatement of...
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