Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo

• Decision Date: 14 May 1996
• Docket Number: HERNANDEZ-GOME,No. CV-93-0202-PR,P,CV-93-0202-PR
• Citation: 185 Ariz. 509,917 P.2d 238
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2731, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,593 Amparoetitioner, v. Hon. John S. LEONARDO, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent, VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, a Foreign Corporation, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 238

917 P.2d 238

185 Ariz. 509, 64 USLW 2731, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,593

Amparo HERNANDEZ-GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. Hon. John S. LEONARDO, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, a Foreign Corporation, Real Parties in Interest.

No. CV-93-0202-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

May 14, 1996.

Haralson, Kinerk & Morey, P.C. by Gregory G. Wasley, D. Dale Haralson, Tucson, for Petitioner.

Fennemore Craig, P.C. by Timothy Berg, William T. Burghart, Joseph P. Mikitish, Phoenix, for Real Parties in Interest.

FELDMAN, Chief Justice.

Amparo Hernandez-Gomez (Plaintiff) was rendered quadriplegic on November 6, 1988, when the 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit in which Plaintiff was a passenger veered off the road and flipped over, smashing her head and shoulders against the car's roof. Plaintiff alleges that the design of the Rabbit's occupant restraint system failed to provide adequate protection in foreseeable rollover accidents. The restraint system for the car's right front passenger seat consisted of a shoulder belt that automatically moved into place diagonally across the chest when the door was shut, a knee bolster, and a seat designed to prevent the occupant from submarining under the dashboard in a head-on collision. Plaintiff claims that the lack of a manual lap belt made the car's design defective and unreasonably dangerous to its occupants, thereby enhancing her injuries.

The trial court granted Volkswagen's motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the Rabbit's passive restraint system complied with FMVSS 208 (Standard 208), a federal motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment performance standard, and that Plaintiff's claim was therefore preempted by the Safety Act. Plaintiff sought relief from the trial court's order by bringing a special action in the court of appeals, which declined jurisdiction. This court then granted review to answer the fundamental question of whether an automobile manufacturer can be liable under state tort law for a product design defect when that design is permitted by the Safety Act's standards. Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo, 180 Ariz. 297, 298, 884 P.2d 183, 184 (1994) (Hernandez-Gomez I ). Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), we answered this question in the affirmative.

The United States Supreme Court granted Volkswagen's petition for certiorari, vacated our opinion, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court's intervening decision in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Hernandez-Gomez, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1819, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995) (Hernandez-Gomez II ).

On remand, we requested additional briefing from counsel and heard argument on the question of whether our holding in Hernandez-Gomez I could stand in light of Myrick. Accordingly, we begin with a summary of our previous opinion and an analysis of Myrick.

DISCUSSION

A. Hernandez-Gomez I

In Cipollone, the Supreme Court stated:

If Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, ... there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws....

505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Relying primarily on this principle, we determined in Hernandez-Gomez I that federal preemption analysis was limited to ascertaining a federal statute's express preemptive reach and held:

1. Our analysis of preemption by the Safety Act ends with a reading of the text of the preemption clause and its companion savings clause. Hernandez-Gomez I, 180 Ariz. at 305, 884 P.2d at 191.

2. The two clauses work together to forbid states from enacting conflicting regulatory standards but allow common-law tort actions. Id.

We therefore concluded that Plaintiff's action for defective design of the restraint system was not preempted by the express terms of the Safety Act even though that type of design was permitted by Standard 208. Because we believed that the reach of the statute's preemption clause was limited to the text of that clause and the savings clause, we did not address the issue of implied preemption. See id. at 304, 884 P.2d at 190 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618).

B. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick

Myrick modifies our reading of Cipollone. After Myrick, Cipollone appears to stand for the proposition that the limited reach of an express preemption provision does not preclude a finding of implied preemption, although it does raise a rebuttable presumption that a claim is not preempted. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 910, 133 L.Ed.2d 841 (1996) ("inference discussed in Cipollone is rebuttable") (citing Myrick ). As Myrick explains, the presence of an explicit statement limiting Congress' preemptive intent does "not obviate the need for courts to examine the [implied] preemptive effects of a statute." Myrick, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1341 n. 5 (11th Cir.1995), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 752 (1996) ("the Supreme Court recently explained that implied preemption is sometimes appropriate despite the existence of [a limited] preemption provision") (citing Myrick ). Nonetheless, the text of a preemptive clause is still of great importance. Thus, before we can determine whether a particular state common-law claim is preempted by federal law, we must first look to the language of the statute to ascertain its explicit preemptive intent; under Cipollone, the explicit "pre-emptive scope of the [statute is] governed by [its] language." Myrick, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1487.

C. Express preemption

Under Myrick, we must determine 1) whether Congress considered the issue of preemption when enacting the Safety Act; 2) whether it included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue; and 3) whether any such provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority.

1. Has Congress considered the issue of preemption and its extent?

Review of the Safety Act's legislative history clearly shows that Congress considered the issue of preemption. The Senate Report states:

Federal minimum safety standards need not be interpreted as restricting State common law standards of care. Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any person from product liability at common law.... State standards are preempted only if they differ from Federal standards applicable to the particular aspect of the vehicle or item of vehicle equipment.

S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2720. The bill's sponsor, Senator Magnuson, further remarked:

Compliance with Federal standards would not necessarily shield any person from broad liability at the common law. The common law on product liability still remains as it was.

112 Cong.Rec. 14230 (1966). The House committee report also noted:

Common law liability.--Section 108(c) of the reported bill provides that compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard does not exempt a person from any liability under common law.

It is intended, and this subsection specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability. [Even those persons exempt from compliance with these safety standards] under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section will not [be] excuse[d] ... from otherwise applicable legal liability.

H.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966) (emphasis added).

We are mindful of the fact that the expressed intent of several congressmen is not necessarily determinative, and that these "unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws." See Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501, 108 S.Ct. 1350, 1354, 99 L.Ed.2d 582 (1988). We believe, however, that when the sponsors of a bill and the very committees considering that bill tell Congress and the public what they intended to accomplish with a specific provision of that bill, such expressed intentions can be useful to clarify any ambiguity in the meaning of the enacted legislation.

2. Did Congress include in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing the extent of preemption?

Section 1392(d) preempts, "with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any [State] safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (emphasis added). Additionally, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k), the Safety Act's savings clause, which provides that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." Hence, Congress has not only considered the issue of preemption but also has included provisions explicitly limiting its extent.

3. Do the provisions addressing preemption provide a reliable indicium of congressional intent?

The extensive legislative history addressing the issue of preemption, the clearly articulated and explicit provisions in both the savings and preemption clauses of the Safety Act, and Congress' inclusion of the term "common law" in the savings clause provide an uncommonly reliable indication of Congress'...