Trauth v. K. E.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-19-00212-CV,03-19-00212-CV |
| Citation | 613 S.W.3d 222 |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Texas State University President Denise M. TRAUTH; Texas State University Assistant Vice President for Research and Federal Relations Michael Blanda; Texas State University Registrar Louis E. Jimenez, Jr.; and Texas State University Regents William F. Scott, David Montagne, Charlie Amato, Duke Austin, Garry Crain, Veronica Muzquiz Edwards, Dionicio Flores, Nicki Harle, and Alan L. Tinsley, In their Official Capacities, Appellants v. K. E., Appellee |
Texas State University President Denise M. Trauth; Texas State University Assistant Vice President for Research and Federal Relations Michael Blanda; Texas State University Registrar Louis E. Jimenez, Jr.; and Texas State University Regents William F. Scott, David Montagne, Charlie Amato, Duke Austin, Garry Crain, Veronica Muzquiz Edwards, Dionicio Flores, Nicki Harle, and Alan L. Tinsley, who were all sued in their official capacities (collectively, the University officials), challenge the trial court's order denying their plea to the jurisdiction in which they asserted that K.E.'s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were barred by sovereign immunity. We will affirm.
K.E. is a former student and graduate of Texas State University (the University). In May 2011, the University Board of Regents conferred on K.E. a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) with a major in aquatic resources. K.E.'s dissertation research involved the in-field collection of leaves using a leaf gas analyzer called a LiCor instrument. K.E. collected the data in 2008 and relied on that data in completing her dissertation. After the conferral of K.E.'s degree, K.E.'s doctoral advisor raised a concern about K.E.'s 2008 data collection using the LiCor instrument and ultimately submitted a written statement to Assistant Vice President for Research and Federal Relations Michael Blanda conveying her suspicion that K.E. had falsified her research data. Blanda then informed K.E. that there would be a formal inquiry by an "Inquiry Committee" into the allegation of research misconduct. In January 2013, the Inquiry Committee issued a report recommending that the University proceed with a full investigation. In March 2014, the University's Investigative Panel concluded that K.E. had committed misconduct in research and scholarship and recommended that the University revoke the PhD degree conferred three years earlier.
K.E. appealed the Investigative Panel's findings and recommendations to the University President, Denise M. Trauth, who upheld the findings and recommendations and submitted to the Board of Regents her recommendation that K.E.'s degree be revoked. In August 2014, the Board of Regents conducted a hearing on the matter, affirmed Trauth's recommendation to revoke K.E.'s degree, and ordered Trauth to "take such actions as are reasonable and necessary" to effect the revocation. As a result, the University noted the revocation on K.E.'s transcript and asked that she return her diploma to the Registrar. Trauth also requested that K.E. cease representing herself as having received a PhD from the University.
In January 2015, K.E. sued the University officials complaining that the University officials' actions had violated her constitutional right to due process. K.E. amended her petition to allege that the University officials did not have the legal authority to revoke her degree. K.E. sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief seeking an order that the University officials take the actions necessary to reinstate her degree and remove any notation from the University's records that "states or suggests that [her] degree was revoked." K.E. also requested that the court order the Registrar to reinstate her degree.
The University officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which they asserted that K.E.'s claims against them were barred by sovereign immunity. While acknowledging that sovereign immunity is not implicated when a suit is brought against a state official in his official capacity if it seeks to enjoin the official's ultra vires conduct, the University officials asserted that they had the legal authority to revoke K.E.'s degree and, consequently, she had failed to allege a viable ultra vires claim within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the University officials' plea to the jurisdiction. The University officials perfected this appeal and, in two issues, argue that the trial court erred in concluding that K.E. had alleged a viable ultra vires claim and denying their plea to the jurisdiction.
In their second issue, the University officials assert that the trial court erred by denying their plea to the jurisdiction because K.E.'s claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. Our analysis of whether K.E.'s suit is within the trial court's jurisdiction begins with her live pleadings. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff has the initial burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause—in this case, with respect to her claims of ultra vires acts, allegations of fact that would demonstrate that the University officials acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. See id. (citing Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) ). When, as here, the facts relevant to jurisdiction are undisputed, the court should make the jurisdictional determination as a matter of law based solely on those undisputed facts. University of Tex. v. Poindexter , 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (citing Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226 ). Whether the plaintiff has met this burden is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally, taking them as true, and look to the pleader's intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. If, however, the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Id. at 227.
Sovereign immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacity. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 369-70 (Tex. 2009). Sovereign immunity does not, however, bar claims alleging that a government actor acted ultra vires , or without legal authority, in carrying out his or her duties. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston , 487 S.W.3d 154, 157-58 (Tex. 2016). To assert a valid ultra vires claim, the plaintiff "must not complain of a government officer's exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act." Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d at 372. Conversely, if the plaintiff alleges only facts demonstrating acts within the officer's legal authority and discretion, the claim seeks to control state action and is barred by sovereign immunity. Id. ; Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Comm'n on Envt'l Quality , 307 S.W.3d 505, 516 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet).
In her live pleadings, K.E. complains of the University officials' "revocation" of her degree, asserting that such action was unauthorized and violated her constitutional right to due process. K.E. has pleaded a cognizable ultra vires claim if her allegations establish that the University officials exceeded the bounds of their granted legal authority by "revoking" her degree. See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. , 487 S.W.3d at 158. To determine whether K.E. has asserted a valid ultra vires claim that invokes the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we construe the provisions of the relevant statutes that define the scope of the University officials' legal authority, apply them to the facts that K.E. has alleged, and ascertain whether those facts constitute acts beyond the University officials' legal authority. See Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d at 372-73 ; Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Sunset Transp., Inc. , 357 S.W.3d 691, 701 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.).
Texas State University is included within the Texas State University System. See Tex. Educ. Code § 96.41 (). The University's authority derives from the Texas Education Code, which provides for the Texas State University System. See id. § 95.01-.06 (). Broadly, the Education Code confers on the University's Board of Regents certain general responsibilities and authority:
(a) The board is responsible for the general control and management of the universities in the system and may erect, equip, and repair buildings; purchase libraries, furniture, apparatus, fuel, and other necessary supplies; employ and discharge presidents or principals, teachers, treasurers, and other employees; fix the salaries of the persons employed; and perform such other acts as in the judgment of the board contribute to the development of the universities in the system or the welfare of their students.
Id. § 95.21(a) (). Section 95.21(b) empowers the Board to carry out its responsibilities by promulgating and enforcing rules, regulations, and orders, providing:
(b) The board has authority to promulgate and enforce such rules, regulations, and orders for the operation, control, and management of the university...
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