Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes
| Decision Date | 13 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-0311 |
| Parties | John Wesley Hebert, et al., Appellants, v. City of Fifty Lakes, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
*
Crow Wing County District Court
Lonny D. Thomas, Mark A. Severson, Thomas Law, P.A., Crosslake, Minnesota (for appellants)
Paul D. Reuvers, Susan M. Tindal, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant landowners challenge the district court's judgment dismissing their claims of trespass and ejectment against the City of Fifty Lakes. They dispute the court's conclusions that the city's trespass was permanent rather than continuing and that appellants' ejectment claim is barred by the equitable defense of laches. We affirm the judgment on appellants' trespass claim, but we reverse and remand on appellants' ejectment claim.
Appellants John Hebert and nine other landowners own six consecutive lots adjacent to the north shore of Mitchell Lake in the city. The lots were registered as Torrens properties in 1953. At that time, North Mitchell Lake Road cut through several of the lots. In 1954, a 66-foot-wide strip of land abutting the northern boundaries of the lots was dedicated and platted for reconstruction of the road. The city replaced part of the original road in 1962; although the southern boundary of the road may have been meant to coincide with the northern boundaries of lots 18-23, the road encroached into lots 18 and 19. In 1971, the city rebuilt the road again to flatten the slope of a hill and to widen the lanes. This gravel road again deviated from the plat and this time encroached onto lots 18-23. The exact encroachment differs by lot from 29 to 49 feet.
Since 1971, the city has taken steps to maintain the road, but the location of the road has not changed. This maintenance includes grading, sanding, snow removal, brushremoval, roadside mowing, ditch digging and cleaning, tree removal, and power sweeping. The road is the only access for residents living on the north shore of the lake, including appellants, and has been in continuous public use since it was built.
In 1998, the city conducted a survey of the area that demonstrated the road encroachment onto appellants' lots. One of appellants observed the encroachment when examining a copy of the survey distributed to residents at a special city meeting on the subject. Shortly thereafter, all of the appellants began demanding that the city move the road to comply with the plat. No resident complained about the road deviating from the platted area prior to 1998.
In May 2005, appellants filed the current action seeking declaratory judgment of their exclusive property rights in the encroached area, ejectment of the city from their properties, and damages for continuing, unlawful trespass. The ensuing litigation is reflected in three judgments of the district court interspersed with two decisions of this court and one of the supreme court.
The city initially moved to dismiss appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing that the property was acquired by virtue of a de facto taking and that appellants' ejectment and trespass claims were time-barred. Thereupon, appellants moved for partial summary judgment on their declaratory judgment and ejectment claims. The district court granted the city's motion, concluding that the city demonstrated a de facto taking, triggering a 15-year statute of limitations that barred compensation under a theory of inverse condemnation.
On appeal, this court concluded that the city's actions did not amount to a de facto taking and reversed the district court. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes (Hebert I), A06-215, 2007 WL 582956, at *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2007), aff'd, 744 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 2008). This court also determined that appellants' complaint sufficiently stated viable claims of continuing trespass and ejectment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at *5. The supreme court granted review and affirmed the takings issue in Hebert I, not based on the absence of a de facto taking but by clarifying that Torrens property cannot be acquired by such a taking. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes (Hebert II), 744 N.W.2d 226, 232 (Minn. 2008).
The supreme court also held that the statute of limitations did not bar an ejectment claim on this Torrens property but that, despite this matter of law, the claim was susceptible to the equitable defense of laches. Id. at 233 n.6. Finally, the court concluded that appellants' trespass claim would be barred by the statute of limitations if it were permanent and not continuing, that appellants had successfully pleaded a claim for continuing trespass, but that there remained an issue of proof whether the trespass was continuing or permanent. Id. at 233, 236. The supreme court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 236.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the city based on the city's demonstration that it validly obtained the road property through statutory dedication. The court dismissed appellants' motion that they were entitled to judgment that the city's trespass was continuing and their ejectment claim was not barred by laches.In Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes (Hebert III), 784 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. App. 2010), this court determined that statutory dedication and common law dedication are inapplicable to Torrens properties because they amount to a taking by adverse possession, and we remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 855, 857. We affirmed the district court's denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment, concluding there were still issues of material fact regarding the trespass and laches issues. Id. at 856-57.
This court's second remand was followed by a district court trial in August 2012. In its subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court concluded that the road encroachment constituted a permanent rather than a continuing trespass and, as a result, appellants' trespass claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court also ruled that appellants' claim of ejectment was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. This appeal follows.
On appeal from a judgment where there has been no motion for a new trial, as in this case, this court reviews only whether the evidence sustains the district court's finding of facts and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law and the judgment. See Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2003) (); Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (1976) (); see also City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass'n, 800 N.W.2d 165, 172 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing Alpha Real Estate, 664 N.W.2d at 309-10; Gruenhagen, 310 Minn. at 458, 246 N.W.2d at 569). We cannot set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. This court reviews de novo whether the findings of fact support a district court's conclusions of law and judgment. Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. App. 2002). At both oral arguments and in their reply brief, appellants acknowledged that they do not challenge any of the district court's factual findings; these include numerous findings supporting the district court's conclusions regarding the nature of the city's trespass.
A claim of trespass is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(3) (2012). But if a trespass is continuing rather than permanent, a party is not barred from collecting damages for the six years prior to its action for trespass, regardless of the timing of the initial invasion. Hebert II, 744 N.W.2d at 233-34. In this case, unless the city's invasion constitutes a continuing trespass, the limitations period lapsed in 1977, and appellants are barred from seeking any damages under a theory of trespass.
In Hebert II, the supreme court stated that the test to determine whether the city's claimed trespass is permanent is "whether the whole injury results from the original wrongful act—the construction of the gravel road in 1971—or from the wrongfulcontinuance of the state of facts produced by such act." Id. at 234 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). The court further explained that resolution of this issue "centers on the nature of the wrong complained of." Id. (quotation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the wrong complained of is the act of the City in constructing the gravel road, the trespass is permanent." Id. "[I]f the wrong complained of is some continuing or recurring intrusion onto the landowners' property, the trespass is continuing." Id. The supreme court also noted that whether a trespass is continuing or permanent is not "always purely a question of law." Id. at 235. Rather, the "character of the invasion . . . is essentially one of proof." Id. at 236 (quotation omitted).
After a full trial, the district court made the following findings of fact:
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