Harrison v. Alabama Forever Wild Land Trust

• Decision Date: 22 August 2008
• Docket Number: 1070768.
• Citation: 4 So.3d 1114
• Parties: Joe HARRISON, as executor of the estate of Wyatt Harrison, deceased v. THE ALABAMA FOREVER WILD LAND TRUST.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

4 So.3d 1114

Joe HARRISON, as executor of the estate of Wyatt Harrison, deceased v. THE ALABAMA FOREVER WILD LAND TRUST.

1070768.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

August 22, 2008.

Mitchell D. Hays, Tuscumbia, for appellant.

James A. Bradford and David Burkholder of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham; and Braxton W. Ashe of Ashe & Wright, P.C., Tuscumbia, for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

Joe Harrison, as executor of the estate of Wyatt Harrison, deceased, sued the Alabama Forever Wild Land Trust ("the Trust Fund") and others¹ pursuant to § 6-6-540, Ala.Code 1975, seeking to quiet title to an uninhabited 160-acre parcel of land in Colbert County ("the property") claimed by both the Harrison family and the Trust Fund.² The trial court entered a summary judgment quieting title to the property in favor of the Trust Fund, and Harrison now appeals. We affirm.

I.

The property was originally granted to Greenberry Williams, Sr., by the United States government in 1848. At that time, the property was located in Franklin County; however, the property was located in that part of Franklin County that became Colbert County when the legislature created Colbert County in 1870.

In 1856, Greenberry Williams, Sr., conveyed the property to his son, Ausker Williams, by deed. Thereafter, there is a break in the chain of title because the Franklin County courthouse was destroyed by fire in 1890.³ The next instrument involving the property was not recorded until 1907, when a deed was recorded in Colbert County by which Greenberry Williams, Jr.—son of Greenberry Williams, Sr., and brother to Ausker Williams—purported to convey the property to J.T. Crotts and P.B. Worley. The property thereafter was owned by various individuals and timber companies, with each conveyance recorded in Colbert County, before the land was ultimately purchased by the Trust Fund in 2002. Since that time the property has been managed by the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.

Joe Harrison lays claim to the property via the chain of title involving Ausker Williams. Harrison, a descendant of Greenberry Williams, Jr., disputes the validity of the 1907 deed purportedly executed by his great-great-grandfather and argues that the property was instead passed down through the Ausker Williams family pursuant to the 1856 deed by which Greenberry Williams, Sr., conveyed the property to Ausker Williams. In 1953, that 1856 deed was refiled in Colbert County by Mary Waddell Harrison—the granddaughter of Greenberry Williams, Jr., and the grandmother of Joe Harrison. Subsequently, between 1985 and 1987, the living descendants of Ausker Williams, all of whom appear to have left Alabama, executed quitclaim deeds conveying their respective interests in the property to Mary Waddell Harrison. Mary Waddell Harrison then devised the property to her son Wyatt Harrison—the deceased father of Joe Harrison—when she died in 1990.

On December 23, 2005, Harrison filed a complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court seeking to quiet title to the property. The Trust Fund answered the complaint, and both Harrison and the Trust Fund thereafter filed summary-judgment motions asking the trial court to quiet title to the property in their favor. The trial court initially denied both motions; however, after conducting additional discovery, the parties filed renewed motions for summary judgment and, on January 14, 2008, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Trust Fund without specifying the grounds for its ruling. On February 22, 2008, Harrison filed his notice of appeal to this Court.

II.

"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce `substantial evidence' as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.2004).

III.

Section 6-6-540, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"When any person is in peaceable possession of lands, whether actual or constructive, claiming to own the same, in his own right or as personal representative or guardian, and his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed or any other person claims or is reputed to own the same, any part thereof, or any interest therein or to hold any lien or encumbrance thereon and no action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim, or encumbrance, such person or his personal representative or guardian, so in possession, may commence an action to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same."

