Buckman v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 28 January 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12725
• Citation: 484 Mass. 14,138 N.E.3d 996
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph BUCKMAN & another v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.

484 Mass. 14

138 N.E.3d 996

Joseph BUCKMAN & another¹

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.²

SJC-12725

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued October 4, 2019

Decided January 28, 2020

Ruth Greenberg (John Reinstein also present), Boston, for the plaintiffs.

Mary C. Eiro-Bartevyan (Bradley A. Sultan & Richard E. Gordon also present) for the defendants.

Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the Norfolk district.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Jeffrey G. Harris, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services.

Chauncey B. Wood & Donna M. Cuipylo, Boston, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Tatum A. Pritchard for Disability Law Center.

Mary Price, of the District of Columbia, David Milton, & Rebecca Schapiro, Boston, for Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts & another.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

GANTS, C.J.

As part of the comprehensive criminal justice reform legislation enacted in 2018, the Legislature established a medical parole program for prisoners in State and county custody who are terminally ill or permanently incapacitated. See G. L. c. 127, § 119A, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, § 97. In January 2019, counsel for prisoners Joseph Buckman and Peter Cruz filed separate petitions for medical parole on their behalf. Citing Department of Correction (department) policy, the superintendent for each prisoner informed counsel that the petition was incomplete, returned the petition for the resubmission of the required information, and refused to review it as submitted.³ On February 19, 2019, Buckman and Cruz brought an action in the county court, seeking certiorari review of the superintendents' decisions pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, and asserting claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief. They argued that, under § 119A, a superintendent is required to accept a written petition for medical parole and make a recommendation within twenty-one days of its receipt, regardless of whether the superintendent believes the petition is incomplete or inadequate.

The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, posing three questions concerning the interpretation of the medical parole statute:

"1. Whether, for purposes of G. L. c. 127, § 119A, a written petition for medical parole of a prisoner must be considered by the superintendent of the facility where the prisoner is incarcerated, regardless of the superintendent's view as to the completeness or adequacy of the petition.

"2. Which party bears the burden of preparing or procuring ‘(i) a medical parole plan; (ii) a written diagnosis by a physician licensed to practice medicine under [ G. L. c. 112, § 2 ]; and (iii) an assessment of the risk [for] violence that the prisoner poses to society.’ G. L. c. 127, § 119A.

"3. Whether the Commissioner of Correction [ (commissioner) ], on receipt of the petition and the superintendent's recommendation as to release of the prisoner, must provide notice to the prisoner of the recommendation, as well as a copy of the recommendation and any supporting or related materials."

After the case was reported, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (EOPSS) promulgated administrative regulations pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 119A (h ), that govern the medical parole application process and that replaced the department policy that was in effect at the time the superintendents found the written petitions to be incomplete. We consider the reported questions in light of these regulations.^{4 ,5} After careful examination of the plain language of the statute, and its legislative history and purpose, we answer the reported questions as follows:

1. Under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, a written petition for medical parole of a prisoner must be considered by the superintendent (or sheriff, where the prisoner is in custody in a house of correction) of the facility where the prisoner is incarcerated, regardless of the superintendent's (or sheriff's) view as to the completeness or adequacy of the petition.⁶

2. The superintendent (or sheriff) bears the burden of preparing or procuring "(i) a medical parole plan; (ii) a written diagnosis by a physician licensed to practice medicine under [ G. L. c. 112, § 2 ]; and (iii) an assessment of the risk for violence that the prisoner poses to society." G. L. c. 127, § 119A.

3. The commissioner, on receipt of the petition and the superintendent's (or sheriff's) recommendation as to release of the prisoner, is not required to provide the prisoner with the recommendation, but is required to provide the prisoner with all supporting documents submitted by the superintendent (or sheriff) with the recommendation.

To the extent that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of EOPSS (secretary) conflict with the answers to the reported questions, the regulations are hereby declared void.⁷

Background. 1. The statute. We look first to the language of the statute. Under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, medical release is limited to two narrow categories of prisoners: those with "permanent incapacitation," that is, "a physical or cognitive incapacitation that appears irreversible, as determined by a licensed physician, and that is so debilitating that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk"; and those with a "terminal illness," that is, "a condition that appears incurable, as determined by a licensed physician, that will likely cause the death of the prisoner in not more than [eighteen] months and that is so debilitating that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk." G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a ).

Because those eligible for medical parole are so ill, whether physically or cognitively, the statute does not require that a written petition for medical parole be submitted by the prisoner; it alsomay be submitted on his or her behalf by the prisoner's attorney or next of kin, a medical provider at the correctional facility, or even a member of the department's staff.

G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c ) (1). If any of these persons submits a written petition, the superintendent (or, where the prisoner is in the custody of a house of correction, the sheriff) "shall consider" the prisoner for medical parole, and "shall review the petition and develop a recommendation as to the release of the prisoner." Id. The superintendent must consider the petition promptly -- the statute provides that the superintendent "shall" transmit the recommendation to the commissioner "not more than [twenty-one] days after receipt of the petition." Id.

"Whether or not the superintendent recommends in favor of medical parole," the superintendent must transmit four documents to the commissioner with his or her recommendation: (1) the petition itself; (2) "a medical parole plan;" (3) "a written diagnosis by a physician licensed to practice medicine"; and (4) "an assessment of the risk for violence that the prisoner poses to society." Id. "Medical parole plan" is the only one of these four items statutorily defined in § 119A (a ). It is

"a comprehensive written medical and psychosocial care plan specific to a prisoner and including, but not limited to: (i) the proposed course of treatment; (ii) the proposed site for treatment and post-treatment care; (iii) documentation that medical providers qualified to provide the medical services identified in the medical parole plan are prepared to provide such services; and (iv) the financial program in place to cover the cost of the plan for the duration of the medical parole, which shall include eligibility for enrollment in commercial insurance, Medicare or Medicaid or access to other adequate financial resources for the duration of the medical parole."

G. L. c. 127, § 119A (a ). Once the commissioner receives the petition and recommendation, he or she is required to notify the interested parties -- the prisoner, the person who petitioned for medical parole (if it was not the prisoner), the district attorney of the jurisdiction where the prisoner's offense occurred, and, if applicable, the victim or the victim's family -- "that the prisoner is being considered for medical parole." G. L. c. 127, § 119 (c ) (2). Any of the parties who receives notice "shall have an opportunity to provide written statements" to the commissioner. Id. ⁸

The statute requires the commissioner to issue a written decision, accompanied by a statement of reasons, "not later than [forty-five] days after receipt of a petition." G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e ). Under the statute, "[i]f the commissioner determines that a prisoner is terminally ill or permanently incapacitated such that if the prisoner is released the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society, the prisoner shall be released on medical parole." Id. In essence, in deciding whether to allow medical release, the statute requires the commissioner to make three determinations: (1) is the prisoner "terminally ill" or "permanently incapacitated"? (2) if released, will the prisoner live and remain at liberty "without violating the law"?⁹ and (3) is the prisoner's release "incompatible with the welfare of society"? Id. If the commissioner determines that the answer to the first two questions is "yes," and the answer to the third is "no," "the prisoner shall be released on medical parole." Id. Once the commissioner determines that the prisoner shall be released, the parole board imposes the terms and conditions for medical parole. G. L. c. 127, § 119A (f ).

2. Legislative purpose. Because we consider the language of a statute in the context of the Legislature's purpose in enacting it, we examine the legislative history of the medical parole statute to discern its purpose.

Prior to the enactment of the medical parole statute, Massachusetts was one of only a handful of States without a statutory "compassionate release" or "medical...