Hargrove v. Okla. Press Pub. Co.
Decision Date | 06 March 1928 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 17767 |
Citation | 130 Okla. 76,1928 OK 158,265 P. 635 |
Parties | HARGROVE v. OKLAHOMA PRESS PUB. CO. et al. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Libel and Slander--Petition not Alleging Special Damages Demurrable Where Publication not Libelous Per Se.
Where, in an action for libel, no special damages are alleged, a demurrer interposed to the petition should be sustained by the court, unless the publication complained of is libelous per se.
2. Same--When Publication Actionable Per Se.
A publication is actionable per se when the language used therein is susceptible of but one meaning, and that an opprobrious one, and the publication on its face shows that the derogatory statements, taken as a whole, refer to the plaintiff and not to some other person.
3. Same--Language Given Its Usual Meaning.
In construing language alleged to be libelous, the court should give to said language the same meaning and understanding as is usually applied thereto.
4. Same--Libelous Per Se to Say White Person is Negro or is Cohabiting with Negro.
In this state it is libelous per se to write of or concerning a white person that said person is a negro, or to write of a white woman that she is cohabiting with a negro.
5. Pleading--Truth of Facts Pleaded in Petition Admitted by Demurrer but not Truth of Pleader's Inferences.
Where a demurrer is interposed by the defendant to the petition of plaintiff, the demurrer only admits the truth of the facts pleaded, but does not admit the truth of the inference of the pleader based on the facts pleaded, unless the facts themselves are sufficient to authorize such inference.
6. Libel and Slander--False Publication that Man is Negro not Actionable Libel Against Wife.
A false publication that a man is a negro is not of itself a libel upon his wife for which she can maintain an action.
Error from District Court, Muskogee County; O. H. Searcy, Judge.
Action by Florence Hargrove against the Oklahoma Press Publishing Company et al. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Thomas J. Wiley, for plaintiff in error.
Joseph C. Stone, Charles A. Moon, and Francis Stewart, for defendants in error.
¶1 The parties occupy the same relative position here as in the trial court, and, for convenience, they will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants, as they there appeared.This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition in an action for libel based upon an article published in the "Muskogee Phoenix" on the 12th day of November, 1925. The publication reads as follows:
¶2 Plaintiff's petition, after alleging that the defendants had published said article, continues:
"Plaintiff states she is the person described and designated in said false and defamatory article as the wife of William Hargrove and that she is a white person; that the said William Hargrove mentioned in said article and described and designated as a negro therein and described and designated as the husband of plaintiff therein is a white person; that said article falsely and maliciously imputes and charges that this plaintiff is the wife of a negro and is calculated to expose this plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy; plaintiff states that she is now about 26 years of age; that for over three years next preceding said false and defamatory publication, plaintiff and said William Hargrove have sustained the relationship of husband and wife; that such relationship was a matter of common knowledge and public repute; that this plaintiff and sala William Hargrove are in truth and fact white persons, and that they each at all times prior to said false and defamatory publication bore the reputation of being white persons; that at no time prior to said false and defamatory publication had this plaintiff been stigmatized as the wife of a negro, and at no time prior to said false and defamatory publication did this plaintiff bear the reputation of being the wife of a negro."
¶3 No special damages are alleged. Therefore, if said publication is not libelous per se, the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition was proper. Matthews v. Oklahoma Publishing Company, 103 Okla. 40, 219 P. 947; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Watkins, 77 Okla. 270, 188 P. 99; Kee v. Armstrong Byrd Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 P. 494.
¶4 Does the published article contain libel actionable per se? The term "pe se" means "by itself; simply as such; in its own nature without reference to its relations" (Standard Dictionary); and, in connection with slander and libel, the term is applied to words which are actionable because they, of themselves, without anything more, are opprobrious. In other words, a publication is actionable per se when the language used therein is susceptible of but one meaning, and that an opprobrious one, and the publication on its face shows that the derogatory statements, taken as a whole, refer to the plaintiff and not to some other person. Kee v. Armstrong Byrd Co., supra; Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co. (Mont.) 239 P. 1035.
¶5 As to whether the article herein is libelous per se, we must consider in our determination only the thought, idea, impression, or opinion conveyed to the reader of the same. If the article, when so considered, engenders in the mind of the reader a conclusion, impression, or opinion of the plaintiff that is defamatory, and as such tends to expose plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, obloquy, it is libelous per se. Bratcher v. Gernert, 77 Okla. 12, 185 P. 1081; Phoenix Printing Co. v. Robertson, 80 Okla. 191, 195 P. 487; Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 P. 224; Stevens v. Snow (Cal.) 214 P. 968; Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. v. Lillich (Ala.) 86 So. 383; Jones v. Greeley (Fla.) 6 So. 448.
¶6 The publication cannot be measured by its effect when subjected to the critical analysis of a legal mind; it must be measured by its natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average lay reader.
¶7 There are, perhaps, some parts of the United States in which a publication describing a white man as a negro would not tend to disgrace or degrade or render him odious in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, but if there were ever two opinions on this subject in this state, the question has been definitely settled in the case of Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946, where the court said:
¶8 And for the same reasons it would hardly be possible to publish of a white woman matter that would more certainly tend to degrade or disgrace her or arouse the scorn and hatred and render her more odious and contemptible in the estimation of her friends and acquaintances than to charge her with cohabiting with a negro. The...
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