Hauman v. Coleman, CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1159

• Decision Date: 09 November 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1159
• Parties: DARIN L. HAUMAN, Petitioner v. BRIAN V. COLEMAN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

DARIN L. HAUMAN, Petitioner v. BRIAN V. COLEMAN,THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents

CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1159

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 9, 2018

(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Darin Hauman ("Hauman") filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment and conviction imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the petition.

I. Factual Background

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, quoting the county court, summarized the factual background of this case as follows:

[Hauman] was arrested in Allegheny County following his attempt to meet with an underage girl. [Hauman], calling himself Jake Thomas, had been exchanging e-mails concerning sexual topics with a girl named ShyLittleMissy who[m] he believed to be 12 or 13 years old. ShyLittleMissy was, in fact, an undercover Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Trooper who was given this e-mail account by a private citizen named Ty Grabowski who had originally set up the account to help law enforcement find child pornographers.

Following his arrest, [Hauman] was interviewed by PSP and admitted that he had been in contact with a girl he believed was 13 years old and that his intentions were sexual in nature. This information was relayed to PSP in Fulton County and a search warrant for [Hauman's] residence was obtained to attempt to find evidence of child pornography. The warrant was executed and 27 photographs were found under the carpeting of his home. As a result [Hauman] was charged with 27 counts of Possession of Child Pornography.

...

A bench trial was held on October 2, 2003 and the [c]ourt found [Hauman] guilty on 11 counts of possession of child pornography and not guilty on the remaining 16 counts. [Hauman] was sentenced on March 15, 2004.

Commonwealth v. Hauman, 2015 WL 7586974, *1-2 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 3/2/12, at 1; PCRA Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/13/14, at 1-2).

II. State Court Proceedings¹

On August 27, 2001, Hauman was arrested and charged with 27 counts of possession of child pornography. (Doc. 1 at 50; https://ujsportal.pacourts.us, electronic docket number CP-29-CR-0000115-2001). On October 2, 2003, a bench trial was held and the court found Hauman guilty on 11 counts of possession of child pornography and not guilty on the remaining 16 counts. (Id.) Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Hauman met the criteria of a sexually violent predator under Megan's Law. (Id.) On March 15, 2004, Hauman wassentenced to an aggregate term of incarceration of 7 ½ to 17 years in a state correctional institute followed by an aggregate term of probation of 10 ½ years. (Id.)

Hauman filed a timely direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hauman, 2015 WL 7586974, at *2 n.1. On March 18, 2005, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing. See id. On August 23, 2005, Hauman was resentenced to serve an aggregate term of incarceration of 7 ½ to 18 years in a state correctional institute followed by an aggregate term of probation of 10 ½ years. (Doc. 1 at 2).

Following resentencing, Hauman again appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Hauman, No. 1444 MDA 2005 (Pa. Super.). On September 1, 2006, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and on November 18, 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Hauman, 909 A.2d 879, No. 1444 MDA 2005 (Pa. Super. 2006) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Hauman, 961 A.2d 858, No. 832 MAL 2006 (Pa. 2008). Hauman petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Hauman v. Pennsylvania, 558 U.S. 824 (2009). On October 5, 2009, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.

On July 14, 2010, Hauman filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-46. (Doc. 29-2, PCRA Petition). On March 2, 2012, the PCRA court denied the petition. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-16, PCRA Court Order and Opinion). Hauman filed a timely notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On March 12,2013, the Superior Court vacated the March 2, 2012 Order denying PCRA relief, and held a Grazier² hearing on July 16, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 59-62, Commonwealth v. Hauman, No. 644 MDA 2012 (Pa. Super.)).

On October 7, 2013 Hauman filed a motion for leave to amend his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Hauman, 2015 WL 7586974, at *1. On February 24, 2014, the Superior Court denied the motion to amend. See id. In that same order, the Superior Court reinstated the denial of Hauman's PCRA petition to provide him with an appealable order. See id. On March 10, 2014, Hauman filed a notice of appeal. See id. On January 16, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's denial of Hauman's petition. (Doc. 1-1 at 64-83, Commonwealth v. Hauman, No. 439 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super.)). Hauman did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Hauman filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1).

III. Standards of Review

The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). A habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). "[I]t is not the province of a federalhabeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Rather, federal habeas review is restricted to claims based "on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68.

A. Exhaustion

Habeas corpus relief cannot be granted unless all available state remedies have been exhausted, or there is an absence of available state corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is grounded on principles of comity in order to ensure that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).

A state prisoner exhausts state remedies by giving the "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).³ Respect for the state court system requires that the petitioner demonstrate that the claims in question have been "fairly presented to the state courts." Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct.1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). To "fairly present" a claim, a petitioner must present its "factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a claim is fairly presented when a petitioner presents the same factual and legal basis for the claim to the state courts). While the petitioner need not cite "book and verse" of the federal Constitution, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971), he must "give the State 'the opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights" before presenting those claims here, Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. 509).

In this case, respondents concede that Hauman properly exhausted eight of the ten ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the federal habeas petition. (Doc. 29-1, at 22-24).

B. Merits Standard

Once a court has determined that the exhaustion requirement is met and, therefore, that review on the merits of the issues presented in a habeas petition is warranted, the scope of that review is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) provides, in pertinent part, that an application for a writ of habeas corpus premised on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court shall not be granted unless:

(1) [the decision] was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) [the decision] was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To establish that the decision was contrary to federal law "it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show merely that his interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is more plausible than the state court's; rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary outcome." Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, a federal court will only find a state court decision to be an unreasonable application of federal law if the decision, "evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." Id.

Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a federal court is required to presume that a state court's findings of fact are correct. A petitioner may only rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence of the state court's...