S.K. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (In re Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ.)

• Decision Date: 27 January 2012
• Docket Number: 1101401.
• Citation: 280 Ed. Law Rep. 1190,88 So.3d 837
• Parties: Ex parte MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. (In re S.K., a minor, by and through her mother, Tertrina Capehart v. Montgomery County Board of Education et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

88 So.3d 837

280 Ed. Law Rep. 1190

Ex parte MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.(In re S.K., a minor, by and through her mother, Tertrina Capehart

v.Montgomery County Board of Education et al.).

1101401.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 27, 2012.

Mark S. Boardman and Dana Bolden Hill of Boardman, Carr, Hutcheson & Bennett, P.C., Chelsea, for petitioners.

Karen Sampson Rodgers, Montgomery, for respondent.

MAIN, Justice.

The Montgomery County Board of Education (“the Board”); its members Charlotte Meadows, Eleanor Lewis Dawkins, Mary Briers, Melissa B. Snowden, Robert Porterfield, Beverly Ross, and Heather Sellers (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Board members”); and Elaine L. Guice, a teacher in the Montgomery County School System (“Guice”), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment as to the claims filed against them by S.K. by and through S.K.'s mother, Tertrina Capehart, and to enter an order granting their summary-judgment motion. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

According to the complaint, on April 26, 2007, S.K., a third-grade student at Peter Crump Elementary School in Montgomery County, went into the restroom with two friends; Guice, her third-grade teacher, did not accompany them. S.K. claimed that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the stall door jammed. She further claimed that she attempted to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hook or hanger on the back of the door. On April 24, 2009, S.K., by and through her mother, Tertrina Capehart, sued the Board, the Board members in their official capacities, and Guice, both individually and in her official capacity, asserting claims of negligence and wantonness and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

The Board, the Board members, and Guice filed a motion for a summary judgment. They asserted that there were no genuine issues of material fact, that Guice is immune from suit under the doctrine of State-agent immunity and that the Board and the Board members are immune from suit under the doctrine of State immunity. They also asserted that S.K. was contributorily negligent, arguing that her injuries were the result of her “playing” in the restroom. Additionally, they asserted that S.K. had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to her. On July 15, 2011, the Montgomery Circuit Court issued an order denying the summary-judgment motion. The Board, the Board members, and Guice petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate the July 15, 2011, order and to enter a summary judgment in their favor.

II. Standard of Review

“ ‘ “While the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996)....

“ ‘ “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.2d 402 (Ala.1996). A court considering a motion for summary judgment will view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.2d 397 (Ala.1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand Co., 591 So.2d 486 (Ala.1991); will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra,Aldridge v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So.2d 981 (Ala.1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, Hurst, supra,Ex parte Brislin, 719 So.2d 185 (Ala.1998).

“ ‘ “An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply these same standards applicable in the trial court. Fuqua, supra,Brislin, supra. Likewise, the appellate court will consider only that factual material available of record to the trial court for its consideration in deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So.2d 1278 (Ala.1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So.2d 595 (Ala.1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala.1992).” ’

“Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912–13 (Ala.2000)). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the petitioner can demonstrate: ‘ “(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’ Ex parte Nall, 879 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001)).”

Ex parte Yancey, 8 So.3d 299, 303–04 (Ala.2008).

III. Analysis

A. Claims against the Board

The Board contends that it is entitled to a summary judgment because, it says, it enjoys immunity, pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901, from the tort claims alleged against it in the complaint. Although S.K. initially conceded that the Board is entitled to State immunity, in her brief to this Court she argues that “the Defendants' immunity” is not absolute when one or more of the defendants have acted willfully, in bad faith, and beyond their authority. She then alleges that she has “provided plenty of evidence that all Defendants acted beyond their authority, acted willfully, and in bad faith.” S.K.'s argument is not well taken. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Board is entitled to the immunity it asserted in its summary-judgment motion.

Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides “[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” It is well settled in Alabama that “[l]ocal school boards are agencies of the State, not of the local governmental units they serve, and they are entitled to the same absolute immunity as other agencies of the State.” Ex parte Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 68 So.3d 782, 789 (Ala.2011). In Ex parte Monroe County Board of Education, 48 So.3d 621 (Ala.2010), this Court held:

“ ‘ “Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides ‘[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.’ This section affords the State and its agencies an ‘absolute’ immunity from suit in any court. Ex parte Mobile County Dep't of Human Res., 815 So.2d 527, 530 (Ala.2001) (stating that Ala. Const.1901, § 14, confers on the State of Alabama and its agencies absolute immunity from suit in any court); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.2000) (‘Under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14, the State of Alabama has absolute immunity from lawsuits. This absolute immunity extends to arms or agencies of the state....’). Indeed, this Court has described § 14 as an ‘almost invincible’ ‘wall’ of immunity. Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So.2d 943, 946 (Ala.1994). This ‘wall of immunity’ is ‘nearly impregnable,’ Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002), and bars ‘almost every conceivable type of suit.’ Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So.2d 281, 283 (1971). Moreover, if an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case ‘presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent.’ Patterson, 835 So.2d at 142–43.”

“ ‘Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004) (emphasis added). For purposes of § 14 immunity, county boards of education are considered agencies of the State. Louviere v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So.2d 873, 877 (Ala.1995) (“County boards of education, as local agencies of the State, enjoy [§ 14] immunity.”). Thus, this Court has held that county boards of education are immune from tort actions. See Brown v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 524 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1988); Hutt v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 454 So.2d 973, 974 (Ala.1984).’

“Ex parte Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 4 So.3d [1099,] at 1102–03 [ (Ala.2008) ].

“In Ex parte Hale County Board of Education, 14 So.3d 844 (Ala.2009), this Court revisited the issue whether county boards of education were immune from suit, overruling Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education, 337 So.2d 1310 (Ala.1976), and Kimmons v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 204 Ala. 384, 85 So. 774 (1920), and stating that ‘because county boards of education are local agencies of the State, they are clothed in constitutional immunity from suit’ and that the immunity accorded a county board of education is absolute.”

48 So.3d at 624–25. Therefore, the motion for a summary judgment based on § 14 immunity was due to be granted as to the Board and a summary judgment entered on the tort claims against the Board.

B. Claims against the Board members and Guice in their official capacities

The Board members and Guice likewise contend that they enjoy immunity under to § 14 for the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. The Board members and Guice are correct. See Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 68 So.3d at 789 (“ ‘Not only is the State immune from suit under § 14, but “[t]he State cannot be sued indirectly by suing an officer in his or her official capacity.” ’ ” (quoting Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 839 (Ala.2008))); and Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675, 681 (Ala.2010) (holding that all claims against a State official in his or her official capacity seeking damages are barred by the doctrine of immunity). “This Court has held that the immunity afforded the State by § 14 applies to instrumentalities of the State and State officers sued in their official capacities when such an action is effectively an action against the State. Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Al...