Pursuant to this statute, Harrison argues that he presented substantial evidence indicating that he and his family were in peaceable possession of the property and that any evidence the Trust Fund presented to the contrary merely created a genuine issue of material fact for the fact-finder to decide. See, e.g., Adams v. Bethany Church, 380 So.2d 788, 791 (Ala. 1980) ("What constitutes peaceable possession will vary as it is a determination based on the facts in each case." (citing Williams v. Romano, 289 Ala. 190, 266 So.2d 750 (1972))). The Trust Fund, however, argues that the undisputed facts establish that the Harrison family was not in peaceable possession of the property; rather, it was the Trust Fund that was in peaceable possession of the property at the time this action was filed. Additionally, the Trust Fund argues that Harrison's action is barred by the rule of repose. We agree that the rule of repose bars Harrison's action.

In Boshell v. Keith, 418 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Ala.1982), this Court summarized the rule of repose as follows:

"Since McArthur v. Carrie's Admr., 32 Ala. 75 (1858), this State has followed a rule of repose, or rule of prescription, of 20 years. This principle of repose or prescription is similar to a statute of limitations, but not dependent upon one, and broader in scope. Scott v. Scott, 202 Ala. 244, 80 So. 82 (1918); Patterson v. Weaver, 216 Ala. 686, 114 So. 301 (1927). It is a doctrine that operates in addition to laches. Unlike laches, however, the only element of the rule of repose is time. It is not affected by the circumstances of the situation, by personal disabilities, or by whether prejudice has resulted or evidence obscured. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 230 Ala. 567, 161 So. 820 (1935); 30A C.J.S., Equity § 113 (1965), at p. 33. It operates as an absolute bar to claims that are unasserted for 20 years. Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578 (1909). The rationale for this absolute bar to such actions was set forth in Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 58 So. 201 (1912), as follows:

"`As a matter of public policy, and for the repose of society, it has long been the settled policy of this state, as of others, that antiquated demands will not be considered by the courts, and that, without regard to any statute of limitations, there must be a time beyond which human transactions will not be inquired into. It is settled that, after a period of 20 years, without any payment, settlement, or other recognition of liability, mortgages and liens will be presumed to have been paid, settlements will be presumed to have been made by administrators, trustees, agents, and other persons occupying fiduciary positions. It is necessary for the peace and security of society that there should be an end of litigation, and it is inequitable to allow those who have slept upon their rights for a period of 20 years, after they might have demanded an accounting, and after, as is generally the case, the memory of transactions has faded and parties and witnesses passed away, to demand an accounting. The consensus of opinion in the present day is that such presumption is conclusive, and the period of 20 years, without some distinct act in recognition of the trust, a complete bar; and, as said in an early case, "the presumption rests not only on the want of diligence in asserting rights, but on the higher ground that it is necessary to suppress frauds, to avoid long dormant claims, which, it has been said, have often more of cruelty than of justice in them, that it conduces to peace of society and the happiness of families, `and relieves courts from the necessity of adjudicating rights so obscured by the lapse of time and the accidents of life that the attainment of truth and justice is next to impossible.'"—Harrison et al. v. Heflin, Adm'r, et al., 54 Ala. 552, 563, 564[(1875)]; Greenlees' Adm'r v. Greenlees et al., 62 Ala. 330 [(1878)]; Nettles v. Nettles, 67 Ala. 599, 602 [(1880)]; Garrett v. Garrett, 69 Ala. 429, 430 [(1881)]; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 260, 6 South. 46, 9 South. 265, 24 Am. St. Rep. 929 [(1891)]; Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 427, 49 South. 578, 135 Am. St. Rep. 107 [(1909)].'

"Snodgrass, at 176 Ala. 280, 281, 58 So. 201."

(Emphasis omitted.)

The Trust Fund claims ownership of the property by way of the 1907 deed whereby Greenberry Williams, Jr., transferred the property to Crotts and Worley. That deed was properly recorded in Colbert County, and Harrison's ancestors were accordingly on notice as of that date that another party claimed an interest in the property. See § 35-4-63, Ala.Code 1975 ("The...