Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4D09-2591,4D09-2591
• Parties: BRUCE HARRINGTON and JANET HARRINGTON, Appellants, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

BRUCE HARRINGTON and JANET HARRINGTON, Appellants,

v.CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 4D09-2591

District Court Of Appeal Of The State Of Florida Fourth District

July Term 2010

December 15, 2010

Taylor, J.

Bruce and Janet Harrington appeal a summary final judgment entered in favor of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation in a declaratory judgment action brought by the Harringtons to establish liability coverage under a Citizens' policy for an accident that occurred at their residence. Because the trial court erred in interpreting the policy language, we reverse.

The Harringtons owned real property in West Palm Beach at 477 Mozart Road ("the Mozart property"), their primary residence, and at 301 Vallette Way ("the Vallette property"), their rental property, where they did not live. Citizens issued the Harringtons a homeowners insurance policy with personal liability limits of $300,000. Stuart Williams was seriously injured on the Mozart property while performing work. Williams filed a claim against the Harringtons, who, in turn, sought liability coverage under the Citizens policy. Citizens denied coverage, contending that the policy covered only the Vallette property. The Harringtons filed a complaint against Citizens, seeking declaratory relief that the Mozart property was an "insured location," as defined by the policy; thus, the policy provided liability coverage for Williams's accident under "Coverage L—Personal Liability" and "Coverage M—Medical Payments to Others." The complaint further alleged breach of the insurance policy.

"Insured Location" is defined in the policy as:

a. the "residence premises"; [or]b. the part of other premises, other structures and grounds used by you as a residence, and: (1) which is shown in the Declarations;....

The Harringtons moved for final summary judgment, arguing that the Mozart premises fell under the definition of "insured location," despite Citizens' contention that the Mozart property was not listed in the Declarations as the "residence premises." Asserting that the Mozart property was not covered, Citizens moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that Citizens was entitled to final summary judgment as a matter of law and denied the Harringtons' motion for summary judgment. The court stated that "it is so abundantly clear that when [Plaintiffs] walked in they were seeking insurance not on the... Mozart Road house... but they were seeking insurance on the [Vallette] Way property. I do not believe the policy is so ambiguous as to be required an interpretation to find that there is coverage for the worker's injury on the Mozart Way property. And the policy applies to the [Vallette] Way property in West Palm Beach. So, I'm going to deny the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." The court entered its written order, finding that "[b]ased upon the pleadings, depositions, exhibits, affidavits and other matters of record in this action, there is no genuine issue of material fact. It appears from the terms and conditions of the Citizens homeowners insurance policy at issue in this matter, that there is no coverage for the claim as presented by the allegations of the Complaint in this cause."

The Harringtons appealed, arguing that the court erred in its interpretation of the policy and that the Mozart property was covered by the policy. They contend that the Vallette property met the definition of "residence premises" and "insured location." "The standard of review for summary judgment orders is de novo." Sulkin v. All Fla. Pain Mgmt., Inc., 932 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Questions of insurance policy interpretation—legal questions—are subject to de novo review. Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2010).

Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (citing Menendez v. Palms W. Condo. Ass'n, 736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). Summary judgment should be granted where "'the facts are so clear and undisputed that only questions of law remain.'" Sulkin, 932 So. 2d at 486 (quoting Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 643 (Fla. 1999)). Further, the record must bereviewed by the appellate court in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing City of Lauderhill v. Rhames, 864 So. 2d 432, 434 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) (2009) provides that the parties may rely on "affidavits, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence."

An insurance contract "'must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy.'" Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003)). The policy terms "should be given their plain and unambiguous meaning as understood by the 'man-on-the-street.'" State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The Third District explained:

"A court may resort to construction of a contract of insurance only when the language of the policy in its ordinary meaning is indefinite, ambiguous or equivocal. If the language employed in the policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction or the exercise of a choice of interpretations. In the absence of ambiguity... it is the function of the court to give effect to and enforce the contract as it is written."

Id. (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)) (alteration in original). If the language is ambiguous, the contract should be construed in favor of the insured¹; but if it is unambiguous, it must be given effect as written. Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 2002). Courts may not "'rewrite contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the intentions of the parties.'" State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986)).

Florida courts apply an "objective" theory of contractual intent when interpreting insurance policies, which are contracts between the insured and the carrier: "'The making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of twosets of external signs—not the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.'" Id. at 400 (quoting Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, meaning is derived from the parties' unambiguous language, not from their subjective understandings. Id. Here, when the court stated that "it is so abundantly clear that when [Plaintiffs] walked in they were seeking insurance not on the... Mozart Road house... but they were seeking insurance on the [Vallette] Way property," the court appeared to have been considering the parties' subjective intent, rather than applying an objective interpretation of the policy language.

If an insurer does not define a policy term, "'the insurer cannot take the position that there should be a "narrow, restrictive interpretation of the coverage provided."'" State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1998) (quoting State Comprehensive Health Ass'n v. Carmichael, 706 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). Further, we explained as follows:

Strict construction does not mean that a court must always find coverage. Strict construction does not mean... that clear words may be tortured into uncertainty so that new meanings can be added. Where the insurer has defined a term used in the policy in clear, simple, non-technical language,... strict construction does not mean that judges are empowered to give the defined term a different meaning deemed more socially responsible or desirable to the insured.

Deni Assocs., 678 So. 2d at 401.

If more than one interpretation could be given to the policy provision, an ambiguity results. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 639 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Ellsworth v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 508 So. 2d 395, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)). The Florida Supreme Court explained ambiguity:

"If the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and another limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous." To find in favor of the insured on this basis, however, the policy must actually be ambiguous. "A provision is not ambiguous simply because it is complex or requires analysis.... '[I]f a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms.'"

Penzer, 29 So. 3d at 1005 (quoting Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 2007)) (alterations and emphasis in original).

First, we disagree with the Harringtons' argument that the Mozart property falls under the definition of "residence premises. The policy defines "residence premises" in pertinent part as:

a. the one family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or

b. that part of any building;

where you reside and which is shown as the "residence premises" in the Declarations.

The word "and" is used to join the elements of "where you reside" and "which is shown as the 'residence premises' in the Declarations"; "and" is a conjunction to mean that both elements must be met. Based on the plain, unambiguous meaning, to meet the definition, one must both reside in the dwelling, and that location must be shown as the "residence premises" in the Declarations. The Mozart property does not meet this definition. Although the Harringtons reside in the Mozart property, the...