Heisler v. Heisler

• Decision Date: 10 June 1911
• Citation: 131 N.W. 676,151 Iowa 503
• Parties: HEISLER v. HEISLER ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

151 Iowa 503

131 N.W. 676

HEISLER

v.HEISLER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 10, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Butler County; C. H. Kelley, Judge.

The defendants are parents of plaintiff's former husband, and in this action, judgment for damages alleged to have been caused by the alienation of his affections was entered against them. They appeal. Reversed.

See, also, 127 N. W. 823.Dawley & Wheeler, Williamson & Willoughby, and W. T. Evans, for appellants.

Edwards & Gregory and Courtright & Arbuckle, for appellee.

LADD, J.

[1] In December, 1905, plaintiff married Willie Heisler. She left him October 2, 1907, and shortly afterwards the bonds of matrimony were severed by a decree of divorce. She claims that he once loved her, and his affections were alienated by the machinations of the defendants. They admit that the attachment existed, and assert that it had never ceased, and denied that they interfered in his affairs save as parents might. She supposed up to the final separation that his regard for her was unabated, and at the trial he testified that he loved her still. His acts, however, in falsely accusing her of accepting attentions from and of undue familiarity with other men, utterly without cause, in striking her on several occasions, and in cruelly beating her on the day of their separation, put in issue whether his affections had in fact been alienated. Appellants say that, even if the jury might have found that his affections had been alienated, the finding that this had been caused by wrongdoing on their part is not sustained by the evidence. In passing on this question, it must be borne in mind that the defendants are the parents of Willie, and, owing to this relation, had the right to counsel him in all the matters relating to his welfare, provided that in so doing they acted in good faith. The reciprocal obligations and the affection of parent and child continue through life, after as well as before marriage, and caution must be exercised lest the assertion of a supposed right of action be made to rest upon a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness of the child. There is a broad distinction between a case of this kind against the parent and one against a stranger. Parents are under obligations by the laws of nature to protect their children from injury and relieve them when in distress. Their natural affections prompt them to interest themselves in the welfare of the child. Conduct of a stranger which justly would be characterized as that of a malicious intermeddler might express but the natural impulse of parents. The law recognizes the right of father or mother to advise their son concerning his domestic affairs, even though this lead to separation or that separation be effected, without incurring liability for alienation, if the advice be given honestly with a view to the welfare of both parties. Beisel v. Gerlach, 221 Pa. 232, 60 Atl. 721, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 516;Leavell v. Leavell, 122 Mo. App. 654, 99 S. W. 460;Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93, 19 South. 955, 32 L. R. A. 623;Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468;Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280, 47 Atl. 553, 80 Am. St. Rep. 396;Barton v. Barton, 119 Mo. App. 507, 94 S. W. 574;Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 196.

[2] The motives of the parent are presumed to have been good until the contrary is made to appear, and the burden of proof is on the complainant to show, not only actual alienation of the affections, and that this was caused by the interference of the parents, but in so doing that they acted intentionally and maliciously. Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317, 33 N. E. 638, 51 Am. St. Rep. 310;Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N. E. 762, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 322; Leavell v. Leavell, supra.

[3][4][5][6][7] 2. The action is for an intentional, not merely a negligible, tort, and, in order to justify a verdict against both defendants, there must have been co-operation between them with the design to alienate Willie's affection. Where the concurrent negligence of two or more persons contribute to the harm, the tort-feasors may be jointly sued, but, where the torts are intentional and independent of each other, though their combined influence may result in injury, it seems that the liability is not joint. Barton v. Barton, supra. Even though both were sued, if a cause of action was made out against one only, the jury might have so found, and judgment have been entered accordingly. Young v. Gormley, 119 Iowa, 546, 93 N. W. 565. When the record is examined in the light of these principles, it will be found that no cause of action was made out against Conrad Heisler. Immediately after their marriage, Willie took plaintiff to the residence of defendants on their farm in Pleasant Valley. He was 22 years of age, and always had lived there. She was a year younger, had been reared in town, and for some time previous had been in charge of the local telephone office. This arrangement continued until June, when the parents moved to Parkersburg, leaving Willie, who had rented the farm, with plaintiff in undisputed possession. But, as was natural, the father and mother frequently visited the old home, the former assisting Willie at his work, and the latter helping about the house. Neither of them extended to the young wife the sympathy and encouragement which might well have been given. On the contrary, both were somewhat inclined to criticise, though neither is shown ever to have advised or even to have suggested a separation. Nor does it appear from this record that they cooperated with any such design. True, Conrad Heisler was often present and remained silent when his wife, according to plaintiff's story, gave vent to her suspicions concerning plaintiff. But as what was said required no response from him, either by way of denial or admission, an inference of acquiescence therein by him is not to be drawn. Unless the remarks were concerning a matter and so directed as naturally to call for an expression from him, no account should be taken of his omission to speak. See, Young v. Young, 8 Wash. 81, 35 Pac. 592. Possibly at the common law, Heisler might have been chargeable with what his wife did or said in his presence. See McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224, and Bethel v. Otis, 92 Iowa, 502, 61 N. W. 200, where it was conceded that the husband was responsible for the wrong of his wife done in his presence. But the matter is now controlled by statute which declares that: “For civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may be recovered from her alone, and her husband shall not be liable therefor, except in cases where he would be jointly liable with her if the marriage relation did not exist.” And...