Sechler v. State

• Decision Date: 06 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. A12A0676.,A12A0676.
• Citation: 730 S.E.2d 142,12 FCDR 2442,316 Ga.App. 675
• Parties: SECHLER v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

316 Ga.App. 675

730 S.E.2d 142

12 FCDR 2442

SECHLER

v.The STATE.

No. A12A0676.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 6, 2012.

Sean Aaron Black, Toccoa, for Appellant.

Fredric Daniel Bright and Alison Teresa Burleson, for Appellee.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

Errett Christopher Sechler III appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion for discharge and acquittal for an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.¹ Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the relevant factors for determining whether there was a constitutional speedy trial violation, we affirm.

In January 2008, Sechler was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) in the City of Madison, Georgia. The case was docketed in the Municipal Court of Madison, where Sechler pled guilty in May 2008. Subsequent to the guilty plea, Sechler filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Morgan County in October 2008, contending that his guilty plea should be set aside because he was not advised of his constitutional rights under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In July 2009, the superior court granted the requested habeas corpus relief and set aside the guilty plea.

The case was re-docketed in the Municipal Court of Madison, and Sechler filed a demand for jury trial and motion to transfer the case to the Superior Court of Morgan County in January 2010. After the case was bound over to superior court in April 2010, defense counsel filed a notice of leave of absence in May 2010 for several days in June, July, and October 2010.

In September 2010, the District Attorney's Office filed an accusation in the superior court charging Sechler with DUI. Sechler filed a written waiver of arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty in October 2010, and the case was placed on the next available trial calendar set for January 2011. However, Sechler had an outstanding motion to suppress that he wanted heard prior to trial, which initially was set for a hearing in December 2010 but was re-set to April 2011 because both the State and defense counsel had scheduling conflicts. The superior court heard the motion to suppress in April 2011 on the rescheduled date and denied the motion in a written order entered that same month.

A few days after the superior court denied the motion to suppress, defense counsel filed a second notice of leave of absence for several days in May, June, and July 2011. The case originally was placed on the June 2011 trial calendar, but it was not tried that week because defense counsel had a conflict and asked for a continuance. The case then was placed on the next trial calendar set for August 2011.

During the pendency of the case, Sechler never filed a statutory demand for speedy trial. Then, in August 2011, Sechler for the first time filed his motion for discharge and acquittal on the ground that his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Georgia Constitutions had been violated. Later that month, the superior court heard evidence and orally denied the motion for discharge and acquittal.² In October 2011, the superior court issued a written order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision. This appeal followed.

A speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as by the Georgia Constitution. See U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI (a). The template for deciding constitutional speedy trial claims is well-established and involves application of the analysis set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522–523(II), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). See State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 525–526(2)(a), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011); Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55(2), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008).

The Barker–Doggett analysis has two steps. See State v. Stallworth, 293 Ga.App. 368(2), 667 S.E.2d 147 (2008). In the first step, the trial court engages in a threshold inquiry and decides whether the pretrial delay has been sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–652(II), 112 S.Ct. 2686;Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55(2), 663 S.E.2d 189. If the pretrial delay is considered presumptively prejudicial, the trial court then moves to the second step of the analysis and balances four factors:

[1] whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, [2] whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.

Porter, 288 Ga. at 525–526(2)(a), 705 S.E.2d 636 quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651(II), 112 S.Ct. 2686. Balancing of the four factors is “context-sensitive” and “necessarily compels [trial courts] to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55(2), 56(2)(b), 663 S.E.2d 189. “The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors-its ultimate judgment-are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” Porter, 288 Ga. at 526(2)(a), 705 S.E.2d 636.³ Mindful of these principles, we turn to the procedural history and the superior court's order in the instant case.

1. Presumptive Prejudice. “For serious crimes that do not involve unusual complexities, one year generally marks the point at which expected deliberateness in the prosecution of a criminal matter turns into presumptively prejudicial delay.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ward v. State, 311 Ga.App. 425, 428(1), 715 S.E.2d 818 (2011). See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55(2)(a), 663 S.E.2d 189. “Where no trial has occurred, the length of delay should be calculated from the date of arrest or formal accusation to the date on which the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds was decided.” Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588, 593(1)(a), 723 S.E.2d 876 (2012).

The superior court found that the pretrial delay experienced by Sechler was presumptively prejudicial. Sechler was arrested on January 30, 2008, and the superior court's order denying his constitutional speedy trial claim was entered on October 12, 2011, for a total pretrial delay of approximately 44 months. The State does not dispute that the approximately 44–month delay crossed the threshold of presumptive prejudice, triggering analysis of the four Barker–Doggett factors. See State v. Bazemore, 249 Ga.App. 584, 585(1)(a), 549 S.E.2d 426 (2001) (more than 21–month delay in DUI case was presumptively prejudicial); State v. Yates, 223 Ga.App. 403, 404(1), 477 S.E.2d 670 (1996) (more than 27–month delay in DUI case was presumptively prejudicial). The superior court, therefore, acted within its discretion in finding presumptive prejudice.⁴

2. The Barker–Doggett Factors.

(a) Whether the Pretrial Delay Was Uncommonly Long. The first Barker–Doggett factor, whether the pretrial delay was uncommonly long, requires consideration of “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ward, 311 Ga.App. at 428(2), 715 S.E.2d 818.

It is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker–Doggett analysis. This is because uncommonly long delays have a tendency to compromise the reliability of trials in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. As a result, the weight accorded the other factors in the balancing test depends, to a large degree, on the length of the delay.

(Citation omitted.) Kemp v. State, 314 Ga.App. 327, 330(2)(a), 724 S.E.2d 41 (2012). See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56–57(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189.

The superior court's order does not reflect that it separately considered whether the pretrial delay in this case was uncommonly long. “To the extent the [superior] court overlooked this factor in the four-part balancing process, it erred.” Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 59(2)(b)(i), 663 S.E.2d 189. See Kemp, 314 Ga.App. at 330(2)(a), 724 S.E.2d 41;Teasley v. State, 307 Ga.App. 153, 158(2)(a), 704 S.E.2d 248 (2010). The pretrial delay experienced by Sechler far exceeded the amount of time necessary to establish a presumption of prejudice, and, therefore, was uncommonly long and must be weighed against the State. See Hill v. State, 315 Ga.App. 833(2)(a), 729 S.E.2d 1 (2012) (21–month pretrial delay was uncommonly long and should be weighed against the State).

(b) Whether the Government or the Criminal Defendant is More to Blame for the Pretrial Delay. The second Barker–Doggett factor requires consideration of “both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the [S]tate.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 341(2)(b), 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009). In analyzing the reasons for the pretrial delay,

we are required to assign various degrees of weight to the different reasons provided by the prosecution and the defense respectively. For instance, deliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the prosecution. More neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. In contrast, delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant[.]

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kemp, 314 Ga.App. at 330–331(2)(b), 724 S.E.2d 41. At the same time, some pretrial delay is “inherent in the adversarial process itself,” such as the time that normally must be expended by the...