Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 15 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A11A1615.,A11A1615. |
| Citation | 12 FCDR 1061,726 S.E.2d 455,314 Ga.App. 816 |
| Parties | HARRIS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John E. Harris, pro se.
Barry E. Morgan, Solicitor–General, Christopher S. Lanning, Thomas J. Campbell, Assistant Solicitors–General, for appellee.
John E. Harris appeals the denial of his motion for directed verdict of acquittal in his prosecution for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer. In order to affirm on this record, we would be required to hold that any refusal to cooperate, even the peaceable assertion of constitutional rights, can support an obstruction conviction. We decline to adopt such a rule and find the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. We therefore reverse.
A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is due to be granted when there is no conflict in the evidence, and the evidence and its reasonable deductions and inferences demand it. OCGA § 17–9–1(a). When reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, the reviewing court may consider all the evidence in the case and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga.App. 879, 881–882(2), 583 S.E.2d 922 (2003). But where, as here, the evidence of record includes an audio or video recording, “[t]o the extent that the controlling facts ... are undisputed because they are plainly discernable from the ... recording, we review those facts de novo.” Johnson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 474, 474–475, 682 S.E.2d 601 (2009), citing Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 658–659, 535 S.E.2d 841 (2000). The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is whether under the rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Harvey v. State, 212 Ga.App. 632, 634(2), 442 S.E.2d 478 (1994).
The accusation charged Harris with “unlawfully knowingly and willfully obstruct[ing] and hinder[ing] C SCAGGS, a law enforcement officer, in the lawful discharge of [her] official duties....” Detective Scaggs of the Cobb County Police Department testified that on July 29, 2009, the Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) notified the Cobb County police that they needed to go to Harris's house to check on the welfare of a 10–day–old infant, C.H., and if she were there, to take her into protective custody. Harris is C.H.'s father. Her mother is Kayla Bagwell. C.H.'s older siblings had already been placed in protective custody; C.H. had not been taken at the same time because she had not yet been born.
The police officers had a document reflecting a bond condition for a domestic violence case that restricted Harris's and Bagwell's contact with each other. The residence was the address Bagwell had listed with the police, the courts, and DFCS; and the bond condition stated that Harris could not be at the residence.
Five officers went to Harris's house. They knocked on the door and identified themselves. Harris exited the house and shut the door. An audio recording of the encounter was played for the jury and entered into evidence. The audio recording demonstrated that the following transpired:
Audible footsteps
[Inaudible]
Male Officer 1: Is Ms. Kayla Bagwell in?
Harris: [Inaudible] unless you've got a court order or, or [inaudible].
Male Officer 2: We have a special bond [inaudible]
[inaudible]
Harris: Let me see it.
Male Officer 1: ... special bond ... Ms. Kayla Bagwell [inaudible].
Harris: This case is over with. Be right back, get. I've got a, uh, I've got the resolution to this. There's a ...
Female Officer: Okay, well you're not going back in there by yourself. One of us is going in there with you.
Harris: Okay, then none of us are going.
Male Officer 1: Is the child here?
Harris (talking at the same time as the officer): I want you guys...
Male Officer 1: Is the child here?
Male Officer 1: Is the child here?
Harris: What child? Okay ...
Male Officer 1: The ten-day old....
Harris: Okay, I would like you guys to leave.
Male Officer 1: No sir, that's not gonna happen.
Harris: Okay.
Male Officer 1: We can either do this the easy way or we can do it the hard way.
Harris: What's the easy way and what's the hard way?
Male Officer 1: The easy way is for you to answer the questions.
Harris: I don't have to answer any questions.
Harris: What's the hard way?
Male Officer 1 (talking at the same time as Harris): ... do it the hard way ... for obstruction.
Harris: For what?
Male Officer 1: For obstruction.
Harris: For what?
Male Officer 1: Obstructing ...
Harris: Of what?
Male Officer 2: Our investigation.
Harris: Into what? [inaudible]
Male Officer 1 (talking at the same time as Harris): Into whether or not there's a deprivation of a child.
Harris: That's a civil matter.
Male Officer 1: No, it's not. [inaudible]. You think I do civil matters?
Harris: No sir, I don't.
Male Officer 1: Okay. Then why are you saying you think it's a civil matter?
Harris: Because deprivation's a civil matter.
Male Officer 1: No, it's not. It's a criminal matter.
[inaudible]
Female Officer (talking at the same time as Male Officer 1): No, it's not.
Harris: No sir, deprivation is a civil matter. I mean ...
Male Officer 1: I ain't got time for this. Turn around.
Harris: Alright.
Male Officer 1: Put your hands behind your back.
Harris: Alright, fine.
[inaudible]
Male Officer 1: Put your hands behind your back.
[inaudible]
Male Officer 1: You can sit there and say you want to obstruct us all day long.
[inaudible]
Male Officer 1: I told you and I told you.
Harris: My child is in the house.
Male Officer 1: Okay. See how easy that was?
From the knock on the door to the arrest, the entire encounter lasted 95 seconds. Harris made no threats and was not violent. At trial, Harris testified that
The accusation does not specify the conduct that obstructed Detective Scaggs. At trial, after recounting the events leading up to Harris's arrest, an officer described his conduct as “basically, just refusing to cooperate.” On cross-examination that officer conceded that the basis for Harris's arrest was “only ... two things ... he did not allow [the officers] in the house and he didn't answer questions about the child.” In its brief on appeal, the state argues that Harris's conviction can be sustained on the basis of his “demand for the officers to leave the premises” and his “attempt[ ] to misdirect the officers by repeatedly asking ‘what child,’ feigning ignorance of the situation.”
1. Harris argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for directed verdict because he did not obstruct the police but instead stood on his rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We agree with Harris that his conduct did not constitute obstruction under the statute.
Because our decision is founded on statutory construction, we need not reach Harris's implicit claim that the obstruction statute, as applied to his behavior, violated the Constitution. See Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 327–328(1), 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998) (); Southern R. Co. v. Schlittler, 1 Ga.App. 20, 58 S.E. 59 (1907) (same). See generally Ga. Transmission Corp. v. Worley, 312 Ga.App. 855, 856, 720 S.E.2d 305 (2011) (); Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515, 521(2)(b), 712 S.E.2d 838 (2011) ().
OCGA § 16–10–24(a) provides that a person commits misdemeanor obstruction if the person “knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties.” As an initial matter, we agree with the state that the jury was authorized to conclude that the officers were acting in the lawful discharge of their duties. The state presented evidence that the officers had the authority to conduct a welfare check on the child pursuant to an open deprivation case.
The more difficult question is whether the statute criminalizes Harris's conduct. We conclude that it does not.
The statute's history sheds some light on its intended scope. At one time, this court construed the misdemeanor obstruction statute so that violence—or its verbal equivalent—was an essential element of the crime. See, e.g. Moccia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 764, 765, 331 S.E.2d 99 (1985); McCook v. State, 145 Ga.App. 3, 5(2), 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978). Cf. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga.App. 739, 741–742(2), 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975). But the statute was revised in 1986, and “the offense of misdemeanor obstruction under existing OCGA § 16–10–24(a) no longer contains the element of violence as does the offense of felony obstruction under existing OCGA § 16–10–24(b).” (Citations omitted.) Stryker v. State, 297 Ga.App. 493, 495, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). Hudson, 135 Ga.App. at 742, 218 S.E.2d 905 (). “Certainly the assertion of one's constitutional rights cannot be an obstruction of an officer, or every assertion of such rights would lead to obstruction charges.” Ballew v. State, 245 Ga.App. 842,...
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