Harry Gill Co. v. Superior Court In and For Santa ClaraCounty

• Decision Date: 10 December 1965
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The HARRY GILL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Respondent; Stephen Eric SCHNEIDER, a minor, by Raymond C. Schneider, his Guardian Ad Litem, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 23190.

Page 93

48 Cal.Rptr. 93

238 Cal.App.2d 666

The HARRY GILL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Respondent;

Stephen Eric SCHNEIDER, a minor, by Raymond C. Schneider, his Guardian Ad Litem, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 23190.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 10, 1965.

Kane, Owen & Melbye, Redwood City, for petitioner.

Lewis & Whiting, Palo Alto, for real party in interest.

MOLINARI, Justice.

This is a petition by The Harry Gill Company, a corporation, for a writ of mandate seeking to compel the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to quash service of summons made upon petitioner. The sole issue presented is whether petitioner, as a foreign corporation, is amenable to service of process and the jurisdiction of the California courts.

In H. Liebes & Co. v. Erica Shoes, Inc., 237 A.C.A. 19, 21-22, 46 Cal.Rptr. 470, 471, we stated the applicable principles as follows: 'Under subdivision 2 of Code of Civil Procedure section 411, which prescribes the means by which service of summons must be made as against a foreign corporation, it is requisite, in order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over such a corporation, that the corporation be 'doing business in this State. * * *' The meaning of this term as applied to jurisdiction to maintain litigation is stated in Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 855, 858, 323 P.2d 437, 439, as follows: 'That term is a descriptive one that the courts have equated with such minimum contacts with the state 'that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'' International Shoe Co. v. [State of] Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 . Whatever limitation it imposes is equivalent to that of the due process clause. "[D]oing business' within the meaning of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the power of the state to subject foreign corporations to local process.' Eclipse Fuel etc. Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal.App.2d 736, 738, 307 P.2d 739, 741.' (See also Empire Steel Corp. of Texas, Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 823, 831, 17 Cal.Rptr. 150, 366 P.id 502.) 'Whether a Cal.Rptr. 150, 366 P.2d 502.) 'Whether a this state so that jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised depends upon the circumstances of each individual case. [Citations.] * * * [T]he analysis is concerned with weigning the various relevant 'contacts' by the foreign corporation within the state attempting to exercise jurisdiction. [Citation.]' (Empire Steel Corp. of Texas, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, p. 831, 17 Cal.Rptr. p. 155, 366 P.2d p. 507.) In determining whether jurisdiction may constitutionally be assumed the following factors have received attention by our courts: 'The interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents [citation] or in regulating the business involved [citation]; the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another [citations]; the ease of access to an alternative forum [citation]; the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications [citations]; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant's local activities [citations] * * *.' (Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 225-226, 1 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 347 P.2d 1, 3.)'

In the instant case an action for damages for personal injuries was filed in respondent court against petitioner, the Palo Alto Unified School District and Ronald Skillicorn, an employee of the school district. The amended complaint filed therein alleged that on or about August 6, 1963 one Stephen E. Schneider, a minor, the real party in interest, sustained injuries when a vaulting pole, furnished him by the Palo Alto Unified School District and manufactured, supplied and sold by petitioner, broke while he was using it, causing him to fall. Petitioner was served by service upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Corporations Code sections 6501, 6502, whereupon petitioner moved to quash service of summons on the ground that it was a foreign corporation not doing business in California and not subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. The motion was supported by the declaration of petitioner's president which stated essentially that petitioner manufactures and distributes track and field equipment throughout the United States; that it does not now, nor has it ever, done business in California; that it has no representatives in California, and that its only business office and plant are located in Urbana, Illinois.

