Harrison v. Moore

• Decision Date: 03 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 18563.,18563.
• Citation: 199 S.W. 188
• Parties: HARRISON et al. v. MOORE et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

199 S.W. 188

HARRISON et al. v. MOORE et al.

No. 18563.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 3, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Reynolds County; E. M. Dearing, Judge.

Action by E. A. Harrison and others against Louise C. Moore and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, the defendant named appeals. Affirmed.

It is admitted by all parties to this suit that the following statement of the facts of the case and proposition of law to be decided are correctly stated by counsel for appellant, which are as follows:

"This is a suit to quiet title to the following described lands situate, lying, and being in the county of Reynolds, state of Missouri, to wit: All of lots 1 and 2 of the northwest quarter of section 31, township 30, range 2 east.

"The case was tried in the Reynolds county circuit court at the November term, 1913, and by the court taken under advisement until the next regular term. At the May term, 1914, the court rendered its judgment decreeing the plaintiffs to be the owners of the premises in controversy and adjudging that the defendants, including the appellant, Louise C. Moore, had no right, title, or interest whatever therein. From this judgment the appellant Louise C. Moore has appealed to this court.

"The facts in the case are substantially as follows: The common source of title is James Dailey. On April 12, 1861, James Dailey executed a general warranty deed conveying to Alexander Rogers the real estate in controversy; which deed was duly recorded in the deed records of Reynolds county, Mo., on July 31, 1873. On July 9, 1861, nearly two months after the execution of the deed to Rogers, this same James Dailey and wife executed a deed conveying to Michael B. Hogan the same premises; which last-mentioned deed was recorded on the same day, to wit, July 9, 1861. The appellant Louise C. Moore, claims title by mesne conveyances under the subsequent deed made to Michael B. Hogan.

"The court will note that, although the deed made to Alexander Rogers was first executed, it was the last one recorded. The sole question therefore in this case is whether or not, under the recording laws of this state, a deed first recorded takes precedence over a prior deed subsequently recorded, in the absence of any showing on the part of those holding under the subsequent deed that the same was procured without knowledge of the execution of the prior unrecorded deed.

"There was no testimony whatever in the record even tending to show absence of notice or knowledge on the part of Michael B. Hogan of the fact that a deed had been made by his grantor to Alexander Rogers prior to his purchase. The appellant contended at the time of the trial, and still contends, that it was incumbent upon the respondents to introduce testimony or make some showing that their grantor, Michael B. Hogan, had no knowledge or notice of the existence of the deed to Alexander Rogers at the time he purchased from James Dailey. The trial court, however, held to the contrary and ruled that the presumption was that said Michael B. Hogan had purchased from James Dailey without knowledge or notice of the existence of the prior deed to Alexander Rogers. Accordingly, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs; and, after unsuccessful motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, defendant Louise C. Moore appealed to this court."

Leslie C. Green, of Poplar Bluff, and Ernest A. Green, of St. Louis, for appellant. R. I. January, of Centerville, for respondents.

WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Counsel for appellant state their contention in this case in the following language:

"Under the recording statutes of this state, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs, and the burden of proof was upon them, to show that their grantor, Michael B. Hogan, had no notice or knowledge of the existence of the unrecorded deed from James Dailey to Alexander Rogers at the time of Hogan's purchase from said Dailey, and that his purchase was for value. There being no showing on the plaintiffs' part of these facts, the trial court erroneously decreed title in the plaintiffs, and its judgment should have been for the defendant Louise C. Moore."

In support of this contention, counsel cite us the following authorities: Section 2811, R. S. Mo. 1909; Holdsworth v. Shannon, 113 Mo. 508, 21 S. W. 85, 35 Am. St. Rep. 719; Young v. Scofield, 132 Mo. 650, 34 S. W. 497; Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. loc. cit. 294, 22 S. W. 623, 38 Am. St. Rep. 656; 13 Cyc. 594; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 288; Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303; Sillyman v. King, 36 Iowa, 208; Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 293, 22 S. W. 623; Hogdon v. Green, 56 Iowa, 733, 10 N. W. 267; Rush v. Mitchell, 71 Iowa, 333, 32 N. W. 367; Hume v. Franzen, 73 Iowa, 25, 34 N. W. 490; Railroad v. Railroad, 116 Iowa, 681, 88 N. W. 1084.

