Hayes v. State
| Decision Date | 15 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A1497,S92A1497 |
| Citation | 426 S.E.2d 886,262 Ga. 881 |
| Parties | HAYES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Megan C. DeVorsey, Atlanta, for Hayes.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Peggy R. Katz, Staff Atty., Atlanta, for State.
Nancy A. Grace, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta.
Leonora Grant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for other appellee.
Henry Hayes was convicted of the malice murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 1
The evidence shows that on the night of the murder the defendant met friends at a crack house where he smoked crack and marijuana and drank beer. Later, the defendant walked to the home of his parents, with whom he was staying. Shortly after arriving at the house, the defendant went to his parents' bedroom and demanded money for crack. The defendant attacked his father, who was in bed, with a knife, inflicting multiple wounds on his face, chest and hands. The defendant's mother ran from the house to call for help. When the police arrived, they found the defendant placing his mother's purse in the bed of a pickup truck. As the police approached, the defendant blurted out, In the police car, the defendant told the police that he had become enraged with his father when he refused to give him money for crack cocaine. Police found the defendant's father on the livingroom floor; efforts were made to stop the bleeding, but the victim died later at Grady Hospital. At trial the defendant claimed that he had suffered a blackout and could recall nothing of the events surrounding his father's death.
The defendant was found guilty of malice murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was represented at a motion for new trial by appointed counsel (motion counsel), who raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of the trial counsel. After the denial of the motion for new trial, appellate counsel was appointed and now raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as to both the trial counsel and the motion counsel.
1. After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Defendant through appellate counsel raises a second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel, basing that claim on grounds which are different from those supporting the original claim of ineffective assistance and which we shall discuss in Division 3, infra. 2 A defendant has an obligation to raise all allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the earliest practicable moment, and any allegation not raised is deemed waived. Ponder v. State, 260 Ga. 840, 400 S.E.2d 922 (1991).
3. Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance from counsel who represented him at the hearing on the motion for new trial. For reasons of judicial economy, and because the trial court has already heard one such claim, we will address the merits of this contention rather than remanding the matter to the trial court. See French v. State, 261 Ga. 424, 405 S.E.2d 35 (1991). In determining whether or not a defendant received effective assistance of counsel we apply the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The test is in two parts, the first being a measure of the performance of counsel and the second requiring that the deficient performance of counsel not prejudice the defense. Since resolution of the issue before us turns on whether there was prejudice to the defense, we address only the second prong of the test. To make a showing of prejudice to the defense, a defendant must establish that, but for the inadequate performance of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Thus, in the present case, involving as it does a claim against counsel's performance at the motion hearing, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the ineffective assistance of motion counsel, a new trial would have been granted.
a. First, the defendant contends that motion counsel was ineffective because he did not raise as grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel the trial counsel's failure to object to the instruction on voluntary intoxication given by the trial court to the jury. While we will have to address the question of whether or not the trial court erred in instructing the jury as it did, the issue is whether the trial court would have granted a new trial if the claim of ineffectiveness had been raised by motion counsel.
The trial court gave the following charge to the jury:
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime unless such intoxication has resulted in the alteration of brain function so as to negate intent. Even then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary.
Defendant argues that such an instruction was harmful because it relieved the state of the burden of proving every element of the defense and shifted to the defendant the burden of proving a permanent brain alteration.
The charge delivered to the jury and to which defendant objects is quoted directly from this Court's decision in Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491, 371 S.E.2d 384 (1988). As the charge is a correct statement of law, it is obvious that the trial court did not err. Equally obvious is the conclusion that the defendant would not have been granted a new trial had motion counsel set forth trial counsel's failure to object to these instructions.
b. The defendant contends that motion counsel was ineffective because he did not set forth trial counsel's failure to properly authenticate medical records as grounds for the ineffective assistance claim against trial counsel. First, the ruling of the trial court with respect to the records was correct. The medical records contained the opinions and evaluations of persons not present at trial; the defendant failed to properly authenticate these records and the trial court refused to admit them on the ground that a proper foundation had not been laid for their admission. But, again, our inquiry is whether motion counsel's failure to raise this lack of authentication as evidence of ineffective assistance would have resulted in a new trial.
The documents at issue are reports completed by staffers at the Fulton County Rehabilitation Center during an earlier period when the defendant was undergoing treatment for cocaine addiction. The defendant argues that the medical records would have been instrumental in establishing his cocaine...
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Bright v. State
...function alteration must be more than temporary." Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491, 371 S.E.2d 384 (1988). Accord Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 883, 426 S.E.2d 886 (1993). Although Bright offered evidence of a serious history of drug abuse, of depression stemming from guilt over past action......
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...have lacked merit, and “[f]ailure to make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.” Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 884–885(3)(c), 426 S.E.2d 886 (1993). Therefore, Lewis also cannot show the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise and litigat......
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...in the sentencing phase. "Failure to make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance." Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 884-885(3)(c), 426 S.E.2d 886 (1993); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687(III),104 S.Ct. 2052; Smith, 253 Ga. at 783(1),325 S.E.2d 362. Accordingly, we con......
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