Hartzell v. S. O.

• Citation: 613 S.W.3d 244
• Decision Date: 04 September 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 03-19-00131-CV,03-19-00131-CV
• Parties: University of Texas at Austin President Jay HARTZELL; University of Texas at Austin Registrar Mark Simpson; University of Texas Dean of Students Soncia Reagins-Lilly; University of Texas Regents Kevin Paul Eltife, R. Steven Hicks, Christina Melton Crain, Jodie Lee Jiles, David J. Beck, Kelcy L. Warren, Janiece M. Longoria, Nolan Perez, and James Conrad Weaver, in their official capacities, Appellants, S. O., Cross-Appellant v. S. O., Appellee, University of Texas at Austin President Jay Hartzell; University of Texas at Austin Registrar Mark Simpson; University of Texas Dean of Students Soncia Reagins-Lilly; University of Texas Regents Kevin Paul Eltife, R. Steven Hicks, Christina Melton Crain, Jodie Lee Jiles, David J. Beck, Kelcy L. Warren, Janiece M. Longoria, Nolan Perez, and James Conrad Weaver, in their official capacities, Cross-Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

613 S.W.3d 244

University of Texas at Austin President Jay HARTZELL; University of Texas at Austin Registrar Mark Simpson; University of Texas Dean of Students Soncia Reagins-Lilly; University of Texas Regents Kevin Paul Eltife, R. Steven Hicks, Christina Melton Crain, Jodie Lee Jiles, David J. Beck, Kelcy L. Warren, Janiece M. Longoria, Nolan Perez, and James Conrad Weaver, in their official capacities, Appellants, S. O., Cross-Appellant

v.S. O., Appellee, University of Texas at Austin President Jay Hartzell; University of Texas at Austin Registrar Mark Simpson; University of Texas Dean of Students Soncia Reagins-Lilly; University of Texas Regents Kevin Paul Eltife, R. Steven Hicks, Christina Melton Crain, Jodie Lee Jiles, David J. Beck, Kelcy L. Warren, Janiece M. Longoria, Nolan Perez, and James Conrad Weaver, in their official capacities¹ , Cross-Appellees

NO. 03-19-00131-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Filed: September 4, 2020

OPINION

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

S.O. sued the University of Texas at Austin President Jay Hartzell; University of Texas at Austin Registrar Mark Simpson; University of Texas Dean of Students Soncia Reagins-Lilly; and University of Texas Regents Kevin Paul Eltife, R. Steven Hicks, Christina Melton Crain, Jodie Lee Jiles, David J. Beck, Kelcy L. Warren, Janiece M. Longoria, Nolan Perez, and James Conrad Weaver, all in their official capacities (collectively, the University officials) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the University officials from holding an internal disciplinary proceeding for the purpose of deciding whether to revoke S.O.'s doctoral degree in organic chemistry that was conferred by the University of Texas at Austin (the University) in 2008. The University officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. In this appeal, the University officials challenge the trial court's denial of their plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of S.O.'s claims that the University officials' conduct is ultra vires based on sovereign immunity. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

S.O. earned her doctoral degree in organic chemistry from the University of Texas at Austin in 2008. In 2012, the University instituted a disciplinary investigation into allegations of academic misconduct related to S.O.'s dissertation and, in 2014, attempted to revoke S.O.'s degree.²

The University informed S.O. that her degree had been revoked on February 12, 2014. Two days later, S.O. filed suit against certain University officials (the first lawsuit) asserting that the University's procedures related to its investigation and decision regarding her degree did not comport with the minimum constitutional standards guaranteed by the Texas Constitution's due course of law provision. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. That day, S.O. and the University entered into a Rule 11 agreement specifying that the University would restore S.O.'s degree "subject to further discussions regarding additional process." The University officials then filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which they argued that, because the University had restored S.O.'s degree and initiated a student disciplinary proceeding to consider the allegations against her, S.O. had been provided all the relief she sought in her lawsuit, rendering it moot. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction, and this Court affirmed. See Orr v. The University of Tex. at Austin , No. 03-14-00299-CV, 2015 WL 5666200, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 23, 2015, no pet.).

