Hart v. State
Decision Date | 28 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-22.,01-22. |
Citation | 62 P.3d 566,2003 WY 12 |
Parties | Jason Christopher HART, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant. Argument by Ms. Kerin.
Hoke MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jay Jerde, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee. Argument by Mr. Jerde.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN1, KITE and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] A Sheridan County jury found appellant Jason Hart (Hart) guilty of aggravated assault and battery for threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon on his former father in-law. After reviewing the record, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and also conclude the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct in closing argument. In addition, we find no reversible error as a result of the actions of Hart's former attorney, who "switched sides" and was employed by the prosecuting attorney's office at the time of trial. However, as detailed below, in future cases involving an attorney who switches sides, a prosecuting attorney's office must do much more than was done in this case to establish, on the record, that the attorney in question was properly screened from the prosecution of the former client.
[¶ 2] We affirm.
[¶ 3] Hart and the State present these issues:
[¶ 4] Hart and Natalie Moline divorced in January of 1996. After their divorce, they maintained an "on-again/off-again" relationship. In February of 1998, a son was born of their union. Sometime in late January of 2000, Ms. Moline informed Hart that their relationship was over. According to Ms. Moline, Hart became very upset as a result. The situation reached a head on January 29, 2000.
[¶ 5] During the late afternoon of that day, Hart called Ms. Moline several times. Scared by the phone calls, Ms. Moline left her home and drove to her parents' home. After speaking with her parents and being assured that her son was safely in the care of Hart's parents, Ms. Moline decided to return to her home. As she left her parents' home, she observed Hart approaching in his pickup truck. Ms. Moline ran back inside her parents' house and called 911. In the meantime, Hart parked his vehicle across the street from the Moline home and exited his vehicle.
[¶ 6] As Hart walked toward the Moline home, Ms. Moline observed Hart tuck a handgun into the back waistband of his pants. Informed that Hart was approaching with a gun, Richard Moline, Ms. Moline's father, went to the front door of the home to lock and secure the door. Hart opened the outer screen door and demanded to be let in. He told Mr. Moline: "Dick, you better let me in." Mr. Moline responded by telling Hart to go home and either cool off or settle down. Hart then pulled the gun out of the back of his pants and showed it to Mr. Moline by holding it straight up in the air, pointing toward the sky, directly in front of a window. Hart then beat on the Molines' front door. When it became apparent he would not gain entry, Hart left. As he walked to his pickup truck, Hart stopped and shot four rounds into Ms. Moline's pickup truck. He then drove off.
[¶ 7] Hart was apprehended within minutes of the incident and arrested. He was later charged with aggravated assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii). A two-day jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict, and this timely appeal followed.
[¶ 8] Hart contends the State presented insufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon. Our standard for reviewing such a claim is well established.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo.1989)). We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence. Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo.1996). We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Id. (citing Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo.1993)). "We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, ... our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did." Id. (citing Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995)).
Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999).
[¶ 9] Hart was convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides in pertinent part:
Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987).
[¶ 10] Applying these principles to this case, we find adequate evidence to sustain Hart's conviction. Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the facts show that Hart went to the front door of the Molines' home and told Mr. Moline, "you better let me in." To reinforce this demand, Hart held up his handgun for Mr. Moline to see. Clearly, this is more than mere presence of a weapon in Hart's hand. Instead, given Hart's demands and his display of a deadly weapon to the man resisting the demands, we are satisfied that a jury could rationally conclude that Hart made an actual threat to use a drawn deadly weapon on Mr. Moline. We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
[¶ 11] Hart next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. Hart points to two remarks, one from the prosecutor's closing argument, the other from the prosecutor's rebuttal closing. In his brief, Hart quotes the first challenged remark:
[¶ 12] Appellant contends the prosecutor's remark was a gross misstatement of the law because intent does matter, even if the crime is a general intent crime. See Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1185-86 (Wyo.1992)
( ); accord Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Wyo.1999). However, when viewed in context, we find no error in this remark. Instead, we find the prosecutor was imploring the jury to focus on Hart's intent with respect to his actions at the Molines' front door, not Hart's purported intent to commit suicide. Indeed, defense counsel, in opening statement, importuned that Hart's intent when leaving his home, with three firearms, was to commit suicide. In addition, one of the arresting officers testified that Hart stated he intended to kill himself. Thus, because Hart's suicidal ideation was a factual issue before the jury, the prosecutor was free to direct the jury's focus with respect to those facts. We find no error in the prosecutor's remarks that Hart's suicidal ideation was not the issue. Such an argument was well within the permissible scope of a prosecutor's argument, as set out in Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2002).
[¶ 13] The second challenged remark came as the prosecutor finished his rebuttal argument. There, the prosecutor stated:
I trust that you'll follow your oath and return a finding of guilty against the Defendant.2
[¶ 14] Recently, in Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 28, 49 P.3d 975, ¶ 28 (Wyo.2002), we addressed Wilks' challenge to the following comment from the prosecutor: "Do your duty, please, and find the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder." There, we wrote:
"Generally, an exhortation to the jury to `do the right thing,' to `do your job,' or to `do your duty' is error if it `implies that, in order to do so, it can only reach a certain verdict, regardless of its duty to weigh the evidence and follow the court's instructions on the law.'" Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 979, 1029 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 1387, 149 L.Ed.2d 311 (200...
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