Haworth v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 08 June 1933
• Citation: 152 So. 663,113 Fla. 591
• Parties: HAWORTH v. CHAPMAN, Superintendent of State Prison.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

152 So. 663

113 Fla. 591

HAWORTH v. CHAPMAN, Superintendent of State Prison.

Florida Supreme Court

June 8, 1933

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1934.

En Banc.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Joe Haworth against L. F. Chapman, as Superintendent of the State Prison.

Petitioner remanded to custody.

ELLIS and BUFORD, JJ., dissenting.

COUNSEL

J. W. Watson, Jr., of Miami, and H. E. Henderson for petitioner.

Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

LOVE Circuit Judge.

In response to a writ of habeas corpus issued by this court, the return shows the petitioner is held in custody under a conviction, for violating sections 1-3, chapter 8466, Acts of 1921, sections 7308-7310, Comp. Gen. Laws, and a judgment and sentence to 'pay costs of prosecution and be imprisoned for seven years in the state penitentiary from the date of your delivery to the officers thereof, upon failure to pay costs an additional 6 months' sentence is imposed.'

The statute under which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced is as follows:

'Chapter 8466--(No. 71).

'An Act Relating to Fraud or the Attempt to Defraud by Assuming to Have or be Able to Obtain Certain Information Whether the Same Exists or Not; To Prescribe Certain Evidence, and to Provide Penalties for the Violation of This Act.

'Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

'Section 1. That on and after the passage and approval of this Act it shall be unlawful for any person or persons to defraud or attempt to defraud any individual or individuals out of any thing of value, by assuming to have or be able to obtain any secret, advance or inside information regarding, any person, transaction. Act or thing, whether such person, transaction, act or thing exists or not.

'Sec. 2. Any person or persons guilty of violating the provisions of Section 1 of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars and ten years in the State penitentiary.

'Sec. 3. All paraphernalia of whatsoever kind in possession of and used in defrauding or attempting to defraud as specified in Section 1 of this Act shall be held and accepted by any Court of Jurisdiction in this State as prima facie evidence of guilt.

'Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its becoming a law. Approved June 14, 1921.'

It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the penalty provided in section 2 of the act for its violation, viz. that the offender 'shall be fined not more than Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars and ten years in the State penitentiary,' is so indefinite and uncertain as to render the act void, in that, considered with its context, such quoted part of the act does not authorize the imposition of a fine as the sole penalty for its violation, and further, in that it does not authorize by express words, imprisonment in the state penitentiary, it fails to constitute its violation a felony; and further that said quoted part of section 2 is such an inseparable integral part of the interdependent provisions of the act that the quoted provision, being uncertain and indefinite, is in whole or in part unoperative, if it does not render the entire act ineffectual to authorize the imposition of any sentence, either of fine or imprisonment.

It is a well-settled rule that the intent of a valid statute is the law, and this is to be ascertained by a consideration of the language of the enactment. The purpose to be accomplished within constitutional limitations is to be considered as controlling and effect given to the act as a consistent and harmonious whole. State ex rel. Davis v. Knight, 98 Fla. 891, 124 So. 461; Amos v. Conkling, 99 Fla. 206, 126 So. 283; Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18.

Thus the fundamental principle in the judicial interpretation of a statute is that the object is to determine what intention is conveyed by the language used therein. The rule is well and aptly stated in Orvil Tp. v. Borough of Woodcliff, 64 N. J. Law, 286, 45 A. 686, 687, as follows: 'When the intention is expressed, the question is one of verbal construction only; but, if the language be not express, and some intention must necessarily be imputed, then it must be determined by inference grounded on legal principles, one of which is that the legislature must have entertained some intention, and the interpreter must determine what it was, unless it be that the statute lacks the formal requisite needed in order to give it the effect of a law. It is the true sense of the form of words which is used which is to be discovered by the interpretation or construction of the statute, taking all its parts into consideration, and, if fairly possible, giving them all effect. Speaking more concretely, when the intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, words may be altered or supplied in the statute so as to give it effect, and to avoid any repugnancy to or inconsistency with such intention.'

Section 7105 (5006) provides that: 'Any crime punishable by death, or imprisonment in the State Prison, is a felony, and no other crime shall be so considered. Every other offense is a misdemeanor.'

In the Constitution, section 25, art. 16, appears the following provision: 'The term felony, whenever it may occur in this Constitution or in the laws of the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable with death or imprisonment in the State penitentiary.'

If, therefore, the absence of the words 'imprisonment for' from the above-quoted provision of the act restricts the penalty for its violation to a fine, the offense denounced is a misdemeanor, though in the very words of the penalty clause it is termed a felony, thus producing an obvious contradiction if not an absurd conclusion. There is a strong presumption against absurdity in a statutory provision; it being unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended their own stultification, so, when the language used is susceptible of two senses, the sense will be adopted which will not lead to absurd consequences. Considering then the act as a whole and all of its language, it cannot be successfully contended that the intent and purpose of the Legislature was to punish the violation of its provisions by a fine only, thus making the offense a misdemeanor, contrary to the expressed intent of the act.

The only remaining alternatives are either to hold the entire statute invalid for the indefiniteness of its penal provision or to give it life and effect by ascertaining and enforcing the intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting it, if this can be done with reasonable certainty from a consideration of its language and the purpose to be accomplished within constitutional limitations.

To hold that the statute is invalid requires us to decide that its penal clause is so uncertain that the court is unable to determine what the Legislature intended or is so incomplete that it can not be executed.

It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that in the interpretation of a statute that construction of the language employed is to be adopted, if possible, which will sustain the validity of a statute, in accordance with the maxim 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat.' Under this rule the courts will correct evident...