Helton v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-725,92-725 |
| Citation | 641 So.2d 146 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1581 Kris HELTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Louis Campbell, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and COPE, JJ.
On Rehearing Granted
We grant the State's motion for rehearing, withdraw the opinion dated May 11, 1993, and substitute the following opinion:
Kris Helton appeals his conviction for first degree murder. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of murdering his fiance's 22-month old son. The evidence against him was circumstantial. He contends that the evidence does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and accordingly that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted.
The principles applicable in circumstantial evidence cases are outlined in State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla.1989). There, the court said:
The law as it has been applied by this Court in reviewing circumstantial evidence cases is clear. A special standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence applies where a conviction is wholly based on circumstantial evidence. Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse.
....
... A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Consistent with the standard set forth in Lynch [v. State], [293 So.2d 44 (Fla.1974) ], if the state does not offer evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's hypothesis, "the evidence [would be] such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the [state] can be sustained under the law." 293 So.2d at 45. The state's evidence would be as a matter of law "insufficient to warrant a conviction." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.380.
It is the trial judge's proper task to review the evidence to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences. That view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state. The state is not required to "rebut conclusively every possible variation" of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Once that threshold burden is met, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The total convincing force and effect of the evidence, as well as the reasonableness of the suggested hypotheses of innocence, is for the jury to weigh under proper instructions." Bouler v. State, 389 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Moreover, "the circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense version of the facts on which the State has produced conflicting evidence, and the State, as appellee, is entitled to a view of any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict." Peterka v. State, 640 So.2d 59, 68 (Fla.1994) (citations omitted); accord Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla.1989); Fowler v. State, 492 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.1987).
Finally, as a general evidentiary principle:
Where the evidence is in conflict, it is within the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, and upon evaluating the testimony, rely upon the testimony found by it to be worthy of belief and reject such testimony found by it to be untrue.... The testimony of a single witness, even if uncorroborated and contradicted by other State witnesses, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
I.R. v. State, 385 So.2d 686, 687-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (noncircumstantial evidence case); see also Freeze v. State, 553 So.2d 750, 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). With these principles in mind, we review the evidence.
Defendant was engaged to Marcella Gunderson. They resided together in Ms. Gunderson's rental home on Little Torch Key. Defendant sold computers. Ms. Gunderson was director of a kindergarten and also baby-sat children in her home.
Ms. Gunderson had three children from a prior marriage: Matthew, age six, Michael, age four, and the victim, Marshall, age 22 months. Defendant had a good relationship with the older boys. The victim, however, did not like the defendant and would squirm and try to get away if defendant held him.
On July 31, 1991 Ms. Gunderson was at home with the children. The victim had an ear infection but was otherwise in good health. She put the victim to bed at 8:30 p.m. He was uninjured at that time. The four year old was also put to bed. Each child had a separate bedroom.
At 9:30 the defendant arrived home. By his account he had had two beers before coming home. The six year old was then put to bed and defendant had dinner. By defendant's account he consumed two or three more beers at that time. However, there is evidence which would support the conclusion that defendant had five beers after arriving home that evening. 1
Before going to bed, Ms. Gunderson checked on the children and they were all fine. The couple retired to watch TV at 11:00 p.m. Ms. Gunderson testified that she dozed off around 11:15. At 1:30 a.m. Ms. Gunderson awakened. She observed that the defendant was sitting up in bed, smoking. He had a worried look on his face. She thought the defendant was worried about his business. When she asked him what was wrong, the defendant told her that she had bumped him while sleeping, which had awakened him.
Ms. Gunderson got up to check on the children. The victim was not in his crib. Ms. Gunderson asked the defendant to help her look and went throughout the house turning on the lights. She then found that the front door to the house was standing open. In the front yard, at the bottom of the front steps, was the victim, lying face down. He was not breathing and the back of his head was soft to the touch. Defendant took the child and shook him. Ms. Gunderson took the child back. The couple attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation while the rescue squad was on the way. The child was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
After investigation, the state charged defendant with first degree murder. At trial the defendant argued that there were at least four hypotheses of innocence: that there had been an accident; that an outside intruder had committed the crime; that Ms. Gunderson's ex-husband had committed the crime; and that Ms. Gunderson herself had committed the crime. Although not argued by the defense, the state also addressed the hypothesis that the other children had committed the crime. We next consider those hypotheses.
Defendant suggested that the victim had climbed out of his crib, opened the front door, and fell off the porch, fatally injuring himself.
Assuming the child had climbed out of the crib, 2 the state adduced evidence showing that the front door was secured by two locks and a latch, and that the child could not have opened it. The front door had a conventional doorknob with a lock in it. The front door also had a deadbolt lock keyed from the outside, with a handle on the inside. Finally, the front door had a child-proof latch six feet above floor level.
The evidence showed that the victim could barely touch the inside handle of the deadbolt lock with his fingers, but could not grip or turn it. There was no way that the victim could reach the child latch six feet above floor level. Ms. Gunderson testified that all of the locks were locked from the inside on the evening in question. Further, there was other testimony that Ms. Gunderson was scrupulous about keeping the front door locked at all times.
Assuming (contrary to the evidence) that the child had somehow opened the door and reached the front porch, the medical evidence categorically refutes any theory that there was an accident. The height from the front porch to the ground was 28 inches. The medical examiner testified that the child had two extremely severe skull fractures. This would have required at least two strong blows with a blunt object and would have had to be inflicted by an adult. Given the force of the blow, the child would not be able to cry out and death would follow within a few minutes. A portion of the child's brain had been pressed through one of the skull fractures, and the child had bled extensively between the skull and scalp, resulting in the perception that the back of the child's head was soft. However, there was no external bleeding.
The medical examiner unequivocally rejected the possibility that this was an accident. According to the medical examiner, the degree of force involved would have been equivalent to a fall from a three story building, or being struck by a car going 30 miles per hour.
Plainly the jury was entitled to reject this hypothesis of innocence.
The defendant never suggested below that the four year old and six year old brothers inflicted this injury. However, the state in an abundance of caution adduced evidence that no child could have inflicted these injuries.
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