Harris ex rel. Harris v. McCray, 2001-CA-01627-SCT.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-01627-SCT.,2001-CA-01627-SCT.
• Citation: 867 So.2d 188
• Parties: Victor Lorell HARRIS, a Minor by and through his Mother and Next Friend, Betty Jean HARRIS, and Acting Individually v. Willie McCRAY and the Jefferson County School District.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

867 So.2d 188

Victor Lorell HARRIS, a Minor by and through his Mother and Next Friend, Betty Jean HARRIS, and Acting Individually v. Willie McCRAY and the Jefferson County School District.

No. 2001-CA-01627-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 23, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2004.

Anita M. Stamps, Jackson, attorney for appellant.

John Simeon Hooks, Jackson, James A. Keith, Long Beach, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

EASLEY, Justice, for the Court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. On April 26, 1996, Victor Lorell Harris (Harris), by and through his mother and next friend, Betty Jean Harris, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County against Willie McCray (Coach McCray) and the Jefferson County School District (the School District) for damages resulting from a heatstroke Harris suffered while at football practice on August 21, 1995. The trial court conducted a bench trial. After a full hearing on the merits, the trial court issued its opinion and subsequently its final judgment. The trial court determined that Harris had suffered damages in the amount of $350,000, as a result of the School District's negligence. However, the trial court concluded that the School District was immune from liability under the Mississippi Torts Claims Act (MTCA), Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev.2002 & Supp.2003). The trial court entered judgment for the School District and McCray and denied Harris's motion for reconsideration, new trial and other relief. Harris perfected his notice of appeal to this Court.

FACTS

¶ 2. On August 21, 1995, Harris, then a fifteen-year-old student enrolled at Jefferson County High School, alleged he suffered a heatstroke while participating in scheduled football practice. The football practice was scheduled and conducted by Coach McCray in his capacity as head football coach. As head football coach, Coach McCray had the discretion to determine the time that practice would be conducted and the nature of the practice, including the timing of breaks and cancellation of practice. At all times, Coach McCray was acting within the course and scope of his employment as an employee of the School District.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

¶ 3. While raising various issues on appeal, the dispositive issue raised by the parties necessary for this Court to address is whether the trial court erred in determining that the School District, as a political district and a governmental entity, had immunity from liability under the MTCA for the discretionary acts of an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d).

¶ 4. A governmental entity and its employee enjoy immunity if there is exercise of ordinary care in the performance of a duty under a statute, ordinance or regulation. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(b) (Rev.2002). On the other hand, a governmental entity and its employee enjoy immunity under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d) "[b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion be abused."

¶ 5. After the bench trial, the trial court determined that, "[b]ased on the evidence adduced in this cause ... the damages incurred by the plaintiff were a direct and proximate result of the negligent acts and omissions of Coach McCray." The trial court found that Harris suffered damages in the amount of $350,000, including the $68,000, in medical bills. However, the trial court further determined that pursuant to the MTCA, where the governmental conduct is a discretionary act, governmental entities and their employees are entitled to immunity pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d). The trial court referenced Prince v. Louisville Mun. Sch. Dist., 741 So.2d 207, 211-12 (Miss.1999), where this Court held that the decisions and acts of high school coaches are considered discretionary. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the School District and Coach McCray.

¶ 6. We find that the trial court correctly determined that Harris's reliance on L.W. v. McComb Separate Municipal School District, 754 So.2d 1136, 1141 (Miss.1999), was misplaced. The trial court herein further stated that, "plaintiff [Harris] has made no showing of any failure on the part of defendants herein to exercise reasonable care in the performance of or in the failure to execute or perform a statute, ordinance or regulation." L.W. involved the issue of whether the school district and its employees had violated its statutory duty to provide a safe environment for its students. Clearly, this case was decided based on the application of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(b); therefore, the discussion on ordinary care was quite appropriate. Id. at 1140-43. In short, a governmental entity and its employee enjoy immunity if ordinary care is exercised in the performance of a duty under a statute, ordinance or regulation. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(b). On the other hand, a governmental entity and its employee have immunity under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d) "[b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion be abused."

¶ 7. The facts of L.W. are obviously distinguishable from the case sub judice. In L.W., the complaint alleged:

On October 9, 1995, the minor plaintiff/appellant J.A. turned fourteen years old. J.A. is a student at Denman Middle School in McComb School District. On that morning, J.A. was threatened by a fellow student, Matthew Garner, while in music class. J.A. told Mr. Dykes, a nearby teacher, of the threats. The teacher did nothing in response.

That afternoon, both J.A. and Matthew were in after-school detention. During this time, Matthew again threatened J.A. in front of the detention teacher, Mrs. Paul. As they left detention, Matthew followed J.A. across the school's baseball field. At this point, words were exchanged, and Matthew attacked J.A. Matthew struck him in the face and ordered him to perform oral sex. When J.A. resisted, Matthew continued to beat him and forced him to perform the act. The incident was witnessed by one student and later reported to a coach. Upon knowledge of the incident, J.A. was taken by his mother, L.W., to the hospital.

754 So.2d at 1137.

¶ 8. This Court in L.W. further held that Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-69 "mandates that school personnel maintain appropriate control and discipline of students while the children are in their care." Id. at 1142. Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-69 (Rev.2001) provides:

It shall be the duty of each superintendent, principal and teacher in the public schools of this state to enforce in the schools the courses of study prescribed by law or by the state board of education, to comply with the law in distribution and use of free textbooks, and to observe and enforce the statutes, rules and regulations prescribed for the operation of schools. Such superintendents, principals and teachers shall hold the pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct at school, on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds and during recess.

Again, this is not the factual situation at bar.

¶ 9. The MTCA operates as the exclusive civil remedy over any other civil action or civil proceeding by reason of the same subject matter for damages against a governmental entity or against its employee for the acts or omissions that gave rise to the claim or suit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1). See also L.W., 754 So.2d at 1145

(MTCA provides the exclusive civil remedy for claims of negligence against a school district). Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1) provides in pertinent part:

[T]he "state" and its "political subdivisions," as such terms are defined in Section 11-46-1, are not now, have never been and shall not be liable, and are, always have been and shall continue to be immune from suit at law or in equity on account of any wrongful or tortious act or omission or breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract ... by the state or its political subdivisions, or any such act, omission or breach by any employee of the state or its political subdivisions, notwithstanding that any such act, omission or breach constitutes or may be considered as the exercise or failure to exercise any duty, obligation or function of a governmental, proprietary, discretionary or ministerial nature and notwithstanding that such act, omission or breach may or may not arise out of any activity, transaction or service for which any fee, charge, cost or other consideration was received or expected to be received in exchange therefor.

(emphasis added).

¶ 10. Working in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1), Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) defines "political subdivisions" to specifically include school districts. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g) provides that "`governmental entity' means and includes the state and its political subdivisions." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d) provides:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.

(emphasis added).

¶ 11. This Court finds that the trial court properly analyzed the statutes addressed above concluding that the School District was a governmental entity which fell within the statutory provisions providing immunity from liability.

¶ 12. When an official is required to use his own judgment or discretion in performing a duty, that duty is discretionary. See T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1343 (Miss.1995)

. See also Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935). In Prince, this Court held that the actions of the high school coaches were discretionary in nature. Prince, 741 So.2d at 211-12. The Court...