Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1981
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HENRY F. RAAB CONNECTICUT, INC. v. J. W. FISHER COMPANY.

Page 834

438 A.2d 834

183 Conn. 108

HENRY F. RAAB CONNECTICUT, INC. v. J. W. FISHER COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 9, 1980.

Decided Feb. 10, 1981.

Richard E. MacLean, Norwalk, with whom, on the brief, were James M. Gartland and Douglas C. Mintz, Norwalk, for appellant (defendant).

Gordon R. Erickson, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY, ARMENTANO and WRIGHT, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's granting of an application brought under General Statutes § 49-37 ¹ ordering the dissolution of a mechanic's lien upon the substitution of a surety bond.

Certain factual circumstances are necessary to set out the background of this appeal. On December 26, 1979, the defendant, J. W. Fisher Co. (Fisher), caused a mechanic's lien to be filed in the Shelton land records against real estate owned by the Bridgeport Hydraulic Company (Hydraulic). The lien was filed to secure Fisher's claim against the plaintiff, Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. (Raab), for services rendered and materials furnished Raab by Fisher while Fisher was a subcontractor for Raab on Hydraulic's Trap Falls Reservoir construction project in Shelton. Turner Construction Company (Turner) was the general contractor on this project. After Fisher filed its mechanic's lien, Turner withheld $50,000 from Raab.

On January 23, 1980, Hydraulic, as owner of the liened real estate, made an application under General Statutes § 49-35a ² to the Superior Court at Stamford for the discharge or reduction of the mechanic's lien. Raab, as well as Turner, was cited in as a party defendant in the Stamford application. On February 29, 1980, the Stamford application was denied. At that time the court overruled Hydraulic's claim that the Raab-Turner agreement waived all rights of Fisher as to mechanics' liens. Hydraulic appealed to this court from that ruling, but withdrew its appeal on April 1, 1980.

On March 10, 1980, Raab made application under General Statutes § 49-37(a) to the Superior Court at Bridgeport for an order dissolving the mechanic's lien upon the substitution of a bond with surety. Fisher was given notice of the application and cited in as a defendant. After a hearing, the court, on March 24, 1980, granted Raab's application and entered an order dissolving the mechanic's lien upon the substitution of a bond with surety. ³ Fisher has appealed from the judgment rendered on the Bridgeport application.

On appeal Fisher claims: (1) that the Bridgeport application should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the pendency of the Stamford matter "involving the same parties, transactions and issues of fact and law," and (2) that the Bridgeport application should have been denied because it did not comply with General Statutes § 49-37(a) inasmuch as Raab was not a "person interested" in the real estate upon which Fisher's mechanic's lien had been placed. We cannot accept either of Fisher's claims.

The first claim of the defendant is not properly one of subject matter jurisdiction. " 'Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power (of the court) to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.' " (Citation omitted.) Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 552, 106 A. 822 (1919); see E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 127 Conn. 415, 420, 17 A.2d 525 (1941). "A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it." Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979). Although the defendant articulates its first claim as one of subject matter jurisdiction, its brief appears to recognize that there was subject matter jurisdiction. The gravamen of its claim really is, as its brief says: "(T)he pendency of a prior action between the same parties involving the same issues and transaction should preclude the (Bridgeport) court from exercising the jurisdiction it ordinarily would have over the subject matter of such an application, and for that reason the court below was incompetent to entertain the action for discharge of the mechanic's lien." We do not agree.

" 'The pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties, brought to obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious.' This is 'a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction.' Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 494 (1853); Cahill v. Cahill, 76 Conn. 542, 547, 57 Atl. 284 (1904)." Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank & Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 392, 185 A. 82 (1936); see Zachs v. Public Utilities Commission, 171 Conn. 387, 391-92, 370 A.2d 984 (1976). "The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one 'of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law ....' Hatch v. Spofford (supra)." Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank & Trust Co., supra, 121 Conn. 393, 185 A. 82. The Stamford application was brought under § 49-35a and sought the reduction or discharge of the mechanic's lien. The only party who can bring an application under § 49-35a is "the owner of the real estate" and the relief available is a determination "whether the lien or liens should be discharged or reduced...."

The Bridgeport application was brought under another statute, i.e., General Statutes § 49-37(a), and sought the dissolution of the mechanic's lien upon the substitution of a bond with sufficient surety. This relief is not provided by § 49-35a. Also, Raab, because it was not an "owner of the real estate" liened could not have brought the application under § 49-35a. The purposes of §§ 49-35a and 49-37(a) are separate and distinct as their language indicates. Despite the fact that the same lien is involved in both applications, the issues to be determined under an application brought under each statute are also different as this case demonstrates. Finally, in the present case, the parties to each application were not the same. ⁴ For these reasons, the Bridgeport application was not required to be dismissed under the "another action pending" plea in abatement rationale articulated in such cases as Zachs v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, and Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank & Trust Co., supra.

Moreover, even if that approach were arguably applicable to the present circumstances, a refusal to dismiss the Bridgeport application would be proper on another ground. As we have already observed, the rule referred to in Zachs and Dettenborn forbidding the second action is not one of " 'unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law' "; see, e.g., Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, supra; Hatch v. Spofford, supra. See also 1 Stephenson, Conn.Civ.Proc. (2d Ed.) § 104. Under its contract with Turner, Raab was obligated to cause any mechanic's lien filed against the land "to be satisfied, removed or discharged at its (Raab's) own expense by bond, payment or otherwise within ten (10) days from the date of the filing thereof ...." The contract goes on to provide that, upon Raab's failing to do so "Turner shall have the right, in addition to all other rights and remedies provided under this Agreement and other Contract Documents or by law, to cause such liens ... to be satisfied, removed or discharged by whatever means Turner chooses, at the entire cost and expense of the Subcontractor (such cost and expense to include legal fees and disbursements)." At the time Raab brought the Bridgeport application, Turner was withholding $50,000 from Raab. Under these circumstances, where the institution and maintenance of the Bridgeport application could not be viewed as oppressive and vexatious, the rule forbidding the second action does not apply.

We next take up Fisher's claim that the Bridgeport application should have been denied because Raab was not a proper party under § 49-37(a) to bring the Bridgeport application since it was not a "person interested" in the real estate upon which Fisher's mechanic's lien had been placed. Fisher argues that Raab, as a subcontractor, even with the contract with Turner, "has no equitable or legal claim to the subject property ... and thus has no rights which are prejudiced by an encumbrance on the title to the land." We disagree.

"We have recognized the remedial intent of the law governing a mechanic's lien, which is the creature of statute, and have consistently construed the statute 'so as to reasonably and fairly carry out its remedial intent.' Parsons v. Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 748, 120 A. 505 (1923); City Lumber Co. v. Borsuk, 131 Conn. 640, 645, 41 A.2d 775 (1945)." Roundhouse Construction Corporation v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 168 Conn. 371, 385, 362 A.2d 778, vacated, 423 U.S. 809, 96 S.Ct. 20, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), on remand, 170 Conn. 155, 365 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976); see also Purcell, Inc. v. Libbey, 111 Conn. 132, 136, 149 A. 225 (1930). An examination of the pertinent statutes in our statutory scheme indicates that the legislative intent in enacting § 49-37(a) was to enable the owner or any person "interested" in the property to obtain a dissolution of the mechanic's lien so long as the lienor's rights are not prejudiced in doing so. See Six Carpenters, Inc. v. Beach Carpenters Corporation, 172 Conn. 1, 6, 372 A.2d 123 (1976). Accordingly, while the statutory provisions "are designed to facilitate the transfer of...