Hartman v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 10 December 1973
• Citation: 35 Cal.App.3d 891,111 Cal.Rptr. 126
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Russell Andrew HARTMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, Defendant; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. strike prior conviction on constitutional

Page 126

111 Cal.Rptr. 126

35 Cal.App.3d 891

Russell Andrew HARTMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, Defendant The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. strike prior conviction on constitutional

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 10, 1973.

As Amended Jan 9, 1974.

John C. Herbert, San Francisco, for appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen.--Crim. Div., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen.--Appls. Sec., Karl S. Mayer, James M. Lee, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.

THE COURT:

Appellant was charged with misdemeanor drunk driving in violation of section 23102 of the Vehicle Code in a complaint which also charged a prior conviction of a violation of section 23102. Appellant moved to strike the prior conviction on constitutional grounds. The municipal court denied his motion. Appellant's petition for writ of mandate in the superior court was denied. He appeals.

Even prior to the pronouncement in Mills v. Municipal Court (1973)10 Cal.3d 288, 110 Cal.Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273 at least two court of appeal decisions had concluded that the Boykin-Tahl (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449) requirement of an explicit 'on the record' waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights was applicable to the acceptance of all guilty pleas--felonies and misdemeanors--whenever the defendant appeared before the court either in person or by counsel. (Cooper v. Justice Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 286, 104 Cal.Rptr. 543 (hrg.den.); In re Gannon (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 731, 103 Cal.Rptr. 224.) It had also been recognized that 'when a defendant appears in court personally to plead to a misdemeanor offense, the practicalities of the crowded inferior courts will permit some deviation from the strict felony procedure so long as the constitutional rights of defendants are respected.' (Mills, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 307, 110 Cal.Rptr. at p. 342, 515 P.2d 273, 287; In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 336, 42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420.) The record clearly shows that collective advice regarding their constitutional rights was given to the assembled defendants prior to the entry of their pleas. Appellant was fully advised of his constitutional rights, and he was informed that by entering a plea of guilty he waived them. By the actual entry of his plea, he expressly waived them. 'The prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to preserve.' (North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 39, 91 S.Ct. 160, 168, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.)

Appellant also contends that his plea was invalid because he was not properly advised of the consequences of his plea. To advise appellant of the penalties for a second conviction of section 23102 of the Vehicle Code would have been premature. This was his first...