Hatten v. University Interscholastic League, No. 13-06-313-CV (Tex. App. 9/27/2007)
| Decision Date | 27 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-06-313-CV.,13-06-313-CV. |
| Parties | C.J. HATTEN AND CRAIG HATTEN, Appellants, v. UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE AND WILLIAM FARNEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 261st District Court of Travis County, Texas.
Before Justices GARZA, BENAVIDES and VELA.
Appellants, C.J. Hatten, Jr. and Mathew Hatten, by and through Marion Craig Hatten and Kim Hatten, appeal from a judgment denying their request for declaratory and injunctive relief to restrain the University Interscholastic League and its executive director, William Farney (collectively, "UIL"), from enforcing its decision that C.J. and Mathew were ineligible to play high-school athletics for Pilot Point I.S.D. because they had changed schools for athletic purposes. The trial court issued temporary restraining orders and later temporary injunctions barring the UIL from enforcing its decision. After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court denied all relief. Appellants raise four issues for our consideration. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
As a part of the University of Texas at Austin,1 the UIL is a voluntary organization composed of representatives of Texas school districts and regulates the competitive athletics of junior and senior high-school student athletes in Texas.2 This case involves the enforcement of UIL Rule 443c (the "athletic-purposes rule") which states: "A student who changes schools for athletic purposes is not eligible to compete in varsity league athletic contest(s) at the school to which he or she moves for at least one calendar year, even if both parents move to the new school district attendance zone."
Craig and Kim Hatten lived in Celina, Texas with their four children, including C.J. and Mathew. During the 2002-2003 school year, C.J. and Mathew participated in athletic events at their high school in the Celina I.S.D. At some point, the Hattens' children experienced behavioral problems, and Craig and Kim separated. In February 2003, Craig Hatten complained to a Celina I.S.D. coach about the Celina coaches' method of disciplining Mathew. In March 2003, the Hatten family moved from Celina to Pilot Point, Texas. In order to participate in athletics in the Pilot Point I.S.D., C.J. and Matthew had to receive approval from Celina I.S.D. that their move to Pilot Point was not for athletic purposes. The Celina athletic director determined that the move was for athletic purposes.
The UIL district executive committee determined that C.J. and Mathew changed schools for athletic purposes and were, therefore, ineligible to participate in UIL competition at their new school. The suspension period was from March 28, 2003 until March 27, 2004. The Hattens appealed to the UIL state executive committee, which affirmed the decision. In October 2003, the Hattens filed suit in Travis County district court, seeking a declaration that they have a due-process interest under the Texas Constitution because of the stigmatizing effect of the UIL's actions and, in turn, have been deprived of the full evidentiary hearing to which they are entitled. The district court issued temporary restraining orders and later temporary injunctions, which allowed C.J. and Mathew to play varsity sports despite the UIL's ruling that they were ineligible, and both students played varsity sports during their year of alleged ineligibility. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court entered a final judgment, denying the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by appellants, declaring that the decisions of the UIL were supported by substantial evidence, dissolving the temporary injunctions, and denying attorneys fees to all parties.
In its appellees' brief, the UIL argues the case is moot because C.J.'s senior year is over, and Mathew's year of ineligibility has expired. Thus, before reaching the merits, we must determine whether there is a live controversy to be resolved, or whether the matter has now become moot and unreviewable. Mootness is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Krohn v. Marcus Cable Assocs, L.P., 201 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied); Labrado v. County of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); accord Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 185 (Tex. 2001). A case becomes moot if a controversy no longer exists or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2005); FDIC v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)). "An appeal is moot when a court's action on the merits cannot affect the rights of the parties." Zipp v. Wuemling, 218 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)). When a case becomes moot, the parties lose standing to maintain their claims. City of McAllen v. McAllen Police Officers Union, 221 S.W.3d 885, 895-96 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied) (citing Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184).
The holding in University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) is helpful in determining the mootness issue in this case. Gregory Jones, a junior at Irving MacArthur High School and a player on the school's football team, moved from Irving to Highland Park. Id. at 760. The UIL determined that he had moved for athletic purposes and that he was therefore barred from playing football his senior year at Highland Park. Id. Jones sued to void the UIL's actions and to enjoin it from preventing him from playing football at Highland Park or from penalizing Highland Park for allowing him to play. Id. The trial court granted the injunctive relief, allowing him to play football at Highland Park, and he later graduated from high school. Id. The UIL appealed, and without reaching the merits, the court stated: Id.
Here, because C.J.'s and Mathew's period of ineligibility has expired, and because C.J. has graduated, this appeal is now moot. See id., at 760-61; Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (court determined appeal was moot because the football season had ended);Fink v. Hinson, 243 Ga. 337, 253 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1979) (). Accordingly, the issue of whether C.J. and Mathew moved to Pilot Point for athletic purposes is now moot.
Appellants argue that the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply here. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception; and (2) the collateral-consequences exception. FDIC, 886 S.W.2d at 767; Gen. Land Office v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990).
This exception applies only in rare circumstances. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). To invoke the exception, "a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the challenged action was too short in duration to be litigated fully before the action ceased or expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again." City of McAllen, 221 S.W.3d at 896 (citing Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184). Appellants cite no Texas cases applying this exception to a fact situation similar to the case before us.
Litigants have used this exception to challenge unconstitutional mental commitments after the complaining party's release, see, e.g., State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910 (Tex.1980); Ex parte Ullmann, 616 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd); unconstitutional adjudications of juvenile delinquency, Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. 1972); and unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. 1981). In each case, the exception was used to preserve appellate review of government conduct that violated constitutional rights. However, the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that participation in extracurricular activities is not a fundamental right. See In re Univ. Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding); Eanes Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Logue, 712 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. 1986); Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Starnos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1985).
Furthermore, appellants have not shown that a reasonable expectation exists that the UIL will once again subject either C.J. or Mathew to the athletic-purposes rule. Consequently, appellants have failed to prove the second element of the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184.
This exception is invoked only under narrow circumstances when vacating the underlying judgment will not cure the adverse consequences suffered by the party seeking to appeal that judgment. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006). To invoke this exception, a party must show both that (1) a concrete disadvantage resulted from the judgment and (2) the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is vacated and the case is dismissed as moot. Id. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998); Gen. Land Office, 789 S.W.2d at 571 (...
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