Said section 2811 of our statute reads as follows:

"No such instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder for record."

Under the plain language of this statute, all deeds conveying real estate located in this state are invalid or void, except as between the parties thereto and such others as have actual notice thereof, until the deed is deposited for record. This brings us to the consideration of the question as to upon whom does the burden of proof rest in this class of cases? Counsel for appellant insist that it rests upon the respondent, while the latter contends that it rests upon the former.

In approaching this question, the statute before mentioned must be borne in mind, as it constitutes the line of demarcation between two well-known lines of cases dealing with bona fide purchasers without notice. It should also be remembered that the recording act was designed to have the record of land titles to carry absolute verity upon its face, except in the two instances mentioned, namely, between the parties to the deed and all others who have actual notice of the existence of the unrecorded deed; so, in all other cases where the record is fair upon its face, persons who purchase real estate relying upon that fact acquire a good title against the world, and before that title can be defeated it must be shown that such purchaser was either a party to the unrecorded deed or that he had actual notice thereof, and the burden of proving those facts rests upon those who claim under the unrecorded instrument, as will be shown by the authorities to be presently considered; otherwise, the record of land titles would be of but little, if any, benefit to any one in purchasing real estate.

We will now review the cases cited by counsel for appellant in support of their insistence.

The case of Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303, did not involve the consideration of the statute in any manner, as none of the conveyances in that case were recorded. See last paragraph on page 307, of 8 Mo. After noting that fact, Judge Scott proceeded, and in substance said:

"Although it is well settled that a purchaser with notice of the equity of another from one who purchased without such notice may protect himself under the first purchaser, yet if there are suspicious circumstances attending the purchase which are unexplained, and the answer of the first purchaser is evasive and does not respond to all the material allegations of the bill, it may be inferred that the first purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser, and consequently the second purchaser will not be protected under the first."

This is the old and well-known chancery doctrine which is as old as the English jurisprudence, and therefore needs no further comment. Clearly, that case is not an authority in support of appellant's position, for in the case at bar the respondents' deed was recorded upon the day of its execution and unaccompanied with any suspicious facts or circumstances, whereas the Halsa Case was full of them.

Nor is the case of Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261, 22 S. W. 623, in point. That case did not involve the statute mentioned. The question there was: Did Mrs. Washington have an interest in the land, and was she defrauded out of it; and in discussing that question the court, speaking through Judge Sherwood, in substance said that Smith, the defendant, was not only blameworthy in his transactions with Mrs. Washington, but that he also occupied a fiduciary relation to her. The opinion then properly held, under those facts, that burden of proof rested upon Smith, the person who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. See pages 294 and 295 of 117 Mo., 22 S. W. 623.

The case of Young v. Schofield, 132 Mo. 650, 34 S. W. 497, was one in which the plaintiff, a brother of John C. Young, brought a suit to set aside a sheriff's deed conveying the land of the brother to the defendant in satisfaction of a judgment of $232.63. The grounds of plaintiff's claim were that he was a bona fide purchaser of the land from his brother for a valuable consideration paid without notice, etc. The facts were: The plaintiff was not only a brother of the judgment debtor, but also, after the levy of the execution and during the pending of the sale which afterwards culminated in the execution of the deed assailed, he purchased the land of his brother, as previously stated. Under those facts, the court held that the defense relied upon was an affirmative one, and that the burden of proving the same rested upon the defendant because of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the case. That case was, in our opinion, correctly decided, but it is not in point in the case at bar, for in that case the statute was not involved, and all the facts and circumstances bore suspicion of fraud upon their face; whereas, no such facts or circumstances existed in this case. That case clearly is not in point.

Nor is the case of Holdsworth v. Shannon, 113 Mo....