Henry v. Com.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-SC-000767-DG.,2006-SC-000767-DG. |
| Citation | 275 S.W.3d 194 |
| Parties | Kareem Ali HENRY, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
When Louisville Metro police officers apprehended Kareem Henry outside a service station, they had reason to believe that he had, a few minutes before, discarded a handgun in the vacant lot adjacent to the store. Having frisked and secured Henry, one of the officers asked him, three times, "Where is the gun?" Henry made potentially incriminating responses and later, facing assault, burglary, and illegal possession of a firearm charges, he moved to suppress the statements as having been elicited without the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In separate rulings, two divisions of the Jefferson Circuit Court relied on the "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule as announced by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) and denied Henry's motion to suppress. Henry then pled guilty to assault, burglary, drug and paraphernalia possession, tampering with physical evidence, and to two counts of illegal possession of a firearm, but reserved his right to appeal the suppression rulings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted Henry's petition for discretionary review primarily to consider the lower courts' adoption and application of the Quarles public safety exception. We now affirm all convictions except one of the firearm possession convictions and hold that the public safety exception recognized in Quarles is consonant with our own Kentucky constitutional protections. We reverse, however, the second firearm possession conviction as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The record indicates that on January 14, 2004, Louisville Metro police received a complaint from one of Henry's female acquaintances that he, Henry, had grown angry when she asked him to leave her apartment and had struck her on the forehead with a gun. The victim named Henry as her assailant, identified his photograph, and described his vehicle, a maroon 1990 Plymouth. The next day two officers familiar with Henry went to a Louisville motel where he was known to have recently occupied a room. They recognized Henry's car in the motel parking lot, and as they were inquiring of the manager whether Henry was a guest, a motel security guard interrupted to say that he had just chased Henry from the property and had seen him as he ran to his car throw what appeared to be a handgun over the fence that divided the motel from a neighboring service station. Both businesses were located near the intersection of Bardstown Road and Goldsmith Lane in Louisville, a busy commercial area. The officers promptly reported the abandoned weapon to the police dispatcher and pursued Henry a short distance in the direction the guard had indicated.
Having failed to catch sight of Henry or his vehicle, the officers were returning to the motel when they observed Henry's car pull into the service station and saw Henry exit the vehicle and make his way around the side of the building toward the open area and the fence where he was said to have thrown the gun. In a matter of moments the officers had pulled into the service station; apprehended, frisked, and handcuffed Henry; and secured him in the back of their cruiser. It was then that one of the officers, without reciting the Miranda warnings, asked Henry where the gun was. Henry said that he had two guns, a .45 and a .22. The officer then asked where the gun was he had thrown over the fence, and Henry denied having thrown a gun and added that he no longer had the .45, that he had "put it up." In response to a third request for the gun's location, Henry said that he had sold it. During the frisk, the officer discovered a crack pipe in Henry's pocket, and a subsequent warrants check revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest. For both reasons, the officers formally arrested Henry, and pursuant to the arrest they searched the passenger compartment of his car. There they found and seized .45 caliber bullets. About four hours later, assisting officers found a matching .45 caliber handgun near the fence in the area the security guard had identified.
Based on these facts, on February 25, 2004, a Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Henry (04-CR-00658) for the January 14th assault, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, and for tampering with evidence. The case was assigned to Division Two of the Jefferson Circuit Court. As it happened, the .45 caliber handgun had the same serial number as a gun that had been stolen on January 7, 2004 from the home of another of Henry's acquaintances. Consequently, on March 18, 2004, Henry was separately indicted (04-CR-00884) for burglary and was again charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. That case was assigned to Jefferson Circuit Court Division Fifteen (now Division Twelve). In both cases Henry moved to suppress his statements about the gun due to the absence of Miranda warnings. In the assault case, he also moved to suppress the bullets seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless car search was not justified as a search incident to his arrest. When those motions were denied Henry entered a combined guilty plea to the charges in both cases, in exchange for which the Commonwealth recommended concurrent sentences totaling ten years in prison. In both cases, judgments in accord with that recommendation were entered on February 10, 2005.
On appeal, Henry renews his claim that his statements and the evidence seized from his vehicle should be suppressed and, in addition, contends that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy bars his being convicted twice for the illegal possession of the .45 caliber handgun. We agree with this last contention and remand to the Jefferson Circuit Court for an appropriate modification of the judgment in the second case involving the burglary (04-CR-00884). We begin with the suppression issues, however, and conclude that the trial courts correctly declined to suppress both Henry's statements and the evidence seized from his car.
As the parties correctly observe, our review of a suppression ruling
requires a two-step determination.... The factual findings by the trial court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the application of the law to those facts is conducted under de novo review.
Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky.2007) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky.2004)). Here, although Henry's suppression hearing description of his arrest differed in certain particulars from that of the arresting officer, there is no real dispute about the pertinent facts as summarized above. The officers had warning that Henry had thrown a gun into the area they later saw him approaching — an area open to pedestrian traffic between two businesses — and immediately upon apprehending Henry one of the officers, without first giving the Miranda warnings, asked him where the gun was. Henry contends that the apparent Miranda violation requires that his unwarned statements be suppressed. We disagree.
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of course, Henry has a right not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). To protect that right and to guard against the compulsion inherent in custodial circumstances the United States Supreme Court established, in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the now familiar rule that a defendant's statements during custodial interrogation will generally not be admissible at trial unless prior to the statements the defendant was advised of Miranda's four basic warnings: (1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Dickerson v. United States, supra.
In New York v. Quarles, supra, however, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the Miranda warning requirement. In Quarles, a police officer was attempting to apprehend a rape suspect, Quarles, believed to be armed, in a grocery store. The suspect fled to the back of the store, and the officer momentarily lost sight of him. When moments later Quarles was captured, his shoulder holster was empty, and without giving the Miranda warnings, the officer asked him where the gun was. Quarles indicated a nearby box, where, indeed, the officer found a gun. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the gun and Quarles's pre-warning statements as inadmissible under Miranda. The United States Supreme Court reversed. It held
that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. ... Whatever the motivation of the individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Carolina v. Commonwealth
...Miranda warnings was recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). See also Henry v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194 (Ky.2008) (adult defendant's pre-warning statements admissible where defendant was believed to have abandoned a gun in an area accessib......
-
Smith v. Com.
... ... Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), which we recently adopted in Henry v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194 (Ky.2008) ... In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to 312 S.W.3d 360 the Miranda warning requirement which would allow the admission of a statement made in response to a custodial interrogation if the ... ...
-
Parker v. Commonwealth, 2011–SC–000662–DG.
...probable cause and even if the occupant could not gain access to the vehicle at the time of search. Id.; see also Henry v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194 (Ky.2008) (holding that a search of defendant's vehicle was a valid search incident to defendant's arrest, even though defendant was secure......
-
Jennings v. Commonwealth
...to the warrant requirement in Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101, 106-107 (Ky. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Henry v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194 (Ky. 2008). A search may be as thorough as a magistrate could authorize via a search warrant, including all compartments of the automo......