Hayes v. State

• Decision Date: 15 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. A09A0403.,A09A0403.
• Citation: 298 Ga. App. 338,680 S.E.2d 182
• Parties: HAYES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

680 S.E.2d 182

298 Ga. App. 338

HAYES v. The STATE.

No. A09A0403.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 15, 2009.

Kevin R. Brehm, Kenneth D. Kondritzer, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Marc A. Mallon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

Linda Hayes appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss an indictment charging her with aggravated assault,¹ aggravated battery,² and cruelty to children,³ arguing that any prosecution under this indictment would violate her right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the constitutions of both the United States and the State of Georgia. Finding that the trial court lacked evidence on which to base certain of its findings and that it misapplied the relevant law, we reverse the trial court's holding in this case.

A trial court's ruling as to whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Hester v. State.⁴ The deference owed the trial court's ruling is diminished, however, where it contains factual findings that are either clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record, or where it misstates or misapplies the law. Id. See also State v. Stallworth⁵ (a "trial court abuses its discretion when it rules without evidence to support the ruling or contrary to law or equity").

The undisputed facts of record show that in December 2003, the East Point Police Department began an investigation into the cause of suspicious injuries sustained by Hayes's then-four-year-old grandson. That investigation concluded with the March 5, 2004 indictment of Hayes and both of the child's biological parents on charges of aggravated battery and cruelty to children in the first degree. Hayes was arrested on March 13, 2004 and remained incarcerated while awaiting trial. On January 21, 2005, having conducted no further investigation and having kept Hayes incarcerated for ten months, the State dead-docketed⁶ the indictment against Hayes and the child's mother, and Hayes was released from jail.

On September 14, 2007, some 42 months after dead-docketing the original indictment, the State re-indicted Hayes and her two co-defendants, this time charging them with one count of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree. The district attorney stated on the record that Hayes's initial plea and arraignment on these charges occurred in October 2007. On January 9, 2008, three months after Hayes's arraignment, her counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State's violation of Hayes's constitutional speedy trial rights, by delaying her prosecution for three and one-half years following her initial indictment. Eight months later, on September 2, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, and it entered an order denying that motion on September 12, 2008. This appeal followed.

The template for deciding all constitutional speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution is laid out in the 1972 case of Barker v. Wingo⁷ and the 1992 decision in Doggett v United States....⁸ The analysis has two stages. First, the court must determine whether the interval from the accused's arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered "presumptively prejudicial." If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. If, however, the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.

Ruffin v. State.⁹ We now turn to that analysis.

1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant's arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier. Boseman v. State.¹⁰ Here, the trial court correctly ruled that the delay in Hayes's prosecution created a presumption of prejudice to defendant, but erred in determining that the length of the delay ran from the time of Hayes's incarceration (March 13, 2004) until the filing of defendant's motion to dismiss indictment (January 8, 2008), a period of 46 months. The correct period for consideration was March 5, 2004 (the date of Hayes's original indictment) until September 12, 2008 (the date the court ruled on Hayes's motion), a period of approximately 54 months.¹¹ See Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 55(2)(a), 663 S.E.2d 189 (holding that the pretrial delay included the time it took the trial court to decide the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for an alleged speedy trial violation). A delay of more than one year between the attachment of the right and the trial raises a threshold presumption of prejudice to the defendant. Herndon v. State.¹² Accordingly, "this case long ago crossed the presumptive prejudice threshold ... [and] we must proceed to the second stage of the constitutional speedy trial analysis." Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 55(2)(a), 663 S.E.2d 189.

2. The four factors that form the core of the Barker-Doggett balancing test are: "(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state; (3) the timeliness of the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. [Cit.]" (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Johnson.¹³ No one of these factors, standing alone, "is either a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial." Nelloms v. State.¹⁴ "Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Harris v. State.¹⁵ "Thus, the second stage of the constitutional speedy trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." (Punctuation omitted.) Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 56(2)(b), 663 S.E.2d 189.

(a) Length of the delay. Although the trial court properly found that the delay in this case was sufficient to trigger an analysis of Hayes's speedy trial claim, it thereafter erred by failing to accurately determine the 54-month length of the delay and by failing to weigh the length of that delay in conducting such an analysis. "It is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis." Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 56-57(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189. This is because uncommonly long delays have "a tendency to compromise the reliability of trials in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 56(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189. As a result, the weight accorded the other factors in the balancing test depends, to a large degree, on the length of the delay. See, e.g., Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at 657(III)(B), 112 S.Ct. 2686 (even where the delay in prosecution results from governmental negligence, "our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness"); Hester, supra, 268 Ga.App. at 98(3), 601 S.E.2d 456 (defendant's five-year delay in asserting her right to a speedy trial could not be weighed heavily against her, given the State's failure to indict for three years following her arrest and subsequent delay in appointing her counsel); Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 57(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189 (the longer the delay, the stronger the presumption that it has prejudiced the accused).

The record shows that law enforcement's investigation of the case against Hayes had concluded by the time of her first indictment, and that the State conducted no further investigation between Hayes's first and second indictments. Hayes was arrested and incarcerated for a period of ten months. The State then intentionally and deliberately elected to dead-docket Hayes's case, which it was free to reinstate at any time. They then released her from incarceration. As the trial court's order reflects, the State was unable to articulate any reason for the 54-month delay in bringing the case to trial, other than its own, intentional choices. "Accordingly, this factor weighs against the State on the Barker-Doggett scale. To the extent the trial court overlooked this factor in the four-factor balancing process, it erred." Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 59(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189.

(b) Reasons and responsibility for the delay. The second factor in the Barker-Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both "the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state." (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson, supra, 274 Ga. at 512, 555 S.E.2d 710. Here, the trial court found, and the State concedes, that the responsibility for the delay in this case belonged to the government. Thus, analysis of this factor turns on the State's reasons for the delay and how heavily those reasons should weigh against the State.

"[T]he reason for the delay is pivotal in evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors." Ruffin, supra, 284 Ga. at 59(2)(b)(ii), 663 S.E.2d 189. The Supreme Court has recognized that the reasons for State-induced delay fall along a spectrum. See Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at 656-657(III)(B), 112 S.Ct. 2686. On one end of the spectrum is delay resulting from, or in spite of, the State's diligent prosecution of the case. Such delay could result from the complexity of the case, the need for additional investigation or discovery, or the government's inability to locate a key witness, despite good faith efforts to do so. See, e.g., Hassel...