Prince v. LOUISVILLE MUN. SCHOOL DIST.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-CA-00918-SCT.,97-CA-00918-SCT.
• Citation: 741 So.2d 207
• Parties: Randall PRINCE v. LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, David Chambliss, Bobby Bowman, and Homestead Insurance Company.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

741 So.2d 207

Randall PRINCE v. LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, David Chambliss, Bobby Bowman, and Homestead Insurance Company.

No. 97-CA-00918-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 8, 1999.

Rehearing Denied June 3, 1999.

Christopher D. Hemphill, Columbus, Attorney for Appellant.

David T. Wilson, Paul M. Neville, Jackson, Mark R. Smith, Oxford, Attorneys for Appellees.

EN BANC.

WALLER, Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. This case arose out of a suit filed by Richard Prince on April 11, 1994, against the Louisville Municipal School District (the District), David Chambiss and Bobby Bowman for injures suffered while Prince was a member of the Nanih Waiya High School football team. Prince alleged in his complaint that while practicing as a member of the Nanih Waiya High School football team, he suffered a heatstroke due to the negligence of football coaches Bowman and Chambliss.

¶ 2. On October 26, 1995, the District amended its answer to an interrogatory and listed as its insurer, Homestead Insurance Company (Homestead). On April 12, 1996, Prince moved to join Homestead as a defendant.

¶ 3. On December 20, 1996, the trial court dismissed Prince's claim on a motion for summary judgment by Bowman, Chambliss and the District. The trial court found the defendants were protected by the defense of qualified immunity because the actions of Bowman and Chambliss were discretionary and performed by them in their official capacities. On May 22, 1996, the trial court dismissed Prince's claim against Homestead for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Prince timely appealed listing two errors:

I. WHETHER THE CLAIM AGAINST THE LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, DAVID CHAMBLISS AND BOBBY BOWMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

II. WHETHER THE CLAIMS AGAINST HOMESTEAD INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED

¶ 4. Finding error in the decision below, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS OF THE CASE

¶ 5. Prince alleged he suffered a heat stroke during football practice at Nanih Waiya High School on August 29, 1991, due to the negligence of football coaches Bowman and Chambliss. Prince further alleged Bowman and Chambliss negligently failed to keep a proper monitor on his health and condition, failed to provide necessary liquids and failed to provide necessary medical care in a timely manner. Prince required hospitalization for his injury and claims to have suffered permanent injures.

¶ 6. At the time of Prince's injury, the school district was insured by a policy titled "Liability Catastrophe Plan with Lifetime Settlement Option"¹ issued by Homestead. Prince's mother, Betty Prince, was contacted by the designated administrator of the policy, Doug Ruedlinger, Inc., by letter dated February 26, 1992. This letter stated the company had proof Prince's medical expenses had exceeded the $25,000 deductible and suggested Prince contact an attorney to discuss Prince's benefits under the policy.

¶ 7. Eighteen months after sending the letter informing Prince he had met the deductible of the policy, Homestead advised Prince he had not met the deductible. In a letter dated November 15, 1993, Homestead stated it had received information Prince's medical expenses due to his heatstroke had not exceeded the $25,000 deductible and because no catastrophic injury had occurred as defined in the policy, Homestead denied the claim.

¶ 8. Under the terms of the policy, catastrophic injury is defined below.

"Catastrophic injury" and "student catastrophically injured" are defined to include any bodily injury, including death, the liability for which is covered by this policy, which produces medical expenses in excess of $25,000 within one year of the date of injury. For the sole purpose of determining whether such expenses meet or exceed this definition, such expenses shall be deemed to have been incurred regardless of whether they are payable pursuant to Section III.

¶ 9. Homestead, in its November 15, 1993, letter, stated because Prince's stay in the hospital was extended due to a hospital acquired staph infection not due to his participation in interscholastic athletics or activities, any additional medical costs due to the infection would be factored out and would thus reduce the medical cost below the $25,000 deductible.

¶ 10. On April 11, 1994, Prince filed suit against Bowman, Chambliss and the District alleging their negligence was the cause of Prince's injuries. In July of 1996, Prince filed an amended complaint which included claims against Homestead for breach of insurance contract and bad faith refusal to offer the settlement option as required by their policy.