After dismissal of the first lawsuit, the University proceeded with its investigation and, in January 2016, informed S.O. that it intended to hold a disciplinary hearing concerning allegations that S.O. had violated the University's "Institutional Rules," which could subject her to disciplinary sanctions. S.O. then brought the underlying proceeding in which she sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the University officials from holding an internal disciplinary proceeding for the purpose of deciding whether to revoke her Ph.D. degree. S.O. alleged that such action was ultra vires conduct and a violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. S.O. also sought a temporary injunction to prevent the University from conducting any proceedings related to her Ph.D. degree pending resolution of her claims. The University officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which they asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over S.O.'s claims because they were not ripe. See Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) ("The ripeness doctrine prevents premature adjudication of hypothetical or contingent situations.").

In February 2016, the trial court held a hearing on S.O.'s request for a temporary injunction and on the University officials' plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court did not at that time grant temporary injunctive relief nor did it rule on the University officials' plea. In March 2016, S.O. filed a motion for summary judgment. While that motion was pending, the University informed S.O. that it would conduct its disciplinary hearing on October 21, 2016.³ When the University did not go forward with the proceeding on October 21, 2016, the trial court signed an order reciting that S.O.'s claims were not ripe for review and granting the University officials' plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed S.O.'s claims, and S.O. appealed the dismissal to this Court. S.O. argued that (1) the trial court erred in concluding that her request for a declaratory judgment that the University officials were acting ultra vires was not ripe for review and dismissing it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) assuming the University officials' actions were not ultra vires , the rules the University intended to apply to the disciplinary proceeding would not provide her with adequate due process protection given the nature of the interest at risk and were, for that reason, unconstitutional. This Court held that, of the two issues presented, only the first was properly before it. See S.O. v. University of Texas at Austin President Gregory L. Fenves , No. 03-16-00726-CV, 2017 WL 2628072, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (hereinafter " S.O. 2017 ") ("The trial court made no ruling on the merits of S.O.'s complaints regarding whether the internal disciplinary hearing rules afford her due process."). This Court held that S.O.'s claims for a declaration under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act that the University officials' conduct is ultra vires were ripe for adjudication, id. at * 4, reversed the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction, and remanded the cause to the trial court.

On remand, S.O. filed an amended petition in which she sought the same declaratory relief as in her original petition.⁴ The University officials filed a second plea to the jurisdiction asserting that they "have authority to conduct an internal process to determine whether the allegations of misconduct are substantiated and, if so, what sanction is proper." Thus, they argued, their conduct was not ultra vires , and S.O.'s ultra vires claims were barred by sovereign immunity. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 369-70 (Tex. 2009) (sovereign immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacity). The University officials also asserted that S.O.'s constitutional challenges to any future disciplinary hearing were not ripe and, to the extent her claims constituted efforts to establish the procedures applicable to a disciplinary proceeding, those claims sought to control state action and were barred by sovereign immunity. S.O. filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that she was entitled to summary judgment on her requests for eight declarations because each declaration involved only a question of law. After a hearing on the plea and the motion, the trial court signed an order granting the University officials' plea to the jurisdiction "as to declarations attempting to establish and/or challenge the procedures applicable to her disciplinary proceeding" and denying the plea "as to [S.O.'s] ultra vires claim regarding whether Defendants are acting without authority to revoke a degree." The trial court signed a separate order that granted S.O.'s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to her request for declaratory relief regarding the University officials' authority to revoke her degree, i.e., the ultra vires claims. The University officials perfected this appeal and, in two issues, challenge the trial court's denial of their plea to the jurisdiction as to S.O.'s claims that the University officials' actions are ultra vires. The University officials argue that because they are not acting ultra vires —i.e., because they have the authority to conduct a disciplinary hearing to determine whether to revoke S.O.'s degree—S.O.'s claims for declaratory relief as to whether they are acting without authority to revoke a degree are barred by sovereign immunity. S.O. filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's ruling on two of her requests for declarations unrelated to her ultra vires claims and the trial court's denial of her request for attorneys' fees pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009.

DISCUSSION

The University Officials' Appeal

In their second issue, the University officials argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the University lacks the legal authority to revoke a previously conferred degree and, consequently, their conduct was not ultra vires and S.O.'s claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Our analysis of whether S.O.'s claim is within the trial court's jurisdiction begins with her live pleadings. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff has the initial burden of alleging facts that...