Harvey v. Clayton
| Decision Date | 26 June 1928 |
| Docket Number | 38936 |
| Citation | 220 N.W. 25,206 Iowa 187 |
| Parties | CHARLES N. HARVEY et al., Appellants, v. HENRY C. CLAYTON et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dallas District Court.--J. H. APPLEGATE, Judge.
The appellants, as plaintiffs, brought this action in the court below, to quiet title to certain real estate in Dallas County, against the appellees, as defendants. By answer, the defendants set up defenses tending to defeat plaintiffs' right of recovery; whereupon plaintiffs moved to strike the defendants' pleading, for the reason that it contained no defensive matter. Upon hearing, the district court determined this issue in favor of the defendants and appellees. From this holding the appeal was taken.
Affirmed.
George J. Dugan and John G. Regan, for appellants.
John A. & W. T. Guiher, Harry Wifvat, White & Clarke, and Ed. R Brown, for appellees.
J. H. Clayton was the ancestral owner of the real estate in controversy. On and before the 11th day of November, 1884, he was a widower, and the father of one child, Wilda K. Clayton, then approximately 7 years of age. So, on said 11th day of November, Mr. Clayton, just named, executed a will, the substance of which is as follows:
Afterwards, the testator, J. H. Clayton, without remarrying, died, seized of the property named in the will, which is the subject-matter of this litigation. He was survived, however, by his daughter, Wilda. In the due course of events, the quoted instrument was admitted to probate in the district court in and for Dallas County, on or about the 2d day of September, 1885. According to the nomination in the testament, Harry Gutshall was appointed executor, duly and timely qualified as such, made his final report, which was approved, and was ultimately discharged, October 16, 1886, after full execution of the trust.
Wilda K. Clayton, the daughter, did not die before reaching the age of twenty-one years, but, on the other hand, she lived many years thereafter, and intermarried with one James V. Harvey, to which union six children were born. They are Charles N. Harvey, Hie P. Harvey, J. W. Harvey, Ethel Mae Harvey, Walter Harvey, and Rebecca Harvey, of the appellants. Meanwhile, disposition was made of the 160 acres designated in the J. H. Clayton will, by Wilda K. Harvey (nee Wilda K. Clayton) and her husband, James V. Harvey, by warranty deed, for valuable consideration, so that the appellees are the deed or mortgage grantees, directly or indirectly, from these original and common grantors.
Sometime during the year 1926, Wilda K. Harvey (nee Clayton) died. Therefore, it is to be seen that the dispute here is between the surviving children of Wilda K. Harvey (nee Clayton), on the one hand, and on the other, those claiming through conveyances made by her during her lifetime.
Basis for appellants' demand is the will of J. H. Clayton, on the theory that the devisee, Wilda, took a life estate only, and they, her children, under the doctrine of implication, were entitled to the remainder thereafter. As opposed to this is the contention of appellees that appellants are confronted with a dilemma, either horn of which is fatal to their cause. To elucidate, appellees assert: First, that the fee by "implication" under the will went to Wilda, the mother, rather than appellants, her children; or second, if that is not true, then the testator died intestate, so far as the remainder is concerned, in which event it was inherited, through the laws of descent, by his only heir, Wilda, the mother of appellants. Hence, she having disposed thereof by deed during her lifetime, after thus acquiring and while still holding the entire fee, there is no interest therein remaining now, after her death, for appellants.
The trial court held that the answer presented by appellees, as defendants, stated a good defense to plaintiffs' petition, because: First, the will devised a life estate to Wilda; and second, she acquired the remainder as an intestate inheritance from her father, because she reached the age of twenty-one years. Accordingly, judgment was entered. About this appellants complain. Such is the problem demanding our solution.
I. At the outset, appellants maintain that Wilda acquired, through her father's will, a life estate only, and in no event and under no circumstances did she receive the remainder. Replying to this argument, appellees concede that she received at least "the life estate," but insist that, in addition thereto, she took the remainder, either by devise or distribution.
Many general rules of construction are submitted by both appellees and appellants for our guide and direction in the case at bar. Those standards are useful, as indicating the general direction to be traveled, yet, being in the abstract, rather than the concrete, they are of little aid in reaching particular locations within the broad territory traversed. It is of prime importance that the intent of the testator be ascertained "from the terms of the will" ( Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193; In re Estate of Freeman, 146 Iowa 38, 124 N.W. 804; Iowa City State Bank v. Pritchard, 199 Iowa 676, 202 N.W. 512; In re Estate of Beaty, 172 Iowa 714, 154 N.W. 1028; In re Estate of Condon, 167 Iowa 215, 149 N.W. 264; Olson v. Weber, 194 Iowa 512, 187 N.W. 465; Spaan v. Anderson, 115 Iowa 121, 88 N.W. 200; Richards v. Richards, 155 Iowa 394, 136 N.W. 132; Webb v. Webb, 130 Iowa 457, 104 N.W. 438; Podaril v. Clark, 118 Iowa 264, 91 N.W. 1091; Steiff v. Seibert, 128 Iowa 746, 105 N.W. 328), "under established and recognized canons of construction" (Todd v. Stewart, 199 Iowa 821, 202 N.W. 844). This requirement is to be met by taking the instrument by its four corners, and giving each part thereof full consideration. Bradford v. Martin, 199 Iowa 250, 201 N.W. 574; Dickerson v. Morse, 200 Iowa 115, 202 N.W. 601.
No two wills are likely to be the same. Consequently, the interpretation of one may be of little aid for defining the testator's intent in another.
II. Illustrative of this principle is appellants' argument to the effect that:
"A clause which clearly limits the devise to a life estate will not be enlarged into a fee by the failure to devise the remainder after death."
That, as a general declaration, is no doubt true; but, when specifically applied to the facts of a given case, the text may be too broad. Thus, in the cause at bar, the scope of the quoted doctrine is too wide in its range for specific use in determining the "intent of the testator." A review of the authorities relied upon will reveal this truth. Reference is made to Criley v. Cassel, 144 Iowa 685, 123 N.W. 348; Koonz v. Hempy, 142 Iowa 337, 120 N.W. 976; In re Estate of Proctor, 95 Iowa 172, 63 N.W. 670; Podaril v. Clark, 118 Iowa 264, 91 N.W. 1091; In re Estate of Condon, supra; Paxton v. Paxton, 141 Iowa 96, 119 N.W. 284; Steiff v. Seibert, 128 Iowa 746, 105 N.W. 328; Channell v. Aldinger, 121 Iowa 297, 96 N.W. 781.
Practically all of the testamentary documents involved in those citations contain words making plain the testator's purpose to convey upon the particular devisee a life estate only, without permitting him to take through distribution or devise by implication. Often the remainderman there referred to was definitely named, and when not, the idea was clearly expressed, to the effect that the life tenant was such only, and entitled to obtain no part of the remainder. More particularity in differentiation would serve only to unduly lengthen this opinion, and no useful purpose could be served thereby.
III. Devise of the remainder to appellants by implication must result, they say, because of the presumption against intestacy. Their authorities are Luers v. Luers, 145 Iowa 600, 124 N.W. 603, and Ross v. Ayrhart, 138 Iowa 117, 115 N.W. 906. There may well be added to that list Central Tr. Co. v. Langan, 197 Iowa 1202, 198 N.W. 652, and Redinbaugh v. Redinbaugh, 199 Iowa 1053, 203 N.W. 246. Yet nothing is contained in those pronouncements which defeats the interpretation placed upon this will by the trial court. Only a mere recognition of the general rule is made in the references.
Concerning the usual application of that doctrine, the text of 28 Ruling Case Law, commencing on...
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