Helena-West Helena School Dist. v. Monday

• Decision Date: 03 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1058.,04-1058.
• Citation: 204 S.W.3d 514
• Parties: HELENA-WEST HELENA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Rose MONDAY, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

204 S.W.3d 514

HELENA-WEST HELENA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Rose MONDAY, Appellee.

No. 04-1058.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 3, 2005.

Laser Law Firm, by: Dan F. Bufford and Brian A. Brown, Little Rock, for appellant.

Don R. Etherly, Helena, for appellee.

BETTY C. DICKEY, Justice.

Rose Monday sued the Helena-West Helena School District (District) for slip-and-fall injuries sustained by her son, Elijah Monday. The District filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it has immunity except to the extent that it has applicable liability insurance. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the District appeals pursuant to Ark. R.App. P. — Civ. 2(a)(10).

On January 3, 2001, as Elijah attempted to exit the District school bus, he slipped on ice that had accumulated on the steps of the bus. He suffered injuries that "necessitated the constant application of medications to relieve the pain," and has had to undergo "medical treatment by various medical providers and will require additional medical treatment into the unknown future."

Rose Monday filed a complaint in Phillips County Circuit Court on November 15, 2001, alleging negligence in failing to protect students from harmful conditions and in failing to warn students of dangerous conditions on its buses. The complaint alleged that the District "knew or should have known that the injuries suffered by Elijah Monday could occur or were about to occur." The District filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that it was immune from liability for a slip-and-fall negligence claim under Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301, which provides for only one exception: that a District is liable for its negligence to the extent that it has applicable liability insurance. The District attached an affidavit claiming that it has no general liability insurance policy that would apply to, or indemnify it for, any premises liability/slip-and-fall claim.

Monday filed a response on November 5, 2003, arguing that the District is required to have motor vehicle coverage pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301 and Ark.Code Ann. § 27-19-713 (Repl.2004), and that there were genuine issues of fact to be determined. The trial court heard arguments and on July 29, 2004, it issued an order denying summary judgment.

As a general rule, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. Ozarks Unlimited Resources Coop., Inc. v. Daniels, 333 Ark. 214, 969 S.W.2d 169 (1998); Nucor Holding Corp. v. Rinkines, 326 Ark. 217, 931 S.W.2d 426 (1996). The general rule does not apply where the refusal to grant a summary-judgment motion has the effect of determining that the appellants are not entitled to immunity from suit, as the right of immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial. Id.; Robinson v. Beaumont, 291 Ark. 477, 725 S.W.2d 839 (1987); see also Ark. R.App. P.-Civ. 2(a)(2), which provides that an appeal may be taken from an order that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which the appeal might be taken. In Robinson, this court held that the refusal to grant the motion for summary judgment amounted to "a denial of appellants' claimed defense which would have, if allowed, discontinued the action. The qualified immunity claim is a claim of right which is separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the complaint. . . ." Robinson, 291 Ark. at 482-83, 725 S.W.2d 839.

A trial court may grant summary judgment only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Harris v. City of Fort Smith, 359 Ark. 355, 197 S.W.3d 461 (2004); Craighead Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Craighead County, 352 Ark. 76, 98 S.W.3d 414 (2003); Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 76 S.W.3d 878 (2002). Once the moving party has established a prima facie case showing entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Harris, supra; Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).

The District argues that the only question before this court is whether it is entitled to claim immunity from suit, which is purely a question of law. A question of law is reviewed on appeal using a de novo standard. Cooper Realty Inv. v. Arkansas Contractors Licensing Board, 355 Ark. 156, 134 S.W.3d 1 (2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002). School districts are generally immune from liability for torts, subject to an exception where insurance coverage applies. Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301 provides:

(a) It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improvement districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their boards, commission, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance.

(b) No tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision because of the acts of its agents and employees.

The District points to Matthews v. Martin, 280 Ark. 345, 658 S.W.2d 374 (1983), where this court held that the impact of Act 165 of 1969 was to grant negligent tort immunity to all employees of the described political subdivisions. Because a political subdivision, such as a school district, can only act through its agents, the impact of Matthews was to reinforce the immunity granted by the statute. This court has, since Matthews, recognized immunity of school district employees, and of a district itself, in Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296 (1989).

In Bankston v. Pulaski County School District, 281 Ark. 476, 665 S.W.2d 859 (1984), the Pulaski County School District was sued for negligence in the construction of a house, which was built as a part of a vocational education project. This court held that the district was not liable for...