Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 19 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-689,90-689
• Parties: 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,985, 2 A.D. Cases 449 HENKEL CORPORATION, Appellee, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant, and Stanley Deck, Respondent.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 806

471 N.W.2d 806

60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,985, 2 A.D. Cases 449

HENKEL CORPORATION, Appellee, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant and Stanley Deck, Respondent.

No. 90-689.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 19, 1991.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen. and Teresa Baustian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Larry L. Shepler, Davenport, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The Iowa Civil Rights Commission appeals from a district court ruling on petition for judicial review reversing the commission's final decision and dismissing Stanley Deck's complaint under Iowa Code chapter 601A (1989). We affirm.

Stanley Deck was an employee of Henkel Corporation in Keokuk, Iowa, from March 1980 until his discharge in January 1985. Deck first worked for Henkel in the area of sanitation. He was subsequently transferred to general plant work and then to the vitamin department.

In April 1983, Deck suffered a mental breakdown which led to repeated hospitalizations and treatment during the remainder of 1983 and into 1984. Deck understood the diagnosis of his condition to be mixed neurosis, anxiety, and depression. In August 1983, Deck applied for, and eventually received, social security disability benefits because of his condition. Deck remained absent from work after his mental breakdown and did not return to work until sometime in late August or early September 1984.

In June 1984, Henkel informed Deck that his employment would be terminated because of his protracted absence from work. Deck filed a grievance concerning his termination. An agreement was eventually worked out between Henkel and Deck's union which set forth a number of conditions governing Deck's return to work. The parties agreed to accept a psychiatrist's opinion as to whether Deck could be re-employed safely for an appropriate trial work period. If Deck had a relapse or recurrence of illness during the trial period, he would be terminated.

In August 1984, Deck reported to a psychiatrist pursuant to the agreement. The psychiatrist recommended that Deck be returned to his usual employment. Deck returned to work and began a clean-up and supply job in the starch-gluten department. In September, Deck broke his foot at work. Deck returned to work sometime in November 1984.

On December 3, 1984, one week after he had been back on the job, Deck was assigned to begin training for the assistant operator's job, the next higher position in the starch-gluten department. Under the terms of the union contract, all employees were required to train so that they could handle at least the next two more skilled positions in their department.

Before reaching the halfway point of his training period, Deck approached his supervisor and expressed a desire to be transferred out of the starch-gluten department. During this conversation the supervisor encouraged Deck to stick with his training and assured him that all necessary training would be provided. A written request for transfer was prepared but no lateral moves were available within the company.

Deck completed the formal training and on December 9, 1984, was scheduled to perform the assistant operator's job on a solo basis. Deck approached the foreman at mid-morning and reported that he felt ill and requested permission to leave the plant and go home. Deck was encouraged by the foreman to remain at the plant, even if that meant doing some other work during the balance of the shift. The supervisor also offered Deck additional time to train and learn the job if that was necessary. Deck declined that offer indicating that he would not be able to perform the job and left the facility.

On December 10, 1984, Deck was suspended from his job. Henkel claimed the suspension was based on safety concerns for other employees and Deck's numerous statements that indicated he did not believe he was capable of performing the assistant operator's job. Through the course of a subsequent grievance procedure, the suspension was converted to a termination. The union ultimately denied Deck's grievance.

Unsuccessful in his attempts to grieve his suspension and termination, Deck filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in May 1985 alleging that Henkel illegally discriminated against him on the basis of mental disability in violation of Iowa Code chapter 601A.

Following a hearing, the administrative law judge issued a proposed decision determining that Henkel did not commit an illegal discriminatory act when it terminated Deck.

In April 1989, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission reversed the administrative law judge. The commission found that Henkel discriminated against Deck by suspending and terminating him because of his disability in violation of Iowa Code section 601A.6. The commission awarded Deck back pay and $5000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. Henkel filed a petition for judicial review.

Upon judicial review, the district court reversed the commission, determining that Deck was neither a disabled person subject to protection under Iowa Code section 601A.6 nor qualified for the job from which he was discharged. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission has filed this appeal.

I. Our review of the district court's disposition of this case is clearly limited to the correction of legal errors. See, e.g., Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1987). In deciding whether the district court correctly applied the law, we examine the record before the agency and look to the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court. E.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Iowa 1983).

Iowa Code section 601A.6 prohibits, as an unfair and discriminatory practice, the discharge of any employee because of the employee's disability, unless the discharge was based upon the nature of the occupation. To establish a claim for disability discrimination, the aggrieved employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1983). To do this, the employee must establish:

1) that he belonged to a group protected by Iowa Code Chapter 601A (that he had a disability within the meaning of Iowa Code Sections 601A.6(1)(a) and 601A.2(4);

2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged;

3) that, despite his qualifications he was terminated; and

4) that, after his termination, the employer hired a person not in the employee's protected class or retained persons with comparable or lesser qualifications who are not in a protected group.

Trobaugh v. Hy-Vee Stores, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 1986).

Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. If this burden is carried, the presumption of discrimination drops and the employee must then show that the employer's justification for action was pretextual and that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer. Wing v. Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 426 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa App.1988). The employee bears the ultimate burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination and that burden never shifts to the employer. Id. at 178.

II. The threshold inquiry is whether Deck is a disabled person subject to the protection of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Iowa Code section 601A.2(4) defines "disability" as "the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap ...." Further content is given to this definition by administrative rules. Iowa Administrative Code section 161-8.26(1) defines a "substantially handicapped person," in part, as "any person who has a ... mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (or) has a record of such an impairment ...." Section 161-8.26(3) of the administrative code defines "major life activities" as "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, ... learning, and working."

In determining that Deck was not a disabled...