Haynes v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 19 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-70004,07-70004 |
| Parties | ANTHONY CARDELL HAYNES, Petitioner - Appellant v. RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Respondent - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
*
This case was remanded to us by the Supreme Court, which reversed our decision granting habeas relief to the petitioner, Anthony Cardell Haynes.For the reasons hereinafter assigned, we now affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief.
On September 19, 1999, Haynes was convicted by a jury in Texas of the capital murder of a peace officer "acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty." Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(1). He was then sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Haynes v. State (Haynes I), No. 73,685 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2001) (unpublished). The Supreme Court then denied his petition for a writ for certiorari. Haynes v. Texas, 535 U.S. 999 (2002). The Texas courts denied Haynes' petition for state habeas relief, and he subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in district court. The district court denied the petition, and Haynes appealed to this court. We granted a certificate of appealability regarding Haynes' claims, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that "the prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments through the racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenge[s] as to" two potential jurors, L.V. McQueen and B. Owens. Haynes v. Quarterman (Haynes II), 526 F.3d 189, 202-03 (5th Cir. 2008). In our opinion granting Haynes habeas relief, we cited the following facts:
Two different state trial judges took turns presiding over the jury selection process in this case at the state court level. Judge Wallace presided at the beginning of the jury selection process when the jurors were addressed and questioned as a group; Judge Harper presided during the next stage in which the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually; and Judge Wallace presided again during the final stage in which peremptory challenges were exercised and when Batson challenges were made, considered, and ruled upon.
Haynes v. Quarterman (Haynes III), 561 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2009). We reasoned that the state court decision did not warrant deference pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because Judge Wallace did not personally observe the voir dire and his position for evaluating the prosecutor's demeanor-based reasons for striking the potential jurors was no better than that of a reviewing court. Id. at 541. We granted habeas relief to Haynes on the basis of his claim as to potential juror Owens, reasoning that "no court, including ours, can now engage in a proper adjudication of the defendant's demeanor-based Batson challenge as to prospective juror Owens because we will be relying solely on a paper record and would thereby contravene Batson and its clearly-established 'factual inquiry' requirement." Id. ().1
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari and reversed, "hold[ing] that no decision of this Court clearly establishes the categorical rule on which the Court of Appeals appears to have relied." Thaler v. Haynes (Haynes IV), 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1175 (2010). The Court described that apparent "categorical rule" as follows: "that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror's demeanor." Id. at 1174. Although "where the explanation for a peremptory challenge is based on a prospective juror's demeanor, the judge should take into account, among other things, any observations of the juror that the judge was able to make during the voir dire," the Court held that this did not mandate "that a [prosecutor's] demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe or cannot recall the juror's demeanor." Id. TheCourt also noted that "Snyder quoted the observation in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion), that the best evidence of the intent of the attorney exercising a [peremptory] strike is often that attorney's demeanor" while explaining the reason for the strike. Id. at 1175 (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477). Lastly, the Court remanded for us to consider "whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' determination may be overcome under the federal habeas statute's standard for reviewing a state court's resolution of questions of fact." Id.
"In a habeas appeal, this court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same standard of review that the district court applied to the state court decision." Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir. 2010). In applying AEDPA, we look to the last reasoned state-court decision on the merits of Haynes' Batson claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991) . Here, the TCCA decision on direct appeal is the last explained state-court decision on Haynes' Batson claims.
AEDPA lays out the applicable standards of review for this case. "Under AEDPA, if a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner's claims on the merits, he may receive relief in the federal courts . . . where the state court decision 'resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' . . . ." Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). "A state court's decision is 'contrary to' clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) if 'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law announced in Supreme Court cases, or . . . the state court decides a case differently thanthe Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). "Before this court may grant habeas relief under the unreasonable application clause, the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be more than merely incorrect or erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable." Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 623 (5th Cir. 2004).
"Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may not grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim already adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication 'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 845 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). This standard, like the others, is deferential to the state courts: "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Id. at 849.2
As we explained in Haynes III, a Batson challenge involves three steps:
The Supreme Court has outlined a three-step process for determining whether peremptory strikes have been applied in a discriminatory manner. First, the claimant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if this requisite showing has beenmade, the burden shifts to the party accused of discrimination to articulate race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the claimant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
561 F.3d at 539 (quoting United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1373 (5th Cir. 1993)). Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d at 1373. The trial court, at the third stage, must "decid[e] whether it was more likely than not that the [peremptory] challenge was improperly motivated." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005).
The TCCA outlined the following facts about the voir dire in this case:
The record establishes that Haynes is African-American and that, of the fifty people in the venire, seven were African-American and six appeared for voir dire. The State peremptorily struck four of the six and accepted one venirewoman, whom the defense peremptorily struck; one African-American man was seated on the jury.
Haynes I, No. 73,685 at 14. Owens and McQueen were two of the four African-American potential jurors who were peremptorily struck by the prosecutor.
The state does not contest that Haynes made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes against Owens and McQueen on the basis of race. Thus, our analysis focuses on the second and third steps of Batson.
At the second step of the Batson hearing, the prosecutor offered the following explanation for striking potential juror Owens:
During the interview, this lady's demeanor was one, I guess, best I can describe it, somewhat humorous. She never did really take on a serious attitude during the interview. She would say one thing but her body language would indicate that this is not hertrue feeling. And I'm sure that [the defense attorney] reasonably expected us to...
To continue reading
Request your trial