¶ 11. Bowman, Chambliss and the District moved to dismiss Prince's claim on March 14, 1995. These defendants claimed (1) Prince's complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted; (2) the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity or qualified sovereign immunity; and (3) based on the pleadings, there was no material issue in dispute and the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Homestead joined the other defendants' motion on December 11, 1996, arguing any liability on Homestead's part was derivative of the liability of the other defendants.

¶ 12. On December 20, 1996, the trial court dismissed Prince's claim against Bowman, Chambliss and the District because it found these defendants were protected by immunity. The trial court took Homestead's motion under advisement, and on June 25, 1997, the court entered an order dismissing Prince's claims against Homestead. Prince timely appealed.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. WHETHER THE CLAIM AGAINST THE LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, DAVID CHAMBLISS AND BOBBY BOWMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

¶ 13. We have stated:

In 1982, this Court abolished judicially created sovereign immunity in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982), holding that it was the legislature's duty to determine the extent of sovereign immunity. The legislature responded by enacting Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-1 et seq., which was a comprehensive torts claim act providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Hord v. City of Yazoo City, 702 So.2d 121, 123 (Miss.1997). However, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-6 stated that the Act was not yet effective and that the common law that existed before Pruett would govern until the act became effective. In 1992, in Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 608 So.2d 1288 (Miss.1992), we held that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-6 was unconstitutional because it sought to revive law by reference. Subsequently, we held that Presley was to be applied prospectively only. Robinson v. Stewart, 655 So.2d 866 (Miss.1995).

Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1040 (Miss.1999). The case sub judice is a post-Pruett, pre-Presley cause of action because it arose August 29, 1991. Therefore, according to Robinson, we must follow § 11-46-6 which directs us to apply pre-Pruett common law. Jackson, 739 So.2d at 1040.

¶ 14. For the District, the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandates a finding of non-liability. See Gressett v. Newton Separate Mun. School Dist., 697 So.2d 444, 445-46 (Miss.1997) (finding school district was protected by sovereign immunity for incident occurring in August 1993). ¶ 15. For Bowman and Chambliss individually, "[p]re-Pruett common law mandates a finding of whether the act involved is a discretionary function or a ministerial function.... An official will be immune when the act being performed is discretionary." Id. (citing Coplin v. Francis, 631 So.2d 752, 753 (Miss.1994)) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 16. In Quinn v. Mississippi State University, 720 So.2d 843 (Miss.1998), we were faced with a factual situation comparable to the present case. Bobby Quinn was injured June 22, 1992, while participating in a summer baseball camp at Mississippi State University. An instructor at the camp hit Quinn with a baseball bat during a hitting demonstration. Quinn lost one tooth and suffered permanent damages to four other teeth. Quinn, 720 So.2d at 844-45. Quinn sued the university President, the head baseball coach and an assistant baseball coach, who was also director of the camp. Id.

¶ 17. We affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the three defendants stating "limited immunity applies to actions by a state agency, an arm of the state or local government and the members thereof, who either for remuneration or as a public service, engage in discretionary functions for which the agency or governmental arm was formed." Id. at 849. (citations omitted). The three defendants in Quinn were not present at the time of the injury, but they were "engaged in hiring employees, and coordinating, and supervising the baseball program either directly or indirectly. The motion for summary judgment was correctly granted as [the defendants] were engaged in a discretionary activity that served a public interest." Id.

¶ 18. In a case even more factually akin to the case at bar, Lennon v. Petersen, 624 So.2d 171 (Ala.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the effect of qualified immunity on a negligence action brought against a soccer coach and university trainer by an injured soccer player. Lennon, 624 So.2d at 171. Patrick Lennon alleged his coach was negligent in not recognizing his injuries and providing the proper treatment. Id. at 173. Lennon experienced sharp pain in his hip and groin during soccer practice and received treatment from the University of Alabama at Huntsville athletic trainer, Debbie Lee. Id. Lee diagnosed his injury as "groin strain" and treated him with ice and electricity. Id. Lennon's injury persisted and he sought treatment from a physician after the season ended. Lennon's physician diagnosed his condition as avascular...