No declaration was filed in opposition to that submitted by petitioner. However, when the motion came on for hearing the real party in interest presented the testimony of Marvin Stroh, who testified as follows: That he owns Stroh & Co., a company located in San Francisco that sells athletic equipment; that Stroh & Co. started in business in 1951 and since that time has placed approximately 15-20 orders per year with petitioner; that Stroh & Co. has petitioner's catalog and this catalog illustrates petitioner's products and furnishes prices; that every year when petitioner's product line changes it sends its new catalogs to Stroh & Co. and its other California distributors; that when Stroh & Co. requires additional copies of the catalog, petitioner furnishes them; that Stroh & Co. has required additional catalogs every year; that Stroh & Co. sends the extra catalogs to 'anybody that might want them,' including schools and colleges; that when Stroh & Co. places an order with petitioner, it is generally for 'drop shipment'; that when Stroh & Co. is awarded a contract pursuant to bid it orders either directly from petitioner in Illinois or from other national distributors in California; that his company is a California distributor for petitioner; that petitioner has other national distributors in California, i. e., 'The Wilson people in San Francisco' and the 'Rawlings Company' and 'McGregor-Brunswick Company' in Los Angeles; that these companies have added petitioner's line to their supply catalogs; that when Stroh & Co. purchased directly from petitioner, Stroh & Co. furnished shipping instructions, and petitioner would bill Stroh & Co. on petitioner's invoice, and Stroh & Co., in turn, would bill its customer; that when petitioner's products were purchased from a distributor, Stroh & Co. was billed by the distributor; that Stroh & Co. has no contract with petitioner, and receives no commission for its sales; that McGregor-Brunswick and Rawlings place orders with petitioner in the same manner that Stroh & Co. does and have the same type of 'contact' with petitioner that Stroh & Co. does; that he knows of no exclusive agent for petitioner's products in California; that petitioner has no warehouse in California; that he knows of no other advertising done in California by petitioner other than through its catalog; that the national distributors do not have an exclusive distributorship with petitioner for an assigned geographical area; that while petitioner does not have national representatives, it has some national distributors; and that Stroh 'wouldn't talk to anybody in California that would be * * * [petitioner's] distributor, we would only buy from one of several companies if we wanted to buy some of their products'; that no one from petitioner's company had ever called at his business; that he had met petitioner's representatives at sporting goods conventions in Los Angeles; that petitioner has representatives attending the conventions; that he had met a Mr. Eck from The Harry Gill Company at the Los Angeles conventions; that petitioner has samples on display in hotel rooms at the Los Angeles conventions and puts on exhibits for dealers and others to see; and that at the Los Angeles conventions petitioner has catalogs and price lists available for dealers and others to take and use.

The court below denied petitioner's motion to quash service of summons, whereupon the instant petition was filed. Following real party in interest's reply to the petition we issued the alternative writ.

Alluding to the scope of our review, we note that the evidence adduced is not conflicting. Accordingly, we are not bound by the trial court's findings based on the evidence because the determination is a matter of law. (Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal.2d 77, 81, 346 P.2d 409; Sims v. National Engineering Co., 221 Cal.App.2d 511, 513, 34 Cal.Rptr. 537; Emsco Pavement etc. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal.App.2d 760, 766, 1 Cal.Rptr. 814.) We have concluded, however, that the trial court's determination was correct and that it acted properly in denying the motion to quash the summons. In reaching this conclusion we have determined, upon an analysis of petitioner's activities, that they provide the minimum contacts sufficient to sustain service of process upon a foreign corporation.

The facts presented to the trial court show, essentially, that petitioner regularly sent a substantial quantity of its products into this state through four independent distributors to whom petitioner each year furnished catalogs illustrating its products and giving the prices therefor; that the goods ordered were shipped either to the distributors or directly to the consumer in this state; that on occasions, Stroh & Co. would purchase petitioner's goods from the other California distributors; and that petitioner sent its representatives to conventions held in California at which it would display samples, put on exhibits for the dealers and others, and at which catalogs and price lists were made available.

Analyzing the foregoing activities on the part of petitioner foreign corporation in the light of the decisional law of this state, we find that the crux of the holding in the cases which have found similar activities sufficient...