Harker v. McKissock, A--114

• Decision Date: 18 June 1951
• Docket Number: A--116,A--114,A--115
• Citation: 81 A.2d 480,7 N.J. 323
• Parties: HARKER et al. v. McKISSOCK et al. NOS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 323

7 N.J. 323

81 A.2d 480

HARKER et al. v. McKISSOCK et al.

NOS. A--114, A--115, A--116.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 16, 1951.

Decided June 18, 1951.

M. H. Goldstein, Philadelphia, Pa., argued the cause for plaintiff appellants, Pro hac vice with the permission of the court. Barney B. Brown, Camden, attorney.

Albert B. Melnik, Camden, argued the cause for defendant appellant.

F. Morse Archer, Jr., Camden, argued the cause for defendant respondents. Boyle, Archer & Greiner, Camden, attorneys.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HEHER, J.

The questions posed here are (1) whether there was a valid secession of the plaintiff Local Union No. 1 from the defendant Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, and (2) whether a self-executing provision of the national union's constitution for the transfer, upon disaffiliation, of the local affiliate's property to the national union is valid and enforceable.

The Appellate Division of the Superior Court unanimously resolved the first issue in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, with Judge Bigelow dissenting. The case is here under Article VI, section V, paragraph 1(b) of the Constitution of 1947 and Rule 1:2--1(b) of this Court.

The national union comprises Local No. 1, composed of employees of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation at its shipyard in Camden, New Jersey, Local No. 2, consisting of employees of the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company at its shipyard in Chester, Pennsylvania, and Local No. 3, made up of employees of the Pusey and Jones Corporation at its plant in Wilmington, Delaware, devoted to shipbuilding and the manufacture of paper-making machines. The national and local units are all unincorporated associations. The contention is that National was organized to secure united action by all the employees of a given industry irrespective of trade or craft, industrial unionism as distinguished from craft unionism, 'One Industry--One Union,' and thus the better to serve the interests of all workmen in the industry; and that to this end the national and local unions came into being as an integrated whole by the common effort of all. It is said that 'membership from the very outset was in the national organization,' and that the central council of that body 'initially set up a constitution under which all three locals could and did govern themselves,' and 'the local union had no existence apart from and before the formation of the national union.' In a word, the insistence is that the local unions derive their being from the national union's constitution, whence comes also the essential rights of membership, and they are in substance and effect but subordinate units for local administration. The Local is deemed 'a mere constituent part' of 'a single integrated national structure.'

But this is not a realistic conception of the relations between the local affiliates and their members and the central body. The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of the association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of the association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence.

The right of disaffiliation was inherent in the compact. The association is essentially conventional in character. It derives from the common consent of the parties, and is limited accordingly. The inquiry concerns the nature and scope of the common undertaking; and, in the quest for the common intention, the situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances are to be considered. Regard must be had to the relation of the parties and the surroundings when the agreement was made and the objects which they were striving to attain. Like other contractual relationships, trade union membership is purely voluntary; and the parties are bound only to the extent set by the agreement. The rights and liabilities of the parties are measured by the contract; and it is the judicial function to enforce the contract in all its terms, save as it may transcend public policy or the law of the land. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators, 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 176 A. 692, 97 A.L.R. 594 (E. & A.1935); Ibid. 119 N.J.Eq. 577, 183 A. 157 (E. & A.1936).

Judicial intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions is generally exerted for the protection of a 'property right' or for the enforcement of what is deemed a contract expressed in the union's constitution and laws. Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 124 N.J.Eq. 269, 1 A.2d 386 (E. & A.1938); Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217 (1888); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70, 14 A.L.R. 1443 (1921); Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1931); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942). The property and contract theories have been criticized as pure legal fictions. One writer suggests as a rational alternative concept the recognition of the union member as 'essentially a citizen within an industrial government,' and the function of the courts as the prescription of 'the minimum standards for the protection of individuals within that government.' 64 Harvard Law Review 1048, 1100. See, also, 43 Harvard Law Review 993; 87 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 985. But even though the relationship be deemed Sui generis, not altogether governed by the principles of the law of contracts, it is yet an association derived from and dependent upon the common consent of the parties, expressed in the constitution and laws of the association, and the legal consequences of the compact are measured accordingly. There is a consensual relation giving rise to interests of substance which the law will protect. And the contract rationalization is generally considered sound and adequate. A voluntary association of this class is in its very nature a creature of contract by its members, though it is not necessarily a legal entity for all purposes distinct from its component members.

The articles of agreement are embodied in the constitution and laws of the association; and it is fundamental in the law of contracts that the legal rights and duties thereby arising shall be enforced as written unless condemned by the law. The conventional combination derives its force from and subsists by the will of the parties, and its dissolution entails such consequences as the parties have stipulated, consistent with law and established public policy. The contract establishes the rights of the association and the component unions and the individual members, in relation to one another.

We have considered the provisions of National's constitution and Local's laws cited in support of the thesis that affiliation 'is not a mere voluntary relation of completely autonomous associations, to be severed at will, but that each local union is a dependent member of the national union, irrevocably tied thereto.' They are not in their nature and sweep definitive of this basic design. They are not, either singly or in the aggregate, indicative of a purpose to fuse once and for all the local unit into the national union and thereby preclude the local autonomy and separate existence characteristic of a voluntary affiliation dependent for its continuance upon the will of the parties. In the main these provisions delineate the jurisdiction of the confederation and the affiliated units with reference to collective bargaining, membership and discipline, assessments for the common cause, participation of the local units in the affairs of the association, and the regulation of the locals in the common interest through the instrumentality of the association. For instance, by Article I, section 6 of National's constitution, that body and the local affiliate 'of which he is a member, and each of them, shall be the exclusive representative of each member of this Union' for the purpose of collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of work, and in relation to all claims, grievances and controversies arising out of the employer-employee relationship or affecting his status as an employee or as a member of the national or local unions. These provisions lay restraints upon the activities of the...