Henderson v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 119

• Decision Date: 21 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 119,119
• Citation: 150 S.E.2d 17,268 N.C. 129
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Mrs. Lillian D. HENDERSON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

Page 17

150 S.E.2d 17

268 N.C. 129

Mrs. Lillian D. HENDERSON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

No. 119.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 21, 1966.

Don V. Young, Asheville, for plaintiff H. Phillips, Asheville, for defendant appellee.

Williams, Williams & Morris and Ann H. Phillips, Asheville, for defendant appellee.

BRANCH, Justice.

Plaintiff assigns as error the granting of judgment of nonsuit. The policy here involved provides coverage 'against loss resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained during the term of this policy, And effected solely through accidental means.' (Emphasis ours).

We are cognizant of the well-settled law in this state that 'since insurance policies are prepared by the insurer, they must be construed liberally in favor of insured and strictly against insurer,' Barker v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305, but that the rule of liberal construction does not justify the courts in enlarging the terms of the policy beyond the meaning of the language of the policy. Weiss v. Pacific Mut. Life Insurance Co., 215 N.C. 230, 1 S.E.2d 560.

The contract must be construed as the parties have made it. Scarboro v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 242 N.C. 444, 88 S.E.2d 133, 54 A.L.R.2d 407.

In order to repel the defendant's motion for nonsuit the plaintiff must bring the insured's death within the coverage provision above quoted.

It now seems to be well-settled law in this state that our courts have drawn a distinction between 'accident' and 'accidental means,' on the theory that although the results of an intentional act may be an accident, the act itself, that is, the cause, where intended, is not an 'accidental means,' that where an unusual or unexpected result occurs by reason of the doing by the insured of an intentional act, with no mischance, slip or mishap occurring in doing the act itself, the ensuing death or injury is not caused by 'accidental means.'

In the case of Skillman v. Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Co., 258 N.C. 1, 127 S.E.2d 789, the evidence tended to show that insured was suffering from hypertension, and while driving his car along a straight highway he ran off the highway and into a river. The policy sued on provided for payment of loss 'upon receipt by the Company of due proof that the death of insured resulted, directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury sustained solely through external, violent and Accidental means.' (Emphasis ours). Denny, C.J., speaking for the Court in this case, said:

'This Court has consistently held that there is a distinct difference in the meaning of the terms 'accidental death' and 'death by external accidental means.' In Fletcher v. Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687, Barnhill, J., later C.J., said: "Accidental' means that which happens by chance or fortuitously without intent or design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. 29 Am.Jur., 706--707, sec. 931. 'Accidental means' refers to the occurrence or happening which produces the result and not to the result. That is, 'accidental' is descriptive of the term 'means'. The motivating, operative and causal factor must be accidental in the sense that is unusual, unforeseen and unexpected. Under the majority view the emphasis is upon the accidental character of the causation--not upon the accidental nature of the ultimate sequence of the chain of causation.' See also Slaughter v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 250 N.C. 265, 108 S.E.2d 438, and cf. Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173.'

The case of Langley v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 459, 135 S.E.2d 38, was a case in which the evidence tended to show that the...